Files
OwnCord/.github/workflows/release.yml
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 f5faf82a60 infra: observability, backups, guardrails, and deployment hardening (#1376)
* docs: add infrastructure roadmap plan

Records the verified recommendations from an infrastructure review in three
tracks: raising the single-instance ceiling, cheap seams for a possible
multi-instance future, and ops hygiene. Includes explicit anti-recommendations
and sequencing. Security-sensitive detail is intentionally excluded per
docs/security.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* feat(server): real health checks and saturation metrics

/api/v1/metrics now exposes signals that were already computed in memory but
never surfaced: reconnect replay tier hits, event-persister counters, SQLite
writer-pool wait stats, aggregate per-client backpressure counters (including
previously invisible low-priority drops), and permission-cache hit/miss.

/health now returns a real verdict: hub dispatch-loop liveness, a bounded
database ping, and a free-disk check, returning 503 with a subsystem reason
when degraded. Checks are cached so the unauthenticated endpoint cannot
amplify load. The hub's panic breaker now exits the process so a supervisor
can restart it, instead of leaving broadcast delivery silently dead while
clients still appear online.

OTel instruments that were declared but never recorded are now wired
(ws_active_connections, ws_broadcast_latency_seconds, ws_messages_total,
ws_events_dropped_total, voice gauges) or removed (db_query_duration_seconds).
Also corrects the docs/api.md description of broadcast_drops, which counts
hub-queue overflow, not client send-queue overflow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* feat(server): implement scheduled backups, retention, and backup verification

The backup_schedule and backup_retention settings have existed in the admin
panel and API since the initial schema but were never read by any code. The
15-minute maintenance loop now enforces them: a scheduled backup is taken
when the newest backup on disk is older than the schedule interval (manual
backups reset the clock), and retention prunes backups older than the
configured days while always keeping the newest one.

Backups are now verified with PRAGMA integrity_check immediately after
VACUUM INTO (a failed backup is removed rather than listed as restorable)
and again before a restore may overwrite the live database. A failed VACUUM
INTO also cleans up its partial output file — but never a pre-existing one.

The backup directory is configurable via a new backup.dir key (default
data/backups) so operators can point backups at another disk or an off-host
mount, mirroring the SetDatabasePath plumb.

Restore-handler tests now use real SQLite fixtures (the integrity gate
correctly refuses text files) with the mid-copy failure injected through a
test-only copy hook. Also adds audited gosec suppressions to the Windows
disk-free syscall added in the previous commit, which the Windows lint leg
flagged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* feat(server): capacity and failure-mode guardrails

- server.max_ws_connections: optional cap on concurrent WebSocket clients,
  checked before the upgrade with a 503 + Retry-After; rejections are counted
  and exposed as ws_conn_rejects in /api/v1/metrics.
- Single-process database lock: an OS-level advisory lock (flock / exclusive
  handle) beside the SQLite file makes a second server process fail fast with
  a clear message instead of silently fighting the first over process-local
  state. A bounded retry covers the self-update/restore restart handoff, and
  the lock mechanism failing (e.g. network filesystems) only warns.
- Disk-space awareness: boot-time warnings for the data and backup volumes,
  plus a disk_free_mb metrics field, via a small cross-platform diskutil
  package (already used by /health).
- Upload storage failures: storage.Save now marks server-side filesystem
  failures with a sentinel (storage.ErrIO); handlers return 507 for those
  instead of blaming the client with a 400, and the emoji route stops echoing
  raw storage errors (which embed absolute paths) into responses.
- Unknown config keys now warn at startup — a typo like admin_alowed_cidrs
  previously kept the default silently while the operator believed the
  setting changed. Never fatal: newer servers tolerate older configs.
- Admin settings honesty: the three stored-but-inert settings (server_icon,
  max_upload_bytes, voice_quality) are shown read-only with a note pointing
  at the real config.yaml keys, instead of pretending to apply.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* perf(db): write-path efficiency and capacity knobs

