mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
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* docs: add infrastructure roadmap plan Records the verified recommendations from an infrastructure review in three tracks: raising the single-instance ceiling, cheap seams for a possible multi-instance future, and ops hygiene. Includes explicit anti-recommendations and sequencing. Security-sensitive detail is intentionally excluded per docs/security.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * feat(server): real health checks and saturation metrics /api/v1/metrics now exposes signals that were already computed in memory but never surfaced: reconnect replay tier hits, event-persister counters, SQLite writer-pool wait stats, aggregate per-client backpressure counters (including previously invisible low-priority drops), and permission-cache hit/miss. /health now returns a real verdict: hub dispatch-loop liveness, a bounded database ping, and a free-disk check, returning 503 with a subsystem reason when degraded. Checks are cached so the unauthenticated endpoint cannot amplify load. The hub's panic breaker now exits the process so a supervisor can restart it, instead of leaving broadcast delivery silently dead while clients still appear online. OTel instruments that were declared but never recorded are now wired (ws_active_connections, ws_broadcast_latency_seconds, ws_messages_total, ws_events_dropped_total, voice gauges) or removed (db_query_duration_seconds). Also corrects the docs/api.md description of broadcast_drops, which counts hub-queue overflow, not client send-queue overflow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * feat(server): implement scheduled backups, retention, and backup verification The backup_schedule and backup_retention settings have existed in the admin panel and API since the initial schema but were never read by any code. The 15-minute maintenance loop now enforces them: a scheduled backup is taken when the newest backup on disk is older than the schedule interval (manual backups reset the clock), and retention prunes backups older than the configured days while always keeping the newest one. Backups are now verified with PRAGMA integrity_check immediately after VACUUM INTO (a failed backup is removed rather than listed as restorable) and again before a restore may overwrite the live database. A failed VACUUM INTO also cleans up its partial output file — but never a pre-existing one. The backup directory is configurable via a new backup.dir key (default data/backups) so operators can point backups at another disk or an off-host mount, mirroring the SetDatabasePath plumb. Restore-handler tests now use real SQLite fixtures (the integrity gate correctly refuses text files) with the mid-copy failure injected through a test-only copy hook. Also adds audited gosec suppressions to the Windows disk-free syscall added in the previous commit, which the Windows lint leg flagged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * feat(server): capacity and failure-mode guardrails - server.max_ws_connections: optional cap on concurrent WebSocket clients, checked before the upgrade with a 503 + Retry-After; rejections are counted and exposed as ws_conn_rejects in /api/v1/metrics. - Single-process database lock: an OS-level advisory lock (flock / exclusive handle) beside the SQLite file makes a second server process fail fast with a clear message instead of silently fighting the first over process-local state. A bounded retry covers the self-update/restore restart handoff, and the lock mechanism failing (e.g. network filesystems) only warns. - Disk-space awareness: boot-time warnings for the data and backup volumes, plus a disk_free_mb metrics field, via a small cross-platform diskutil package (already used by /health). - Upload storage failures: storage.Save now marks server-side filesystem failures with a sentinel (storage.ErrIO); handlers return 507 for those instead of blaming the client with a 400, and the emoji route stops echoing raw storage errors (which embed absolute paths) into responses. - Unknown config keys now warn at startup — a typo like admin_alowed_cidrs previously kept the default silently while the operator believed the setting changed. Never fatal: newer servers tolerate older configs. - Admin settings honesty: the three stored-but-inert settings (server_icon, max_upload_bytes, voice_quality) are shown read-only with a note pointing at the real config.yaml keys, instead of pretending to apply. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * perf(db): write-path efficiency and capacity knobs - channel_focus/mark_read now skip the read-state UPSERT when the stored row already matches (same last_message_id, no mentions) — refocus events fire at up to 10/s/user and every no-op write still occupied the single SQLite writer connection. The extra existence check runs on the reader pool, which doesn't serialize. Same shape as the session-touch throttle. - DeleteExpiredSessions is now sargable: migration 031 normalizes legacy expiry formats to the RFC3339-Z layout the server writes and indexes expires_at, replacing the strftime full-table scan that ran on the writer every 15 minutes. - Boot-time ANALYZE runs only when a migration actually applied; unchanged schemas get the cheap PRAGMA optimize instead (which also covers crash-restarts that never reached the shutdown optimize). - The read/write SQL router gets a table-driven test with explicit expected values (INSERT ... RETURNING must hit the writer despite being :one). - New knobs, all defaulting to current behavior: database.max_readers, security.auth_rate_limit_multiplier (for shared-NAT communities), event_persistence.replay_ring_size and replay_cold_limit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * fix(server): shutdown lifecycle ordering - The event pruner and maintenance loop