Files
OwnCord/Server/ws/livekit_webhook.go
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 6afa9e974c refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.

- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
  Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
  Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
  db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
  RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
  signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
  the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
  context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
  and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
  ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
  RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
  ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
  invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
  * voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
    retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
  * rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
  * post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
    security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
  * all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
    login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
  * admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
    the backup list presented as restorable)
  * post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
    fan out when the sender disconnects)
  * hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
    values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
  config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
  instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.

Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 17:03:52 +02:00

240 lines
8.4 KiB
Go

package ws
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/livekit/protocol/auth"
"github.com/livekit/protocol/livekit"
"github.com/livekit/protocol/webhook"
)
// webhookMaxBodyBytes bounds the webhook request body to prevent unbounded
// reads from an unauthenticated caller.
const webhookMaxBodyBytes = 64 * 1024
// NewLiveKitWebhookHandler returns an HTTP handler that processes LiveKit
// webhook events. It synchronises LiveKit room state back into OwnCord's
// voice_states DB — primarily for crash recovery when a participant
// disconnects from LiveKit without sending a WS voice_leave.
//
// Speaker detection is handled client-side via LiveKit's
// RoomEvent.ActiveSpeakersChanged (lower latency than webhooks).
func (h *Hub) NewLiveKitWebhookHandler(apiKey, apiSecret string) http.HandlerFunc {
// The SDK receiver verifies the token signature AND that the token's sha256
// claim matches the request body hash, binding verification to the body so
// a captured token cannot be replayed against a forged payload.
provider := auth.NewSimpleKeyProvider(apiKey, apiSecret)
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Check Authorization header BEFORE reading the body to avoid
// allocating memory for unauthenticated requests.
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: missing Authorization header")
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Bound the body before the SDK reads it (ReceiveWebhookEvent uses an
// unbounded io.ReadAll internally).
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, webhookMaxBodyBytes)
// ReceiveWebhookEvent verifies the JWT signature, the token's body-hash
// claim, and the exp/nbf claims, then parses the payload. This replaces
// the previous manual ParseAPIToken/Verify sequence, which was not bound
// to the request body (forgery/replay).
event, err := webhook.ReceiveWebhookEvent(r, provider)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: verification failed", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
slog.Info("livekit webhook received",
"event", event.Event,
"room", event.GetRoom().GetName(),
"participant", event.GetParticipant().GetIdentity(),
)
switch event.Event {
case "participant_joined":
h.handleWebhookParticipantJoined(r.Context(), event)
case "participant_left":
h.handleWebhookParticipantLeft(r.Context(), event)
default:
slog.Debug("livekit webhook: unhandled event", "event", event.Event)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
}
// parseParticipantIdentity extracts a user ID and optional join token from a
// LiveKit participant identity formatted as "user-{id}" or
// "user-{id}:{joinToken}".
func parseParticipantIdentity(identity string) (int64, string, error) {
if !strings.HasPrefix(identity, "user-") {
return 0, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid identity format: %s", identity)
}
body := identity[5:]
idPart, joinToken, _ := strings.Cut(body, ":")
userID, err := strconv.ParseInt(idPart, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return 0, "", err
}
return userID, joinToken, nil
}
// parseRoomChannelID extracts a channel ID from a LiveKit room name
// formatted as "channel-{id}".
func parseRoomChannelID(roomName string) (int64, error) {
if !strings.HasPrefix(roomName, "channel-") {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid room name format: %s", roomName)