- channel_focus/mark_read now skip the read-state UPSERT when the stored row
  already matches (same last_message_id, no mentions) — refocus events fire
  at up to 10/s/user and every no-op write still occupied the single SQLite
  writer connection. The extra existence check runs on the reader pool, which
  doesn't serialize. Same shape as the session-touch throttle.
- DeleteExpiredSessions is now sargable: migration 031 normalizes legacy
  expiry formats to the RFC3339-Z layout the server writes and indexes
  expires_at, replacing the strftime full-table scan that ran on the writer
  every 15 minutes.
- Boot-time ANALYZE runs only when a migration actually applied; unchanged
  schemas get the cheap PRAGMA optimize instead (which also covers
  crash-restarts that never reached the shutdown optimize).
- The read/write SQL router gets a table-driven test with explicit expected
  values (INSERT ... RETURNING must hit the writer despite being :one).
- New knobs, all defaulting to current behavior: database.max_readers,
  security.auth_rate_limit_multiplier (for shared-NAT communities),
  event_persistence.replay_ring_size and replay_cold_limit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* fix(server): shutdown lifecycle ordering

- The event pruner and maintenance loop are now joined (bounded) before the
  database closes: bgCtx cancellation used to run AFTER database.Close via
  LIFO defers, contradicting its own comment, and neither goroutine was ever
  waited on — a mid-tick scheduled backup or prune could still hold the
  writer while the pool tore down. StartEventPruner returns a done channel
  with the same join contract EventPersister.Stop already had.
- srv.Shutdown now runs before hub.GracefulStop, so in-flight HTTP handlers'
  broadcasts still reach a live hub and the event persister instead of
  vanishing from the replay/event store across a restart. Shutdown does not
  wait on hijacked WebSocket connections, so the swap adds no delay.
- GracefulStopContext threads the 30s shutdown budget into the hub: the 5s
  client-notice window (matching the countdown clients are shown) ends early
  when the budget expires, and is skipped entirely when nobody is connected —
  early-return startup paths and idle servers no longer sleep 5s for an
  audience of zero.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* build(deploy): systemd unit, compose hardening, boot-smoked releases, CI polish

- deploy/owncord.service: hardened systemd unit template with the two
  verified caveats encoded (install dir stays writable for self-update under
  ProtectSystem=strict; CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE for ACME's :80), plus a
  'Linux (systemd)' deployment docs section — the Linux service story was
  previously 'Docker or nothing'.
- New 'Reverse Proxy Topology' docs section with a working nginx snippet and
  the correct signaling-vs-media distinction: /livekit/* is already proxied
  by the server, only WebRTC media ports must be directly reachable.
- docker-compose: log rotation, commented resource limits, and a healthcheck
  backed by a new 'chatserver healthcheck' subcommand (the distroless image
  has no shell) that probes /health without config side effects.
- release.yml: a concurrency group (queue, never cancel), and boot-smoke
  gates — the freshly built server binaries and the Docker image are cold
  booted and probed healthy BEFORE anything is signed or pushed. The release
  feed drives signed self-updates, so a binary that compiles but dies on
  boot previously would have shipped itself to every auto-updating instance.
- ci.yml: client-check/client-tests move to ubuntu with the reasoning
  recorded (no win32 code paths, LF enforced repo-wide); admin-e2e gets a
  written graduation criterion instead of an open-ended non-blocking status.
- docs: Tailscale guide notes the CGNAT range vs the default admin CIDRs;
  architecture overview records presence/voice state as the fifth
  single-instance blocker and the macOS client scope decision.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* perf(server): measured load tooling, narrowed invalidation, presence coalescing, storage and CIDR seams