are now joined (bounded) before the database closes: bgCtx cancellation used to run AFTER database.Close via LIFO defers, contradicting its own comment, and neither goroutine was ever waited on — a mid-tick scheduled backup or prune could still hold the writer while the pool tore down. StartEventPruner returns a done channel with the same join contract EventPersister.Stop already had. - srv.Shutdown now runs before hub.GracefulStop, so in-flight HTTP handlers' broadcasts still reach a live hub and the event persister instead of vanishing from the replay/event store across a restart. Shutdown does not wait on hijacked WebSocket connections, so the swap adds no delay. - GracefulStopContext threads the 30s shutdown budget into the hub: the 5s client-notice window (matching the countdown clients are shown) ends early when the budget expires, and is skipped entirely when nobody is connected — early-return startup paths and idle servers no longer sleep 5s for an audience of zero. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * build(deploy): systemd unit, compose hardening, boot-smoked releases, CI polish - deploy/owncord.service: hardened systemd unit template with the two verified caveats encoded (install dir stays writable for self-update under ProtectSystem=strict; CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE for ACME's :80), plus a 'Linux (systemd)' deployment docs section — the Linux service story was previously 'Docker or nothing'. - New 'Reverse Proxy Topology' docs section with a working nginx snippet and the correct signaling-vs-media distinction: /livekit/* is already proxied by the server, only WebRTC media ports must be directly reachable. - docker-compose: log rotation, commented resource limits, and a healthcheck backed by a new 'chatserver healthcheck' subcommand (the distroless image has no shell) that probes /health without config side effects. - release.yml: a concurrency group (queue, never cancel), and boot-smoke gates — the freshly built server binaries and the Docker image are cold booted and probed healthy BEFORE anything is signed or pushed. The release feed drives signed self-updates, so a binary that compiles but dies on boot previously would have shipped itself to every auto-updating instance. - ci.yml: client-check/client-tests move to ubuntu with the reasoning recorded (no win32 code paths, LF enforced repo-wide); admin-e2e gets a written graduation criterion instead of an open-ended non-blocking status. - docs: Tailscale guide notes the CGNAT range vs the default admin CIDRs; architecture overview records presence/voice state as the fifth single-instance blocker and the macOS client scope decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * perf(server): measured load tooling, narrowed invalidation, presence coalescing, storage and CIDR seams - Fix scripts/k6/ws-load.js against the real wire protocol: envelope-wrapped frames, correct message types (typing_start, presence_update), the correct /api/v1/ws path, and thresholds that fail a run where nobody authenticated or went ready — the script had drifted to pre-envelope framing and reported 100% green while every auth failed on the first frame. A new workflow_dispatch-only load-baseline workflow boots a real server, seeds users through the setup/invite APIs, runs the script, and uploads the k6 summary plus a metrics snapshot for before/after comparison. - Role-scoped channel-override changes now evict only the affected role's members from the permission cache (fail-safe: unreadable member list still flushes everything). InvalidateAll here repopulated every connected user — two reads each — synchronously inside the admin request via RefreshChannelVisibility, a stampede that scaled with total population rather than the role's size. Same pattern the per-user override endpoints already used. - Connect/disconnect presence broadcasts now pass through a 300ms latest-wins coalescer (QueuePresence): each un-coalesced presence change is a sequenced global broadcast (an O(clients) fan-out under seqMu), so a reconnect storm fired O(users) of them from the connect critical path. A flap inside the window collapses to its final state; the wire format, seq ordering, and replay behaviour are unchanged, and the delivery path (BroadcastPresence) is untouched. - Storage seam: api handlers now consume a FileStore interface (consumer-side, same pattern as service.Store) with Open returning a seekable storage.File — writing down the contract (range-request seeks included) an alternative backend would have to meet, without building one. - The metrics surfaces and the LiveKit webhook/health endpoints get their own allowlist keys (metrics_allowed_cidrs, livekit_webhook_allowed_cidrs, both defaulting to admin_allowed_cidrs), so a central Prometheus scraper or an externally-hosted LiveKit no longer requires widening the admin panel's perimeter. Startup now also warns when admin_allowed_cidrs is customized while trusted_proxies is empty — behind a proxy or container network the check would otherwise compare the proxy's private address, not the client's. - The container healthcheck probe now PINS the server's own certificate from disk (VerifyConnection, exact-match) instead of skipping TLS verification, addressing the CodeQL finding on the previous commit; WebPKI verification is used when no local cert exists (ACME). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * fix(server): address self-review findings on the hardening branch Seven fixes from a high-effort review of the full branch diff: - healthcheck CLI now works under tls.mode acme: it overrides ServerName with the configured domain for WebPKI verification instead of pinning a cert that doesn't exist (or is stale) in that mode. Previously an ACME deployment's container healthcheck failed forever. - /health pings the READER pool (new db.PingRead): the writer ping queued behind a scheduled backup's VACUUM INTO and reported the server degraded for the whole backup — which an autoheal watchdog would turn into a nightly mid-backup restart. - /health runs its cached checks under context.WithoutCancel so a probe that disconnects mid-request cannot poison the shared cache with a false degraded verdict for the next 5 seconds. - The token CLI uses a new db.OpenShared that skips the single-process lock: minting a token against a running server is safe under WAL and was a documented workflow the lock had broken. - The per-user TOTP failure cap is no longer scaled by security.auth_rate_limit_multiplier — that knob exists for per-IP limits; scaling the only cross-IP brute-force defence multiplied an attacker's distributed guess budget. Mirrors the unscaled per-user login threshold. - A direct presence_update now drops the user's queued entry in the connect/disconnect coalescer, so a stale connect-time presence can no longer flush 300ms later over the user's fresher chosen status. - The scheduled-backup filename collision loop breaks on any stat error and bounds its suffix probing, instead of spinning the maintenance goroutine forever on a persistent EACCES. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj * test(admin): real SQLite fixture for the merged Close-failure restore test TestHandleRestoreBackup_RestartsWhenCloseFails arrived from main (#1375) with a plain-text backup fixture; this branch's restore handler verifies backups with integrity_check before touching the live database, so the text fixture was (correctly) refused with 400 before the Close-failure branch under test was reached. Use a real backup via BackupToSafe, matching the other restore tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017RtDNHSYWwPKArL8MsRdbj --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
578 lines
19 KiB
Go
578 lines
19 KiB
Go
package db
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"database/sql"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db/dbgen"
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)
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// ─── User Operations ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// CreateUser inserts a new user record and returns the assigned ID.
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func (d *DB) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, username, passwordHash string, roleID int) (int64, error) {
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res, err := d.writer.ExecContext(ctx,
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`INSERT INTO users (username, password, role_id) VALUES (?, ?, ?)`,
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username, passwordHash, roleID,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateUser: %w", err)
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}
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return res.LastInsertId()
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}
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// CreateOwnerIfEmpty atomically checks that no users exist and inserts the
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// first owner in a single transaction. Returns ErrConflict if any user already
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// exists, closing the TOCTOU race in the setup endpoint (BUG-119).
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func (d *DB) CreateOwnerIfEmpty(ctx context.Context, username, passwordHash string, roleID int) (int64, error) {
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tx, err := d.writer.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateOwnerIfEmpty begin: %w", err)
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}
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committed := false
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defer func() {
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if !committed {
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_ = tx.Rollback()
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}
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}()
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var count int64
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if err := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users`).Scan(&count); err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateOwnerIfEmpty count: %w", err)
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}
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if count > 0 {
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return 0, ErrConflict
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}
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res, err := tx.Exec(
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`INSERT INTO users (username, password, role_id) VALUES (?, ?, ?)`,
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username, passwordHash, roleID,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateOwnerIfEmpty insert: %w", err)
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}
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uid, err := res.LastInsertId()
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateOwnerIfEmpty last_id: %w", err)
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateOwnerIfEmpty commit: %w", err)
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}
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committed = true
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return uid, nil
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}
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// CreateUserWithInvite atomically consumes an invite and creates the user in
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// the same transaction so a failed registration does not burn the invite.
