Files
OwnCord/Server/ws/deps.go
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 6afa9e974c refactor(server): thread context.Context through the db layer and all callers
Fixes all 109 golangci-lint findings (106 contextcheck, 1 gocritic,
2 gosec) that accumulated after D2 wired dbgen (whose queries take ctx)
under ctx-less db.DB wrappers while CI lint was quota-dead. No nolint
comments added; every finding fixed by genuinely threading context.

- db: all 138 hand-written db.DB methods take ctx first; the dbCtx()
  Background shim is deleted; raw Query/QueryRow/Exec/Begin use their
  Context variants; the four redundant ctx-less passthroughs removed.
  db.Auditor/WriteAudit gain ctx.
- Seams: permissions.Checker (DB iface, HasChannelPerm,
  RequireChannelAccess) and the service.Store interface mirror the new
  signatures (ws.EventStore and plugin.PluginStore already did).
- Callers: api/admin handlers use r.Context(); ws per-message paths use
  the connection ctx via DispatchV2; hub loops and startup wiring use
  context.Background(); service methods thread ctx where they have one
  and Background where no ctx exists. Public service surface reached by
  ctx-holding chains (PermissionService.HasChannelPerm/GetRoleForUser/
  RequireChannelAccess, message/dm/block/invite/profile methods) is now
  ctx-first.
- Detached (context.WithoutCancel) where cancellation would break an
  invariant, found by a 3-lens adversarial review of the diff:
  * voice-leave background retries (a dead webhook/connection ctx killed
    retry 2 before it ran, leaving ghost capacity-holding voice rows)
  * rollbackVoiceJoin's compensating delete (its trigger IS the cancel)
  * post-2FA-change DeleteOtherSessions and logout DeleteSession (the
    security tail of a committed change must not die with the request)
  * all api/ws audit writes (a banned user could suppress their own
    login_blocked_banned row by aborting the request mid-bcrypt)
  * admin backup VACUUM INTO (an interrupt left a truncated .db that
    the backup list presented as restorable)
  * post-commit message/edit refetches (a committed message must still
    fan out when the sender disconnects)
  * hub settings-cache refresh (one dead connection could pin stale
    values for the 30s TTL)
- gocritic rangeValCopy fixed (index iteration); gosec G306 excluded in
  config with justification (generated source must stay world-readable)
  instead of flipping genprotocol output to 0o600.

Verified: gofmt/vet, all four build-tag variants, full suite, deadlock
pass, full -race pass, golangci-lint 0 issues uncapped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 17:03:52 +02:00

141 lines
5.7 KiB
Go

package ws
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
"github.com/owncord/server/plugin"
"github.com/owncord/server/service"
)
// ClientInfo holds a read-only snapshot of client state for V2 handlers.
// Handlers receive this instead of a mutable *Client pointer, making them
// easier to test and reason about.
type ClientInfo struct {
UserID int64
Username string
Avatar *string
RoleName string
ReqID string
VoiceChannelID int64 // 0 if not in a voice channel
VoiceJoinToken string // opaque join-instance token for the current voice session
}
// ── Per-domain dependency structs ───────────────────────────────────────────
// PingDeps holds dependencies for the ping handler.
type PingDeps struct {
Limiter *auth.RateLimiter
}
// ChatDeps holds dependencies for chat handlers.
type ChatDeps struct {
Limiter *auth.RateLimiter
MessageSvc *service.MessageService
}
// PresenceDeps holds dependencies for presence, typing, and channel focus handlers.
type PresenceDeps struct {
Limiter *auth.RateLimiter
ChannelSvc *service.ChannelService
}
// ReactionDeps holds dependencies for reaction handlers.
type ReactionDeps struct {
MessageSvc *service.MessageService
}
// VoiceTokenGenerator generates LiveKit access tokens. Abstracted so V2
// handlers can be tested without a real LiveKit server.
type VoiceTokenGenerator interface {
GenerateToken(userID int64, username string, channelID int64, voiceJoinToken string, canPublish, canSubscribe, canVideo, canScreenShare bool) (string, error)
URL() string
}
// KeyHolderChecker reports whether a user is the E2EE key holder for a voice channel.
type KeyHolderChecker interface {
IsVoiceKeyHolder(channelID, userID int64) bool
}
// PluginDeps holds dependencies for the chat_command (plugin slash-command)
// handler. Registry is a getter, not a captured value, because the plugin
// registry is wired via SetPluginRegistry AFTER NewHub builds the deps; reading
// it live at dispatch time picks up the late wiring. MessageSvc gates channel
// broadcasts through the same posting policy as a real message send.
type PluginDeps struct {
Registry func() *plugin.Registry
MessageSvc *service.MessageService
}
// VoiceDeps holds dependencies for voice handlers.
type VoiceDeps struct {
DB *db.DB
Limiter *auth.RateLimiter
Permissions *permissions.Checker
LiveKit *LiveKitClient
TokenGen VoiceTokenGenerator // used by voice_token_refresh V2
KeyHolder KeyHolderChecker // used by voice_token_refresh V2
}
// ── V2 permission helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
// requirePerm checks a channel permission via DB lookups. Returns nil if
// allowed, or a Result carrying either an INTERNAL error (when the server
// is misconfigured or a DB lookup fails) or a FORBIDDEN error (when the
// permission bit is genuinely absent from the user's role). Previously
// every branch returned FORBIDDEN, which hid operator-visible failures
// behind a user-facing permission denial.
func requirePerm(ctx context.Context, database *db.DB, perms *permissions.Checker, userID, channelID, perm int64, label string) *Result {
if database == nil || perms == nil {
// Missing dependency is a server bug, not a user ACL outcome. Log
// here so operators see something even when the client surfaces a
// generic error.
slog.Error("ws: requirePerm called with nil dependency",
"have_database", database != nil, "have_perms", perms != nil, "label", label)
r := Result{Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeInternal, Message: "permission check unavailable"}}
return &r
}
role, err := database.GetRoleForUser(ctx, userID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("ws: requirePerm GetRoleForUser failed",
"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID, "err", err)
r := Result{Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeInternal, Message: "permission check failed"}}
return &r
}
if role == nil {
// No role row is a genuine ACL outcome (no role == no perms).
r := Result{Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeForbidden, Message: "missing " + label + " permission"}}
return &r
}
if !perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, role.Permissions, role.ID, channelID, perm) {
r := Result{Error: ClientError{Code: ErrCodeForbidden, Message: "missing " + label + " permission"}}
return &r
}
return nil
}
// hasPerm checks a channel permission via DB lookups. Returns true if allowed.
func hasPerm(ctx context.Context, database *db.DB, perms *permissions.Checker, userID, channelID, perm int64) bool {
if database == nil || perms == nil {
return false
}
role, err := database.GetRoleForUser(ctx, userID)
if err != nil || role == nil {
return false
}
return perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, role.Permissions, role.ID, channelID, perm)
}
// ── V2 handler type ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// HandlerV2 is the function signature for new-style (pure-ish) handlers.
// They receive a typed Command, a read-only ClientInfo snapshot, and a
// domain-specific deps struct (passed as any; handler asserts the concrete type).
// They return a Result describing what events to emit and any error.
// TODO: consider replacing `deps any` with generics (HandlerV2[D any]) to get
// compile-time type safety on deps wiring. Requires reworking the registry map.
type HandlerV2 func(ctx context.Context, cmd Command, info ClientInfo, deps any) Result