- Fix scripts/k6/ws-load.js against the real wire protocol: envelope-wrapped
  frames, correct message types (typing_start, presence_update), the correct
  /api/v1/ws path, and thresholds that fail a run where nobody authenticated
  or went ready — the script had drifted to pre-envelope framing and reported
  100% green while every auth failed on the first frame. A new
  workflow_dispatch-only load-baseline workflow boots a real server, seeds
  users through the setup/invite APIs, runs the script, and uploads the k6
  summary plus a metrics snapshot for before/after comparison.
- Role-scoped channel-override changes now evict only the affected role's
  members from the permission cache (fail-safe: unreadable member list still
  flushes everything). InvalidateAll here repopulated every connected user —
  two reads each — synchronously inside the admin request via
  RefreshChannelVisibility, a stampede that scaled with total population
  rather than the role's size. Same pattern the per-user override endpoints
  already used.
- Connect/disconnect presence broadcasts now pass through a 300ms latest-wins
  coalescer (QueuePresence): each un-coalesced presence change is a sequenced
  global broadcast (an O(clients) fan-out under seqMu), so a reconnect storm
  fired O(users) of them from the connect critical path. A flap inside the
  window collapses to its final state; the wire format, seq ordering, and
  replay behaviour are unchanged, and the delivery path (BroadcastPresence)
  is untouched.
- Storage seam: api handlers now consume a FileStore interface (consumer-side,
  same pattern as service.Store) with Open returning a seekable storage.File —
  writing down the contract (range-request seeks included) an alternative
  backend would have to meet, without building one.
- The metrics surfaces and the LiveKit webhook/health endpoints get their own
  allowlist keys (metrics_allowed_cidrs, livekit_webhook_allowed_cidrs, both
  defaulting to admin_allowed_cidrs), so a central Prometheus scraper or an
  externally-hosted LiveKit no longer requires widening the admin panel's
  perimeter. Startup now also warns when admin_allowed_cidrs is customized
  while trusted_proxies is empty — behind a proxy or container network the
  check would otherwise compare the proxy's private address, not the client's.
- The container healthcheck probe now PINS the server's own certificate from
  disk (VerifyConnection, exact-match) instead of skipping TLS verification,
  addressing the CodeQL finding on the previous commit; WebPKI verification
  is used when no local cert exists (ACME).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* fix(server): address self-review findings on the hardening branch

Seven fixes from a high-effort review of the full branch diff:

- healthcheck CLI now works under tls.mode acme: it overrides ServerName
  with the configured domain for WebPKI verification instead of pinning a
  cert that doesn't exist (or is stale) in that mode. Previously an ACME
  deployment's container healthcheck failed forever.
- /health pings the READER pool (new db.PingRead): the writer ping queued
  behind a scheduled backup's VACUUM INTO and reported the server degraded
  for the whole backup — which an autoheal watchdog would turn into a
  nightly mid-backup restart.
- /health runs its cached checks under context.WithoutCancel so a probe
  that disconnects mid-request cannot poison the shared cache with a false
  degraded verdict for the next 5 seconds.
- The token CLI uses a new db.OpenShared that skips the single-process
  lock: minting a token against a running server is safe under WAL and was
  a documented workflow the lock had broken.
- The per-user TOTP failure cap is no longer scaled by
  security.auth_rate_limit_multiplier — that knob exists for per-IP limits;
  scaling the only cross-IP brute-force defence multiplied an attacker's
  distributed guess budget. Mirrors the unscaled per-user login threshold.
- A direct presence_update now drops the user's queued entry in the
  connect/disconnect coalescer, so a stale connect-time presence can no
  longer flush 300ms later over the user's fresher chosen status.
- The scheduled-backup filename collision loop breaks on any stat error
  and bounds its suffix probing, instead of spinning the maintenance
  goroutine forever on a persistent EACCES.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

* test(admin): real SQLite fixture for the merged Close-failure restore test

TestHandleRestoreBackup_RestartsWhenCloseFails arrived from main (#1375)
with a plain-text backup fixture; this branch's restore handler verifies
backups with integrity_check before touching the live database, so the text
fixture was (correctly) refused with 400 before the Close-failure branch
under test was reached. Use a real backup via BackupToSafe, matching the
other restore tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 20:50:47 +02:00