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func (d *DB) CreateUserWithInvite(ctx context.Context, username, passwordHash string, roleID int, inviteCode string) (int64, error) {
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tx, err := d.writer.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateUserWithInvite begin: %w", err)
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}
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committed := false
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defer func() {
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if !committed {
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_ = tx.Rollback()
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}
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}()
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result, err := tx.Exec(
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`UPDATE invites SET use_count = use_count + 1
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WHERE code = ? AND revoked = 0
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AND (max_uses IS NULL OR use_count < max_uses)
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AND (expires_at IS NULL OR strftime('%s', expires_at) > strftime('%s', 'now'))`,
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inviteCode,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateUserWithInvite use invite: %w", err)
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}
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rows, err := result.RowsAffected()
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateUserWithInvite invite rows: %w", err)
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}
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if rows == 0 {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateUserWithInvite invite unavailable: %w", ErrNotFound)
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}
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result, err = tx.Exec(
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`INSERT INTO users (username, password, role_id) VALUES (?, ?, ?)`,
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username, passwordHash, roleID,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateUserWithInvite create user: %w", err)
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}
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uid, err := result.LastInsertId()
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateUserWithInvite last insert id: %w", err)
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateUserWithInvite commit: %w", err)
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}
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committed = true
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return uid, nil
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}
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// GetUserByUsername returns the user with the given username (case-insensitive),
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// or nil if not found.
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func (d *DB) GetUserByUsername(ctx context.Context, username string) (*User, error) {
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u, err := d.q.GetUserByUsername(ctx, username)
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetUserByUsername: %w", err)
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}
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return userFromGen(u), nil
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}
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// GetUserByID returns the user with the given ID, or nil if not found.
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func (d *DB) GetUserByID(ctx context.Context, id int64) (*User, error) {
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u, err := d.q.GetUserByID(ctx, id)
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetUserByID: %w", err)
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}
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return userFromGen(u), nil
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}
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// UpdateUserStatus sets the status column for the given user ID.
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func (d *DB) UpdateUserStatus(ctx context.Context, id int64, status string) error {
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if err := d.q.UpdateUserStatus(ctx, dbgen.UpdateUserStatusParams{
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Status: status,
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ID: id,
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}); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("UpdateUserStatus: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// UpdateUserTOTPSecret sets or clears the TOTP secret for a user.
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func (d *DB) UpdateUserTOTPSecret(ctx context.Context, id int64, secret *string) error {
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if err := d.q.UpdateUserTOTPSecret(ctx, dbgen.UpdateUserTOTPSecretParams{
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TotpSecret: secret,
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ID: id,
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}); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("UpdateUserTOTPSecret: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// UpdateUserIdentityKey sets or clears the E2EE identity public key for a user
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// (F3 voice E2EE TOFU). Last write wins; key changes are audited at the
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// service layer so peers can detect a rotation.
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func (d *DB) UpdateUserIdentityKey(ctx context.Context, id int64, key *string) error {
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if err := d.q.UpdateUserIdentityKey(ctx, dbgen.UpdateUserIdentityKeyParams{
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IdentityPublicKey: key,
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ID: id,
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}); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("UpdateUserIdentityKey: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ResetAllUserStatuses clears the "online" status left behind by a previous
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// run or crash. Called on server startup. Chosen statuses (idle/dnd/invisible)
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// are left standing — they are what the user picked, not evidence of a session,
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// and the read path already renders a user with no live connection as offline.
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func (d *DB) ResetAllUserStatuses(ctx context.Context) error {
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if err := d.q.ResetAllUserStatuses(ctx); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("ResetAllUserStatuses: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// MarkUserDisconnected records that a user's last session went away: last_seen
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// is refreshed and "online" falls back to "offline", while a chosen
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// idle/dnd/invisible is preserved for the next connect to honour.
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func (d *DB) MarkUserDisconnected(ctx context.Context, userID int64) error {
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if err := d.q.MarkUserDisconnected(ctx, userID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("MarkUserDisconnected: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// BanUser marks a user as banned with an optional expiry. Pass nil for a
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// permanent ban.
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func (d *DB) BanUser(ctx context.Context, id int64, reason string, expires *time.Time) error {
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var expiresStr *string
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if expires != nil {
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s := expires.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z")
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expiresStr = &s
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}
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reasonCopy := reason
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if err := d.q.BanUser(ctx, dbgen.BanUserParams{
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BanReason: &reasonCopy,
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BanExpires: expiresStr,
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ID: id,
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}); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("BanUser: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// UnbanUser removes the ban from a user.