}
return strconv.ParseInt(roomName[8:], 10, 64)
}
func (h *Hub) handleWebhookParticipantJoined(ctx context.Context, event *livekit.WebhookEvent) {
p := event.GetParticipant()
room := event.GetRoom()
if p == nil || room == nil {
return
}
userID, joinToken, err := parseParticipantIdentity(p.Identity)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_joined bad identity",
"identity", p.Identity, "error", err)
return
}
channelID, err := parseRoomChannelID(room.Name)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_joined bad room",
"room", room.Name, "error", err)
return
}
slog.Info("livekit webhook: participant joined",
"user_id", userID,
"channel_id", channelID,
"room", room.Name)
// Validate that the participant has a matching voice_states row (BUG-127).
// A replayed token from a previous session will not have a matching row,
// so we remove the rogue participant from LiveKit.
if h.db != nil {
state, stateErr := h.db.GetVoiceState(ctx, userID)
if stateErr != nil || state == nil || state.ChannelID != channelID {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: rogue participant_joined — no matching voice state, removing",
"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
if h.livekit != nil {
if rmErr := h.livekit.RemoveParticipant(ctx, channelID, userID, joinToken); rmErr != nil {
slog.Error("livekit webhook: failed to remove rogue participant",
"error", rmErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
}
}
return
}
// Verify join token matches to prevent token replay from old sessions.
if joinToken != "" && state.JoinedAt != joinToken {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: stale join token on participant_joined, removing",
"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID,
"expected_token", state.JoinedAt, "got_token", joinToken)
if h.livekit != nil {
if rmErr := h.livekit.RemoveParticipant(ctx, channelID, userID, joinToken); rmErr != nil {
slog.Error("livekit webhook: failed to remove stale participant",
"error", rmErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
}
}
return
}
}
}
func (h *Hub) handleWebhookParticipantLeft(ctx context.Context, event *livekit.WebhookEvent) {
p := event.GetParticipant()
room := event.GetRoom()
if p == nil || room == nil {
return
}
userID, joinToken, err := parseParticipantIdentity(p.Identity)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_left bad identity",
"identity", p.Identity, "error", err)
return
}
channelID, err := parseRoomChannelID(room.Name)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_left bad room",
"room", room.Name, "error", err)
return
}
slog.Info("livekit webhook: participant left",
"user_id", userID,
"channel_id", channelID)
// Clean up voice state if the user disconnected from LiveKit
// without sending a WS voice_leave (e.g. crash, network loss, F5 reload).
h.mu.RLock()
c, exists := h.clients[userID]
h.mu.RUnlock()
if exists {
currentChID, currentJoinToken := c.getVoiceState()
if currentChID == channelID && currentJoinToken != "" && currentJoinToken == joinToken {
// Double-check voice state to guard against a concurrent voice_join
// that updated the state between the read above and clearVoiceState (L8).
if reChID, reJT := c.getVoiceState(); reChID == channelID && reJT == joinToken {
c.clearVoiceState()
if h.db != nil {
if err := leaveVoiceChannelWithRetry(ctx, h, userID, channelID, joinToken); err != nil {
slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannel exhausted retries",
"error", err, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
}
}
h.BroadcastToAll(buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
slog.Info("livekit webhook: cleaned up stale voice state",
"user_id", userID,
"channel_id", channelID)
}
} else if h.db != nil {
// Client has voiceChID=0 or moved to a different channel (e.g.
// after F5 reload), or this webhook is for an older join instance.
deleted, dbErr := h.db.LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch(ctx, userID, channelID, joinToken)
if dbErr != nil {
slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch failed (stale DB row)",
"error", dbErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
} else if deleted {
h.BroadcastToAll(buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
slog.Info("livekit webhook: cleaned stale DB voice row after reconnect",
"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
}
}
} else if h.db != nil {
// Client already disconnected from WS — use channel-conditional delete
// to avoid wiping a newer row if the user reconnected and rejoined.
deleted, dbErr := h.db.LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch(ctx, userID, channelID, joinToken)
if dbErr != nil {
slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch failed (client gone)",
"error", dbErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
} else if deleted {
h.BroadcastToAll(buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
}
}
}
// MountWebhookRoute is a helper for the router to mount the webhook endpoint.
func MountWebhookRoute(h *Hub, apiKey, apiSecret string) http.HandlerFunc {
return h.NewLiveKitWebhookHandler(apiKey, apiSecret)
}