596 lines
24 KiB
YAML

name: Release
on:
push:
tags:
- "v*"
# A deleted-and-re-pushed tag (it has happened — see the checksum note in the
# publish job) must not race two publish runs: `gh release create` fails
# loudly on the second run, but the ghcr :latest push does not, and which run
# wins it would be arbitrary. Queue, never cancel — a half-cancelled release
# is worse than a slow one.
concurrency:
group: release-${{ github.ref_name }}
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
# The v1.1.0-alpha.4 release shipped clients still versioned 1.1.0-alpha.3
# because the client manifests weren't bumped before tagging — deployed
# clients then never saw the update. Fail fast on that mismatch, before any
# expensive build starts.
verify-versions:
name: Verify client version matches tag
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
- name: Compare tag with client manifests
shell: bash
run: |
TAG_VERSION="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
TAURI_VERSION=$(node -p "require('./Client/tauri-client/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json').version")
NPM_VERSION=$(node -p "require('./Client/tauri-client/package.json').version")
CARGO_VERSION=$(sed -n 's/^version = "\(.*\)"$/\1/p' Client/tauri-client/src-tauri/Cargo.toml | head -1)
fail=0
for pair in "tauri.conf.json:$TAURI_VERSION" "package.json:$NPM_VERSION" "Cargo.toml:$CARGO_VERSION"; do
file="${pair%%:*}"; ver="${pair#*:}"
if [ "$ver" != "$TAG_VERSION" ]; then
echo "::error::Release tag v$TAG_VERSION does not match client version $ver in $file — bump the client version before tagging."
fail=1
fi
done
exit $fail
release-client-windows:
name: Build Tauri (Windows)
needs: verify-versions
runs-on: windows-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: 20
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: Client/tauri-client/package-lock.json
- name: Install Rust
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@29eef336d9b2848a0b548edc03f92a220660cdb8 # stable
- name: Rust cache
uses: swatinem/rust-cache@6323deb102c322ba6fcbdcafc7e3dddab59af2b6 # v2.9.2
with:
workspaces: Client/tauri-client/src-tauri
- name: Install npm dependencies
working-directory: Client/tauri-client
run: npm ci
- name: Build Tauri app
working-directory: Client/tauri-client
env:
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY }}
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD }}
run: npm run tauri build
- name: Stage Windows release assets
shell: bash
run: |
mkdir -p release-staging
NSIS_DIR="Client/tauri-client/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/nsis"
INSTALLER=$(find "$NSIS_DIR" -name "*.exe" | head -1)
cp "$INSTALLER" release-staging/
NSIS_ZIP=$(find "$NSIS_DIR" -name "*_x64-setup.nsis.zip" ! -name "*.sig" | head -1)
if [ -n "$NSIS_ZIP" ] && [ -f "$NSIS_ZIP" ]; then cp "$NSIS_ZIP" release-staging/; fi
NSIS_SIG=$(find "$NSIS_DIR" -name "*_x64-setup.nsis.zip.sig" | head -1)
if [ -n "$NSIS_SIG" ] && [ -f "$NSIS_SIG" ]; then cp "$NSIS_SIG" release-staging/; fi
- name: Upload Windows release assets
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
with:
name: windows-release-assets
path: release-staging/
release-client-linux:
name: Build Tauri (Linux)
needs: verify-versions
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: 20
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: Client/tauri-client/package-lock.json
- name: Install Linux system dependencies
run: |
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y \
libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev \
libgtk-3-dev \
libayatana-appindicator3-dev \
libsecret-1-dev \
libdbus-1-dev \
libasound2-dev \
libssl-dev \
patchelf \
librsvg2-dev \
xdg-utils
- name: Install Rust
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@29eef336d9b2848a0b548edc03f92a220660cdb8 # stable
- name: Rust cache
uses: swatinem/rust-cache@6323deb102c322ba6fcbdcafc7e3dddab59af2b6 # v2.9.2
with:
workspaces: Client/tauri-client/src-tauri
- name: Install npm dependencies
working-directory: Client/tauri-client
run: npm ci