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func (d *DB) UnbanUser(ctx context.Context, id int64) error {
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if err := d.q.UnbanUser(ctx, id); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("UnbanUser: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ─── Session Operations ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// maxSessionsPerUser is the maximum number of concurrent sessions allowed per
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// user. When exceeded, the oldest session is evicted. This prevents unbounded
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// session accumulation from credential stuffing or token theft (H-6).
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const maxSessionsPerUser = 25
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// CreateSession inserts a new session and returns the session ID.
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// tokenHash must already be hashed (never store plaintext tokens).
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// H-6: Enforces a per-user session cap by evicting the oldest session when
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// the limit is reached.
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func (d *DB) CreateSession(ctx context.Context, userID int64, tokenHash, device, ip string) (int64, error) {
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// Evict oldest sessions if at or above the cap.
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_ = d.q.EvictOldestSessions(ctx, dbgen.EvictOldestSessionsParams{
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UserID: userID,
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Offset: maxSessionsPerUser - 1,
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})
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expiresAt := time.Now().Add(sessionTTL).UTC().Format(sessionTimeLayout)
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deviceCopy, ipCopy := device, ip
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res, err := d.q.InsertSession(ctx, dbgen.InsertSessionParams{
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UserID: userID,
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Token: tokenHash,
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Device: &deviceCopy,
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IpAddress: &ipCopy,
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ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
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})
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateSession: %w", err)
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}
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return res.LastInsertId()
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}
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// GetSessionByTokenHash retrieves a session by its hashed token, or nil if
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// not found.
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func (d *DB) GetSessionByTokenHash(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (*Session, error) {
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s, err := d.q.GetSessionByTokenHash(ctx, tokenHash)
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetSessionByTokenHash: %w", err)
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}
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sess := sessionFromGen(s)
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return &sess, nil
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}
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// SessionWithBanStatus combines session data with user ban fields
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// in a single query, avoiding two sequential DB round-trips.
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type SessionWithBanStatus struct {
|
|
Session
|
|
Banned bool
|
|
BanReason *string
|
|
BanExpires *string
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}
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|
|
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// GetSessionWithBanStatus returns the session joined with the user's ban
|
|
// status in a single query. Returns nil, nil when not found.
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func (d *DB) GetSessionWithBanStatus(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (*SessionWithBanStatus, error) {
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row, err := d.q.GetSessionWithBanStatus(ctx, tokenHash)
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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|
return nil, nil
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|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetSessionWithBanStatus: %w", err)
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|
}
|
|
return &SessionWithBanStatus{
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Session: Session{
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ID: row.ID,
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UserID: row.UserID,
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TokenHash: row.Token,
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Device: derefString(row.Device),
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IP: derefString(row.IpAddress),
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CreatedAt: row.CreatedAt,
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LastUsed: row.LastUsed,
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ExpiresAt: row.ExpiresAt,
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},
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Banned: row.Banned != 0,
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BanReason: row.BanReason,
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BanExpires: row.BanExpires,
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}, nil
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}
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|
|
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// GetSessionsWithBanStatusBatch returns session+ban rows for every token hash
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// in tokenHashes, keyed by token hash. Hashes with no session row are simply
|
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// absent from the map. Used by the ws revoked-session sweep so N connected
|
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// clients cost one query per sweep instead of N.
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func (d *DB) GetSessionsWithBanStatusBatch(ctx context.Context, tokenHashes []string) (map[string]*SessionWithBanStatus, error) {
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result := make(map[string]*SessionWithBanStatus, len(tokenHashes))
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// Chunk the IN list to stay far below SQLite's bound-parameter limit.
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const chunkSize = 500
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for start := 0; start < len(tokenHashes); start += chunkSize {
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chunk := tokenHashes[start:min(start+chunkSize, len(tokenHashes))]
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|
|
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placeholders := make([]string, len(chunk))
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args := make([]any, len(chunk))
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|
for i, hash := range chunk {
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placeholders[i] = "?"
