Files
OwnCord/Server/api/channel_handler.go
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 6afa9e974c refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.

- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
  Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
  Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
  db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
  RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
  signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
  the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
  context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
  and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
  ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
  RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
  ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
  invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
  * voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
    retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
  * rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
  * post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
    security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
  * all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
    login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
  * admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
    the backup list presented as restorable)
  * post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
    fan out when the sender disconnects)
  * hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
    values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
  config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
  instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.

Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 17:03:52 +02:00

310 lines
9.2 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
"github.com/owncord/server/service"
)
const (
defaultMessageLimit = 50
maxMessageLimit = 100
)
func isInvalidSearchQueryError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
msg := strings.ToLower(err.Error())
return strings.Contains(msg, "fts5") ||
strings.Contains(msg, "unterminated string") ||
strings.Contains(msg, "malformed") ||
strings.Contains(msg, "syntax error")
}
func searchRateLimitMiddleware(limiter *auth.RateLimiter, limit int, window time.Duration, trustedProxies []string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ip := clientIPWithProxies(r, trustedProxies)
if !limiter.Allow("search:"+ip, limit, window) {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", strconv.Itoa(int(window.Seconds())))
writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, errorResponse{
Error: "RATE_LIMITED",
Message: "too many requests, please slow down",
})
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// MountChannelRoutes registers all channel-related routes onto r.
// All routes require authentication. The limiter is used to rate-limit
// expensive endpoints like search.
func MountChannelRoutes(r chi.Router, database *db.DB, svc *service.Services, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, trustedProxies []string) {
r.Route("/api/v1/channels", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(AuthMiddleware(database))
r.Get("/", handleListChannels(svc))
r.Get("/{id}/messages", handleGetMessages(svc))
r.Get("/{id}/pins", handleGetPins(svc))
r.Post("/{id}/pins/{messageId}", handleSetPinned(svc, true))
r.Delete("/{id}/pins/{messageId}", handleSetPinned(svc, false))
})
r.With(
AuthMiddleware(database),
searchRateLimitMiddleware(limiter, searchRateLimitPerMinute, time.Minute, trustedProxies),
).Get("/api/v1/search", handleSearch(svc))
}
// handleListChannels returns all channels the authenticated user can see.
func handleListChannels(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
channels, err := svc.Channels.ListVisibleChannels(r.Context(), user.ID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("handleListChannels", "err", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errorResponse{
Error: "INTERNAL_ERROR", Message: "failed to list channels",
})
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, channels)
}
}
// handleGetMessages returns paginated messages for a channel.
func handleGetMessages(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
before := int64(0)
if raw := r.URL.Query().Get("before"); raw != "" {
v, parseErr := strconv.ParseInt(raw, 10, 64)
if parseErr != nil || v < 0 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "before must be a non-negative integer",
})
return
}
before = v
}
limit := defaultMessageLimit
if raw := r.URL.Query().Get("limit"); raw != "" {
v, parseErr := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if parseErr != nil || v < 1 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "limit must be a positive integer",
})
return
}
if v > maxMessageLimit {
v = maxMessageLimit
}
limit = v
}
msgs, hasMore, err := svc.Messages.GetMessages(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID, before, limit)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(w, err)
return
}
type response struct {
Messages []db.MessageAPIResponse `json:"messages"`
HasMore bool `json:"has_more"`
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, response{Messages: msgs, HasMore: hasMore})
}
}
// handleSearch performs a full-text search across messages.
func handleSearch(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
q := r.URL.Query().Get("q")
if q == "" {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "query parameter 'q' is required",
})
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
var channelID *int64
if raw := r.URL.Query().Get("channel_id"); raw != "" {
v, parseErr := strconv.ParseInt(raw, 10, 64)
if parseErr != nil || v <= 0 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "channel_id must be a positive integer",
})
return
}
channelID = &v
}
limit := defaultMessageLimit
if raw := r.URL.Query().Get("limit"); raw != "" {
v, parseErr := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if parseErr != nil || v < 1 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "limit must be a positive integer",
})
return
}
if v > maxMessageLimit {
v = maxMessageLimit
}
limit = v
}
results, err := svc.Messages.SearchMessages(r.Context(), user.ID, q, channelID, limit)
if err != nil {
if isInvalidSearchQueryError(err) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "invalid search query",
})
return
}
writeServiceError(w, err)
return
}
if results == nil {
results = []db.MessageSearchResult{}
}
type response struct {
Results []db.MessageSearchResult `json:"results"`
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, response{Results: results})
}
}
// handleGetPins returns all pinned messages for a channel.
func handleGetPins(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
msgs, err := svc.Messages.GetPinnedMessages(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID)
if err != nil {
writeServiceError(w, err)
return
}
type response struct {
Messages []db.MessageAPIResponse `json:"messages"`
HasMore bool `json:"has_more"`
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, response{Messages: msgs, HasMore: false})
}
}
// handleSetPinned pins or unpins a message in a channel.
func handleSetPinned(svc *service.Services, pinned bool) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
if !ok {
return
}
messageID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "messageId")
if !ok {
return
}
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
if user == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
})
return
}
if err := svc.Messages.SetMessagePinned(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID, messageID, pinned); err != nil {
writeServiceError(w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
}
// writeServiceError maps a service-layer error to an HTTP response.
func writeServiceError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrRateLimited):
writeJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, errorResponse{Error: "RATE_LIMITED", Message: err.Error()})
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrBadRequest):
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: err.Error()})
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrNotFound):
writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, errorResponse{Error: "NOT_FOUND", Message: err.Error()})
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrForbidden), errors.Is(err, service.ErrBlocked):
writeJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, errorResponse{Error: "FORBIDDEN", Message: err.Error()})
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrConflict):
writeJSON(w, http.StatusConflict, errorResponse{Error: "CONFLICT", Message: err.Error()})
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrInternal):
slog.Error("service error", "err", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errorResponse{Error: "INTERNAL_ERROR", Message: "an internal error occurred"})
default:
slog.Error("service error", "err", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errorResponse{Error: "INTERNAL_ERROR", Message: "internal error"})
}
}
// parseIDParam extracts and validates a chi URL param as int64.
// Writes a 400 response and returns false on failure.
func parseIDParam(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, param string) (int64, bool) {
raw := chi.URLParam(r, param)
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(raw, 10, 64)
if err != nil || id <= 0 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
Error: "BAD_REQUEST",
Message: param + " must be a positive integer",
})
return 0, false
}
return id, true
}