- name: Build Tauri app (AppImage + deb)
working-directory: Client/tauri-client
env:
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY }}
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD }}
run: npm run tauri build -- --bundles appimage,deb
# linuxdeploy bundles the runner's libwayland-* into the AppImage, which
# breaks Mesa EGL init on newer hosts (white window on Arch/Fedora —
# EGL_BAD_PARAMETER). Strip them and regenerate the updater artifact +
# signatures for the patched image.
- name: Strip host-incompatible libs from AppImage and re-sign
working-directory: Client/tauri-client
shell: bash
env:
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY }}
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD }}
run: |
BUNDLE_DIR="src-tauri/target/release/bundle/appimage"
APPIMAGE=$(find "$BUNDLE_DIR" -name "*.AppImage" ! -name "*.sig" | head -1)
bash scripts/strip-appimage-bundled-libs.sh "$APPIMAGE"
TARBALL="$APPIMAGE.tar.gz"
rm -f "$TARBALL" "$APPIMAGE.sig" "$TARBALL.sig"
tar czf "$TARBALL" -C "$(dirname "$APPIMAGE")" "$(basename "$APPIMAGE")"
# Sign straight from the environment. TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY is
# the env form of --private-key, so ALSO passing -f/--private-key-path
# makes the CLI abort: "the argument '--private-key-path' cannot be
# used with '--private-key'". Keeping the key in the env instead of a
# temp file also keeps it off the runner's disk.
npx tauri signer sign -p "$TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD" "$APPIMAGE"
npx tauri signer sign -p "$TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD" "$TARBALL"
- name: Stage Linux release assets
shell: bash
run: |
mkdir -p linux-staging
BUNDLE_DIR="Client/tauri-client/src-tauri/target/release/bundle"
# AppImage
APPIMAGE=$(find "$BUNDLE_DIR/appimage" -name "*.AppImage" ! -name "*.sig" | head -1)
if [ -n "$APPIMAGE" ] && [ -f "$APPIMAGE" ]; then cp "$APPIMAGE" linux-staging/; fi
APPIMAGE_SIG=$(find "$BUNDLE_DIR/appimage" -name "*.AppImage.sig" | head -1)
if [ -n "$APPIMAGE_SIG" ] && [ -f "$APPIMAGE_SIG" ]; then cp "$APPIMAGE_SIG" linux-staging/; fi
APPIMAGE_TAR=$(find "$BUNDLE_DIR/appimage" -name "*.AppImage.tar.gz" ! -name "*.sig" | head -1)
if [ -n "$APPIMAGE_TAR" ] && [ -f "$APPIMAGE_TAR" ]; then cp "$APPIMAGE_TAR" linux-staging/; fi
APPIMAGE_TAR_SIG=$(find "$BUNDLE_DIR/appimage" -name "*.AppImage.tar.gz.sig" | head -1)
if [ -n "$APPIMAGE_TAR_SIG" ] && [ -f "$APPIMAGE_TAR_SIG" ]; then cp "$APPIMAGE_TAR_SIG" linux-staging/; fi
# .deb
DEB=$(find "$BUNDLE_DIR/deb" -name "*.deb" | head -1)
if [ -n "$DEB" ] && [ -f "$DEB" ]; then cp "$DEB" linux-staging/; fi
- name: Upload Linux release assets
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
with:
name: linux-release-assets
path: linux-staging/
release-server:
name: Build server (${{ matrix.os }})
needs: verify-versions
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- os: windows-latest
artifact: server-windows
- os: ubuntu-latest
artifact: server-linux
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
- uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.6.0
with:
go-version: "1.26"
- name: Extract version from tag
shell: bash
run: |
VERSION="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
echo "VERSION=$VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Build server (Windows)
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
shell: bash
run: cd Server && go build -o chatserver.exe -ldflags "-s -w -X main.version=$VERSION" .
- name: Build server (Linux)
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
working-directory: Server
env:
CGO_ENABLED: "0"
run: go build -o chatserver -ldflags "-s -w -X main.version=$VERSION" .
# Boot-smoke the EXACT artifact that ships: this feed drives the signed
# self-update, so a binary that compiles but dies on boot would deploy
# itself to every auto-updating instance. CI's tests exercise the same
# commit but never this build (release ldflags, CGO_ENABLED=0) and never
# execute the produced binary. First run writes config.yaml, generates a
# self-signed cert, migrates a fresh SQLite DB — a real cold boot.
- name: Boot-smoke server binary