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args[i] = hash
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|
}
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|
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query := fmt.Sprintf( //nolint:gosec // G201: placeholder interpolation, not user input
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`SELECT s.id, s.user_id, s.token, s.device, s.ip_address,
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s.created_at, s.last_used, s.expires_at,
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u.banned, u.ban_reason, u.ban_expires
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FROM sessions s
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JOIN users u ON s.user_id = u.id
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WHERE s.token IN (%s)`,
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strings.Join(placeholders, ","),
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)
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rows, err := d.reader.QueryContext(ctx, query, args...)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetSessionsWithBanStatusBatch: %w", err)
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}
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if err := scanSessionsWithBanStatus(rows, result); err != nil {
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|
return nil, err
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|
}
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|
}
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|
return result, nil
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|
}
|
|
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// scanSessionsWithBanStatus scans batch rows into result and closes rows.
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func scanSessionsWithBanStatus(rows *sql.Rows, result map[string]*SessionWithBanStatus) error {
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defer rows.Close() //nolint:errcheck
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for rows.Next() {
|
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var s SessionWithBanStatus
|
|
var device, ip *string
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var banned int
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if err := rows.Scan(
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&s.ID, &s.UserID, &s.TokenHash, &device, &ip,
|
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&s.CreatedAt, &s.LastUsed, &s.ExpiresAt,
|
|
&banned, &s.BanReason, &s.BanExpires,
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|
); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("GetSessionsWithBanStatusBatch scan: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
s.Device = derefString(device)
|
|
s.IP = derefString(ip)
|
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s.Banned = banned != 0
|
|
result[s.TokenHash] = &s
|
|
}
|
|
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("GetSessionsWithBanStatusBatch rows: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DeleteSession removes the session with the given token hash.
|
|
func (d *DB) DeleteSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) error {
|
|
if err := d.q.DeleteSessionByToken(ctx, tokenHash); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("DeleteSession: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DeleteOtherSessions removes all sessions for the given user except the one
|
|
// with keepSessionID. Used after password change or 2FA state change to
|
|
// invalidate all other sessions (BUG-108).
|
|
func (d *DB) DeleteOtherSessions(ctx context.Context, userID, keepSessionID int64) (int64, error) {
|
|
result, err := d.q.DeleteOtherSessions(ctx, dbgen.DeleteOtherSessionsParams{
|
|
UserID: userID,
|
|
ID: keepSessionID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return 0, fmt.Errorf("DeleteOtherSessions: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, _ := result.RowsAffected()
|
|
return n, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DeleteExpiredSessions removes all sessions whose expires_at is in the past.
|
|
// The comparison is plain text against idx_sessions_expires_at, so the cutoff
|
|
// MUST use sessionTimeLayout — the exact stored format (migration 031
|
|
// normalized legacy rows). A space-separated cutoff would compare wrong and
|
|
// silently delete nothing (' ' sorts before 'T').
|
|
func (d *DB) DeleteExpiredSessions(ctx context.Context) error {
|
|
cutoff := time.Now().UTC().Format(sessionTimeLayout)
|
|
if err := d.q.DeleteExpiredSessions(ctx, cutoff); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("DeleteExpiredSessions: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TouchSession updates last_used for the session with the given token hash.
|
|
func (d *DB) TouchSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) error {
|
|
if err := d.q.TouchSession(ctx, tokenHash); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("TouchSession: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ─── Invite Operations ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
// CreateInvite generates a random invite code, persists it, and returns the
|
|
// code. maxUses=0 means unlimited. expiresAt=nil means never expires.
|
|
func (d *DB) CreateInvite(ctx context.Context, createdBy int64, maxUses int, expiresAt *time.Time) (string, error) {
|
|
code, err := generateInviteCode()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("CreateInvite generate code: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var maxUsesVal *int
|
|
if maxUses > 0 {
|
|
maxUsesVal = &maxUses
|
|
}
|
|
var expiresStr *string
|
|
if expiresAt != nil {
|
|
s := expiresAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z")
|
|
expiresStr = &s
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := d.q.CreateInvite(ctx, dbgen.CreateInviteParams{
|
|
Code: code,
|
|
CreatedBy: createdBy,
|
|
MaxUses: ptrItoI64(maxUsesVal),
|
|
ExpiresAt: expiresStr,
|
|
}); err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("CreateInvite insert: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return code, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetInvite returns the invite for the given code, or nil if not found.
