Files
OwnCord/Server/api/invite_handler.go
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 6afa9e974c refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.

- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
  Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
  Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
  db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
  RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
  signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
  the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
  context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
  and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
  ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
  RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
  ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
  invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
  * voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
    retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
  * rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
  * post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
    security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
  * all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
    login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
  * admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
    the backup list presented as restorable)
  * post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
    fan out when the sender disconnects)
  * hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
    values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
  config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
  instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.

Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 17:03:52 +02:00

131 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
"github.com/owncord/server/service"
)
// createInviteRequest is the JSON body for POST /api/v1/invites.
type createInviteRequest struct {
MaxUses int `json:"max_uses"`
ExpiresInHours int `json:"expires_in_hours"`
}
// inviteResponse is the API shape for an invite.
type inviteResponse struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Code string `json:"code"`
MaxUses *int `json:"max_uses"`
Uses int `json:"uses"`
ExpiresAt *string `json:"expires_at"`
Revoked bool `json:"revoked"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
}
// MountInviteRoutes registers invite endpoints on the given router.
// All routes require authentication and MANAGE_INVITES permission.
func MountInviteRoutes(r chi.Router, database *db.DB, svc *service.Services) {
r.Route("/api/v1/invites", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(AuthMiddleware(database))
r.Use(RequirePermission(permissions.ManageInvites))
r.Post("/", handleCreateInvite(svc))
r.Get("/", handleListInvites(svc))
r.Delete("/{code}", handleRevokeInvite(svc))
})
}
// handleCreateInvite processes POST /api/v1/invites.
func handleCreateInvite(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req createInviteRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
if err != io.EOF {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "malformed JSON body",
})
return
}
req = createInviteRequest{}
}
user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if !ok || user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "not authenticated",
})
return
}
// H-4: Cap invite expiration to 30 days.
if req.ExpiresInHours > service.MaxInviteExpiryHours() {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST",
Message: fmt.Sprintf("expires_in_hours cannot exceed %d (30 days)", service.MaxInviteExpiryHours()),
})
return
}
inv, err := svc.Invites.CreateInvite(r.Context(), user.ID, req.MaxUses, req.ExpiresInHours)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(w, err)
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, toInviteResponse(inv))
}
}
// handleListInvites processes GET /api/v1/invites.
func handleListInvites(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
invites, err := svc.Invites.ListInvites(r.Context())
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(w, err)
return
}
resp := make([]inviteResponse, 0, len(invites))
for _, inv := range invites {
resp = append(resp, toInviteResponse(inv))
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
}
// handleRevokeInvite processes DELETE /api/v1/invites/:code.
func handleRevokeInvite(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
code := chi.URLParam(r, "code")
if err := svc.Invites.RevokeInvite(r.Context(), code); err != nil {
writeServiceError(w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
}
// toInviteResponse converts a db.Invite to the API response shape.
func toInviteResponse(inv *db.Invite) inviteResponse {
var maxUses *int
if inv.MaxUses != nil {
v := *inv.MaxUses
maxUses = &v
}
return inviteResponse{
ID: inv.ID,
Code: inv.Code,
MaxUses: maxUses,
Uses: inv.Uses,
ExpiresAt: inv.ExpiresAt,
Revoked: inv.Revoked,
CreatedAt: inv.CreatedAt,
}
}