Files
Stirling-PDF/.github/workflows/_runner-pick.yml
T
dependabot[bot] e51885b379 build(deps): bump step-security/harden-runner from 2.20.0 to 2.21.0 (#7623)
Bumps
[step-security/harden-runner](https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner)
from 2.20.0 to 2.21.0.
<details>
<summary>Release notes</summary>
<p><em>Sourced from <a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/releases">step-security/harden-runner's
releases</a>.</em></p>
<blockquote>
<h2>v2.21.0</h2>
<h2>What's Changed</h2>
<ul>
<li>Support for denied endpoints in block mode. This is included in the
enterprise tier. Customers can deny outbound calls, for example, to
public package registries.</li>
<li>Improved Support for AWS CodeBuild GitHub Actions Runners.</li>
<li>Bug fixes.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Full Changelog</strong>: <a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/compare/v2.20.1...v2.21.0">https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/compare/v2.20.1...v2.21.0</a></p>
<h2>v2.20.1</h2>
<h2>What's Changed</h2>
<ul>
<li>AWS CodeBuild-hosted runner support</li>
<li>Implicitly allow single-labeled (internal) domains in
block-mode</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Full Changelog</strong>: <a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/compare/v2.20.0...v2.20.1">https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/compare/v2.20.0...v2.20.1</a></p>
</blockquote>
</details>
<details>
<summary>Commits</summary>
<ul>
<li><a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/commit/05e31511f85b41b11d1cf0ef85d0992719546e2c"><code>05e3151</code></a>
Merge pull request <a
href="https://redirect.github.com/step-security/harden-runner/issues/684">#684</a>
from step-security/rc-42</li>
<li><a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/commit/0f37afa338f57c61ee3dfc274daca8834963d83e"><code>0f37afa</code></a>
fix: ignore denied-endpoints on non-enterprise tier</li>
<li><a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/commit/93b58ee491c5b6cf3a5324966fca2908f8d447f3"><code>93b58ee</code></a>
fix: resolve cache host read-first and never downgrade egress
policy</li>
<li><a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/commit/e7399dd3e93d6c159d314af54b4704bc48abf6bc"><code>e7399dd</code></a>
fix: align deny-list mode detection with agent and log when both
endpoint inp...</li>
<li><a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/commit/c16689f716a10cdfd9cfe22e63938b8c6c0657de"><code>c16689f</code></a>
test: add denied_endpoints to Configuration fixtures and cover deny-list
merge</li>
<li><a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/commit/40b99cf0c7161e4dcdc6c5508927188b65028df9"><code>40b99cf</code></a>
Merge pull request <a
href="https://redirect.github.com/step-security/harden-runner/issues/682">#682</a>
from rohan-stepsecurity/rp/feat/codebuild-self-v2</li>
<li><a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/commit/fedec027a205365a7d64001a81931e4c36a1af6e"><code>fedec02</code></a>
Merge branch 'rc-42' into rp/feat/codebuild-self-v2</li>
<li><a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/commit/5361fb178b926b2be6df52e11ee257823821567b"><code>5361fb1</code></a>
feat: add build artifacts</li>
<li><a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/commit/286474fffe0b8fe7c9db855f132d04a9b48ab564"><code>286474f</code></a>
feat: Support Bravo agent install on CodeBuild runners</li>
<li><a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/commit/051ec05283d064bd82f41279db4f70f0717bf778"><code>051ec05</code></a>
Merge pull request <a
href="https://redirect.github.com/step-security/harden-runner/issues/683">#683</a>
from h0x0er/jatin/deny-list</li>
<li>Additional commits viewable in <a
href="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/compare/v2.20.0...05e31511f85b41b11d1cf0ef85d0992719546e2c">compare
view</a></li>
</ul>
</details>
<br />

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-24 17:39:57 +00:00

68 lines
2.0 KiB
YAML

name: _runner-pick
# Tiny reusable workflow that classifies the trigger as either a "fork PR
# from an untrusted contributor" or a "trusted commit" so downstream jobs
# can trust-gate (skip secret-dependent jobs on forks) without each one
# duplicating the gate expression.
#
# Caller pattern:
#
# jobs:
# pick:
# uses: ./.github/workflows/_runner-pick.yml
#
# real-work:
# needs: pick
# if: needs.pick.outputs.is_fork != 'true'
# steps: [...]
#
# Outputs:
# is_fork: "true" when the trigger is a pull_request from a fork or an
# untrusted author_association, "false" otherwise.
on:
workflow_call:
outputs:
is_fork:
description: '"true" if the trigger is an untrusted fork PR.'
value: ${{ jobs.pick.outputs.is_fork }}
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
pick:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 1
outputs:
is_fork: ${{ steps.decide.outputs.is_fork }}
steps:
- name: Harden the runner (Audit all outbound calls)
uses: step-security/harden-runner@05e31511f85b41b11d1cf0ef85d0992719546e2c # v2.21.0
with:
egress-policy: audit
- name: Classify the trigger
id: decide
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
HEAD_REPO_FORK: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork }}
AUTHOR_ASSOC: ${{ github.event.pull_request.author_association }}
run: |
set -eu
if [ -z "${PR_NUMBER:-}" ]; then
# Not a pull_request event at all (push, schedule, workflow_dispatch,
# workflow_call from a non-PR trigger) -> trusted by default.
is_fork=false
elif [ "${HEAD_REPO_FORK}" = "true" ]; then
is_fork=true
else
case "${AUTHOR_ASSOC}" in
OWNER|MEMBER|COLLABORATOR) is_fork=false ;;
*) is_fork=true ;;
esac
fi
echo "is_fork=${is_fork}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"