|
|
func (d *DB) GetInvite(ctx context.Context, code string) (*Invite, error) {
|
|
r, err := d.q.GetInvite(ctx, code)
|
|
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetInvite: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return &Invite{
|
|
ID: r.ID,
|
|
Code: r.Code,
|
|
CreatedBy: r.CreatedBy,
|
|
Uses: int(r.UseCount),
|
|
MaxUses: ptrI64toI(r.MaxUses),
|
|
ExpiresAt: r.ExpiresAt,
|
|
Revoked: r.Revoked != 0,
|
|
CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UseInviteAtomic validates and increments the use_count in a single SQL
|
|
// statement, eliminating the TOCTOU race that exists when GetInvite and
|
|
// UseInvite are called as separate operations.
|
|
//
|
|
// The UPDATE only matches rows where:
|
|
// - the code exists
|
|
// - revoked = 0
|
|
// - max_uses IS NULL (unlimited) OR uses < max_uses
|
|
// - expires_at IS NULL (never) OR expires_at > now
|
|
//
|
|
// If zero rows are affected the invite is missing, revoked, expired, or
|
|
// exhausted — an error is returned in all such cases.
|
|
func (d *DB) UseInviteAtomic(ctx context.Context, code string) error {
|
|
result, err := d.q.UseInviteAtomic(ctx, code)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("UseInviteAtomic: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
rows, err := result.RowsAffected()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("UseInviteAtomic rows: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if rows == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("UseInviteAtomic: invite not found, revoked, expired, or exhausted: %w", ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeInvite marks an invite as revoked.
|
|
func (d *DB) RevokeInvite(ctx context.Context, code string) error {
|
|
if err := d.q.RevokeInvite(ctx, code); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("RevokeInvite: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ─── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
// MemberSummary is a lightweight user shape for the ready payload.
|
|
type MemberSummary struct {
|
|
ID int64 `json:"id"`
|
|
Username string `json:"username"`
|
|
Avatar *string `json:"avatar"`
|
|
Status string `json:"status"`
|
|
Role string `json:"role"`
|
|
// IdentityPublicKey is the user's long-term E2EE identity public key
|
|
// (base64), pinned by peers on first sight (F3 TOFU). Omitted when the
|
|
// user has not published one.
|
|
IdentityPublicKey *string `json:"identity_public_key,omitempty"`
|
|
// DisplayName is the nickname to render instead of Username. Null when
|
|
// unset; clients fall back to Username.
|
|
DisplayName *string `json:"display_name"`
|
|
// CustomStatus is the free-text status line shown under the name. Null
|
|
// when unset.
|
|
CustomStatus *string `json:"custom_status"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ForViewer returns a copy of the summary as viewerID may see it: an invisible
|
|
// member is offline to everyone but themselves. Ready payloads go through this
|
|
// so "who is invisible" is decided in exactly one place.
|
|
func (m MemberSummary) ForViewer(viewerID int64) MemberSummary {
|
|
m.Status = StatusForViewer(m.Status, m.ID, viewerID)
|
|
// A connected-but-invisible member collapses to "offline" above, but their
|
|
// custom_status is a separate column BroadcastStatus never touches. Left
|
|
// alone, a viewer sees {status:"offline", custom_status:"<text>"} for that
|
|
// member while every genuinely disconnected member is
|
|
// {status:"offline", custom_status:null} — the surviving text is a tell
|
|
// that the member is actually online. Blank it at the same choke point
|
|
// that collapses the status so no other caller has to remember to.
|
|
if m.ID != viewerID && m.Status == StatusOffline {
|
|
m.CustomStatus = nil
|
|
}
|
|
return m
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ListMembers returns non-banned users as lightweight summaries.
|
|
// M-12: Limited to 1000 rows to prevent unbounded result sets on large servers.
|
|
func (d *DB) ListMembers(ctx context.Context) ([]MemberSummary, error) {
|
|
rows, err := d.q.ListMembers(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ListMembers: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
members := make([]MemberSummary, 0, len(rows))
|
|
for _, r := range rows {
|
|
members = append(members, MemberSummary{
|
|
ID: r.ID,
|
|
Username: r.Username,
|
|
Avatar: r.Avatar,
|
|
Status: r.Status,
|
|
Role: r.Lower,
|
|
IdentityPublicKey: r.IdentityPublicKey,
|
|
DisplayName: r.DisplayName,
|
|
CustomStatus: r.CustomStatus,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
return members, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// generateInviteCode produces a random 8-byte (16-char hex) code.
|
|
func generateInviteCode() (string, error) {
|
|
b := make([]byte, 8)
|
|
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
|
|
}
|