shell: bash
working-directory: Server
run: |
SMOKE_DIR="$RUNNER_TEMP/owncord-smoke"
mkdir -p "$SMOKE_DIR"
cd "$SMOKE_DIR"
BIN="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/Server/chatserver"
[ -f "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/Server/chatserver.exe" ] && BIN="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/Server/chatserver.exe"
"$BIN" &
SERVER_PID=$!
ok=0
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
sleep 1
if ! kill -0 "$SERVER_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "::error::server process exited during boot smoke"
exit 1
fi
if "$BIN" healthcheck; then ok=1; break; fi
done
kill "$SERVER_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "$SERVER_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
if [ "$ok" != "1" ]; then
echo "::error::server never reported healthy within 30s"
exit 1
fi
echo "boot smoke passed"
- name: Create tar.gz (Linux)
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
working-directory: Server
run: tar czf ../chatserver-linux-amd64.tar.gz chatserver
- name: Upload Windows binary
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
with:
name: ${{ matrix.artifact }}
path: Server/chatserver.exe
- name: Upload Linux archive
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
with:
name: ${{ matrix.artifact }}
path: chatserver-linux-amd64.tar.gz
release-client-linux-arm64:
name: Build Tauri (Linux ARM64)
needs: verify-versions
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04-arm
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: 20
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: Client/tauri-client/package-lock.json
- name: Install Linux system dependencies
run: |
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y \
libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev \
libgtk-3-dev \
libayatana-appindicator3-dev \
libsecret-1-dev \
libdbus-1-dev \
libasound2-dev \
libssl-dev \
patchelf \
librsvg2-dev \
xdg-utils
- name: Install Rust
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@29eef336d9b2848a0b548edc03f92a220660cdb8 # stable
- name: Rust cache
uses: swatinem/rust-cache@6323deb102c322ba6fcbdcafc7e3dddab59af2b6 # v2.9.2
with:
workspaces: Client/tauri-client/src-tauri
- name: Install npm dependencies
working-directory: Client/tauri-client
run: npm ci
- name: Build Tauri app (AppImage + deb)
working-directory: Client/tauri-client
env:
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY }}
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD }}
run: npm run tauri build -- --bundles appimage,deb
# Same strip + re-sign as the x86_64 job — see the comment there.
- name: Strip host-incompatible libs from AppImage and re-sign
working-directory: Client/tauri-client
shell: bash
env:
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY }}
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD }}
run: |
BUNDLE_DIR="src-tauri/target/release/bundle/appimage"
APPIMAGE=$(find "$BUNDLE_DIR" -name "*.AppImage" ! -name "*.sig" | head -1)
bash scripts/strip-appimage-bundled-libs.sh "$APPIMAGE"
TARBALL="$APPIMAGE.tar.gz"
rm -f "$TARBALL" "$APPIMAGE.sig" "$TARBALL.sig"
tar czf "$TARBALL" -C "$(dirname "$APPIMAGE")" "$(basename "$APPIMAGE")"
# Sign straight from the environment. TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY is
# the env form of --private-key, so ALSO passing -f/--private-key-path
# makes the CLI abort: "the argument '--private-key-path' cannot be
# used with '--private-key'". Keeping the key in the env instead of a
# temp file also keeps it off the runner's disk.
npx tauri signer sign -p "$TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD" "$APPIMAGE"
npx tauri signer sign -p "$TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD" "$TARBALL"
- name: Stage Linux ARM64 release assets
shell: bash
run: |
mkdir -p linux-arm64-staging
BUNDLE_DIR="Client/tauri-client/src-tauri/target/release/bundle"
