mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
ownerOnlyMiddleware collapsed `err != nil || role == nil` into 403 "role not found", so a transient GetRoleByID failure told the Owner they lack the Owner role. Split the outcomes: a store error logs and answers 503 SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE (the perimeter's contract); a genuinely missing role still answers 403. The existing whitebox tests, which inject only the user into the context, are unchanged. Test: TestOwnerOnlyMiddleware_RoleLookupFailureIs503 (roles table renamed, whitebox — through the full stack the perimeter would answer its own 503). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A17Uq3d2C36rN82Jitf3wo
152 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
152 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
package admin
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"log/slog"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/auth"
|
|
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
|
|
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/permissions"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// ─── Middleware ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
// RequireAdminAuth is the exported admin gate for surfaces outside this
|
|
// package (api/router.go's plugin admin handler). Those routes stay
|
|
// ADMINISTRATOR-only, so it chains the perimeter check with an explicit
|
|
// ADMINISTRATOR requirement rather than exposing the widened perimeter.
|
|
func RequireAdminAuth(database *db.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
perimeter := adminAuthMiddleware(database)
|
|
administrator := requirePerm(permissions.Administrator)
|
|
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return perimeter(administrator(next))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// adminAuthMiddleware validates the Bearer token and requires at least one
|
|
// moderation-capable bit (permissions.AdminPerimeter) — not ADMINISTRATOR, so
|
|
// a Moderator role can reach the routes its bits allow. Individual route
|
|
// groups re-check the specific bit they need via requirePerm.
|
|
// On success it stores the *db.User, *db.Role and *db.Session in the request
|
|
// context so downstream handlers can retrieve them without re-querying.
|
|
func adminAuthMiddleware(database *db.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
token, ok := auth.ExtractBearerToken(r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "missing or invalid authorization header")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hash := auth.HashToken(token)
|
|
// Resolve the bearer token: login session first, then API token. An
|
|
// API token inherits its owning user's role, so a token whose user
|
|
// clears the perimeter authenticates here too and /admin/api/*
|
|
// works for headless clients.
|
|
user, role, sess, err := auth.ResolveTokenHash(r.Context(), database, hash)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrTokenExpired):
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "session has expired")
|
|
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrUserNotFound):
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "user not found")
|
|
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrRoleNotFound):
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "role not found")
|
|
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrTokenNotFound):
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "invalid or expired session")
|
|
default:
|
|
// A wrapped DB error, not one of the sentinels above (mirrors
|
|
// api.AuthMiddleware). A DB outage is not a bad token:
|
|
// answering 401 here would make the client treat a live,
|
|
// valid session as expired — the desktop client's doFetch
|
|
// 401 sink clears auth and deletes the stored credential for
|
|
// a session that was never revoked. Log it and report the
|
|
// failure as a server-side fault instead.
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "admin: token resolution failed", "error", err)
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE", "authentication service temporarily unavailable")
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// F1: reject effectively-banned users before any further processing,
|
|
// as api.AuthMiddleware does — a ban must revoke admin-panel access
|
|
// immediately, not only once the session expires. Deliberately placed
|
|
// AFTER ResolveTokenHash so it also covers the API-token path this
|
|
// commit introduces; gating only the session branch would let a
|
|
// banned administrator keep working through a bot token.
|
|
if auth.IsEffectivelyBanned(user) {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "your account has been suspended")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !permissions.HasAnyPerm(role.Permissions, permissions.AdminPerimeter) {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "moderation permission required")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), adminUserKey, user)
|
|
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, adminRoleKey, role)
|
|
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, adminSessionKey, sess) // nil for API-token principals; consumers guard nil
|
|
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, adminTokenHashKey, hash)
|
|
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// requirePerm gates a route group on a single server-wide permission bit.
|
|
// ADMINISTRATOR bypasses via permissions.HasServerPerm. The role comes from
|
|
// the request context (set by adminAuthMiddleware), so no extra query runs.
|
|
func requirePerm(perm int64) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
role, ok := r.Context().Value(adminRoleKey).(*db.Role)
|
|
if !ok || role == nil {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "not authenticated")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if !permissions.HasServerPerm(role.Permissions, perm) {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN",
|
|
permissions.Name(perm)+" permission required")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ownerOnlyMiddleware wraps a handler to require Owner role (position == 100).
|
|
// It reads the user from context (set by adminAuthMiddleware) rather than
|
|
// re-authenticating, avoiding redundant DB queries and session-expiry gaps.
|
|
func ownerOnlyMiddleware(database *db.DB, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
user, ok := r.Context().Value(adminUserKey).(*db.User)
|
|
if !ok || user == nil {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "not authenticated")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
role, err := database.GetRoleByID(r.Context(), user.RoleID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// A read fault is an outage, not a missing role: answering 403
|
|
// would tell the Owner they lack the Owner role. Mirror the
|
|
// perimeter's contract above — log it, report 503 (OC-0345).
|
|
slog.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "admin: owner role lookup failed", "error", err)
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE", "authorization service temporarily unavailable")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if role == nil {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "role not found")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if role.Position < permissions.OwnerRolePosition {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "owner role required")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|