# AppImage + updater artifact (.tar.gz) + signatures. Every filename
# must carry the arch: FindClientAssets matches on the
# _aarch64.AppImage.tar.gz suffix, and arch-less names would collide
# with the x86_64 assets when both artifact sets are downloaded into
# the same linux/ directory at publish time. Inserting _aarch64
# before ".AppImage" renames installer, tar.gz, and .sig
# consistently, so signatures keep pairing with their artifacts.
for f in "$BUNDLE_DIR"/appimage/*.AppImage "$BUNDLE_DIR"/appimage/*.AppImage.tar.gz "$BUNDLE_DIR"/appimage/*.sig; do
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
base="$(basename "$f")"
[[ "$base" == *aarch64* ]] || base="${base/.AppImage/_aarch64.AppImage}"
cp "$f" "linux-arm64-staging/$base"
done
# .deb
for f in "$BUNDLE_DIR"/deb/*.deb; do
[ -f "$f" ] && cp "$f" linux-arm64-staging/
done
- name: Upload Linux ARM64 release assets
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
with:
name: linux-arm64-release-assets
path: linux-arm64-staging/
release-server-docker:
name: Build & Push Server Docker Image
needs: verify-versions
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
- name: Extract version from tag
shell: bash
run: |
VERSION="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
echo "VERSION=$VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@8d2750c68a42422c14e847fe6c8ac0403b4cbd6f # v3.12.0
- name: Log in to GitHub Container Registry
uses: docker/login-action@c94ce9fb468520275223c153574b00df6fe4bcc9 # v3.7.0
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Extract Docker metadata
id: meta
uses: docker/metadata-action@c299e40c65443455700f0fdfc63efafe5b349051 # v5.10.0
with:
images: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository_owner }}/owncord-server
tags: |
type=semver,pattern={{version}}
type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}}
type=raw,value=latest
# Build locally first so the image can be boot-smoked BEFORE anything
# is pushed — a pushed :latest that dies on boot deploys itself to every
# `docker compose pull` upgrade.
- name: Build image (local, for smoke test)
uses: docker/build-push-action@10e90e3645eae34f1e60eeb005ba3a3d33f178e8 # v6.19.2
with:
context: Server/
load: true
build-args: VERSION=${{ env.VERSION }}
tags: owncord-smoke:candidate
cache-from: type=gha
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
- name: Boot-smoke Docker image
run: |
docker run -d --name owncord-smoke owncord-smoke:candidate
ok=0
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
sleep 1
if [ "$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' owncord-smoke)" != "true" ]; then
echo "::error::container exited during boot smoke"
docker logs owncord-smoke
exit 1
fi
if docker exec owncord-smoke /chatserver healthcheck; then ok=1; break; fi
done
docker logs owncord-smoke
docker rm -f owncord-smoke
if [ "$ok" != "1" ]; then
echo "::error::container never reported healthy within 30s"
exit 1
fi
- name: Build and push
uses: docker/build-push-action@10e90e3645eae34f1e60eeb005ba3a3d33f178e8 # v6.19.2
with:
context: Server/
push: true
build-args: VERSION=${{ env.VERSION }}
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
cache-from: type=gha
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
publish:
name: Publish GitHub Release
needs: [release-client-windows, release-client-linux, release-client-linux-arm64, release-server, release-server-docker]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: 20
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: Client/tauri-client/package-lock.json
- name: Download Windows client assets
uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093 # v4.3.0
with:
name: windows-release-assets
path: windows
- name: Download Linux x86_64 client assets
uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093 # v4.3.0
with:
name: linux-release-assets
path: linux
- name: Download Linux ARM64 client assets
uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093 # v4.3.0
with:
name: linux-arm64-release-assets
path: linux
- name: Download Windows server binary
uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093 # v4.3.0
with:
name: server-windows
path: windows
- name: Download Linux server archive
uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093 # v4.3.0
with:
name: server-linux
path: linux
- name: Extract version from tag
shell: bash
run: |
VERSION="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
echo "VERSION=$VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Create source snapshot (AGPL source availability)
shell: bash
run: |
git archive --format=tar.gz --prefix="OwnCord-${VERSION}/" \
-o "owncord-src-${{ github.ref_name }}.tar.gz" HEAD
# Checksum lines must use bare asset filenames: the v1.0.0 updater's
# ParseChecksumFile does an exact match on the last field, so a
# "windows/" prefix would strand every deployed server on 1.0.0.
- name: Generate SHA256 checksums
shell: bash
run: |
(cd windows && sha256sum *) > checksums.sha256
(cd linux && sha256sum *) >> checksums.sha256
sha256sum owncord-src-*.tar.gz >> checksums.sha256
# The legacy top-level asset/sha256 pair stays bound to the Windows
# binary so already-deployed servers (which only understand the
# single-asset schema) can still verify and update; the assets list
# binds every OS. Server-side schema: updater.releaseManifest.
- name: Generate server update manifest
shell: bash
run: |
WIN_HASH=$(sha256sum windows/chatserver.exe | awk '{print $1}')
LINUX_HASH=$(sha256sum linux/chatserver-linux-amd64.tar.gz | awk '{print $1}')
printf '{"version":"v%s","asset":"chatserver.exe","sha256":"%s","assets":[{"asset":"chatserver.exe","sha256":"%s"},{"asset":"chatserver-linux-amd64.tar.gz","sha256":"%s"}]}' \
"$VERSION" "$WIN_HASH" "$WIN_HASH" "$LINUX_HASH" > windows/server-update-manifest.json
- name: Sign server update assets
working-directory: Client/tauri-client
shell: bash
env:
SERVER_UPDATE_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.SERVER_UPDATE_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY }}
SERVER_UPDATE_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.SERVER_UPDATE_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD }}
run: |
KEY_PATH=$(mktemp)
printf '%s' "$SERVER_UPDATE_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY" > "$KEY_PATH"
trap 'rm -f "$KEY_PATH"' EXIT
npm ci
npx tauri signer sign -f "$KEY_PATH" -p "$SERVER_UPDATE_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD" ../../windows/chatserver.exe
npx tauri signer sign -f "$KEY_PATH" -p "$SERVER_UPDATE_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD" ../../windows/server-update-manifest.json
# Fail closed before publishing: prove the freshly signed assets verify
# against the pinned public key that ships inside the server binary.
# Catches key/pubkey mismatch, signature format drift, and signer flag
# regressions — each of which has silently broken this pipeline before.
- name: Verify signed assets against pinned server update key
shell: bash
run: |
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y minisign
base64 -d Server/updater/server_update_public_key.txt > "$RUNNER_TEMP/server_update.pub"
for f in windows/chatserver.exe windows/server-update-manifest.json; do
base64 -d "$f.sig" > "$RUNNER_TEMP/asset.minisig"
minisign -Vm "$f" -x "$RUNNER_TEMP/asset.minisig" -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/server_update.pub"
done
- name: Install root dependencies (changelogen)
run: npm ci
- name: Generate changelog
shell: bash
run: npx changelogen --output CHANGELOG.md
# Sole publish target. This repo is public, so its own Releases page both
# satisfies AGPL source availability (via the owncord-src snapshot below)
# and serves as the publicly-readable feed that deployed servers and
# clients poll for updates. The former mirror step to a separate public
# releases repo existed only to work around this repo being private.
- name: Create GitHub Release
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
mapfile -t assets < <(find windows linux -type f)
assets+=(checksums.sha256 owncord-src-*.tar.gz)
gh release create "${{ github.ref_name }}" \
--notes-file CHANGELOG.md \
"${assets[@]}"