Files
OwnCord/Server/admin/setup_handler.go
T
J3vbandClaude Opus 5 39551de4a6 refactor(server): work off the complexity backlog — 62 findings to 0 (#1389)
* refactor(ws): split handleVoiceJoin into cohesive join-stage helpers

handleVoiceJoin was 130 statements / cyclomatic 59 / nestif 11, breaking all
three complexity budgets at once. Split along the stage boundaries the doc
comment already described: precheck, leave-current, persist, restore
moderator flags, grant token, complete. The publish-permission derivation
becomes its own helper because it is the one branch-heavy block inside the
token grant.

Pure move: every statement is preserved verbatim. The only edits are bare
`return`s becoming the typed returns of their new helper, `c.userID` becoming
the `userID` parameter inside voiceJoinPublishPerms, and voiceJoinComplete
re-reading `ch.VoiceMaxUsers` instead of receiving it — `ch` is never mutated,
so the value is identical.

Verified by normalising both revisions of the region to sorted, comment- and
whitespace-stripped statements and diffing: the only deltas are the ones
listed above.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: collapse the three duplicated sibling pairs

dupl flagged three pairs of adjacent near-identical functions. Each pair is
now one parameterised implementation plus two thin, still-greppable wrappers.

- ws/voice_controls.go: handleVoiceMuteV2 / handleVoiceDeafenV2 share
  voiceSelfToggleV2; handleVoiceCameraV2 / handleVoiceScreenshareV2 share
  voiceStreamToggleV2. Camera and screenshare drawing from one
  voice_max_video budget (OC-0023) was a bug caused by exactly this
  duplication drifting, so one body is the point, not a side effect.
- db/mention_queries.go: ListMentionTargetsByRoles / ListMentionTargetsByUserIDs
  share listMentionTargets. The matched column is a closed named type
  (mentionTargetColumn) rather than a bare string, so the value interpolated
  into the SELECT cannot become caller-supplied.

Behaviour is unchanged: every rate-limit key, error code, error string, slog
message and slog key is preserved verbatim, including the two "failed to
update <kind> state" messages, which are now assembled the same way
enableVideoSlot already assembled them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): extract readEmojiUpload from handleCreateEmoji

handleCreateEmoji was 101 lines against a 100-line budget. The upload-bytes
stage — pull the file out of the parsed form, cap its size, sniff its MIME
type and sniff its dimensions — is the one self-contained block in it, and it
already wrote its own refusals, so it moves out whole as readEmojiUpload.

The permission-before-parse ordering the doc comment calls out is unchanged;
so is every error string. file.Close() now runs when the helper returns
rather than when the handler does, which is strictly earlier and unobservable:
the bytes are already copied into raw and nothing else touches the handle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: extract one cohesive block from three single-budget offenders

Each of these was over exactly one budget, so each gets exactly one extraction
rather than a restructure:

- api/totp_handler.go handleVerifyTOTP (102 lines / 100): the block that
  resolves the user behind the partial-auth challenge and decrypts their TOTP
  secret becomes totpChallengeSecret. The ban-inside-the-partial-window check
  moves with it.
- service/message_reactions.go handleReaction (cyclop 21 / 20): the whole
  authorisation chain — channel lookup, archived gate, DM participant and
  block checks, non-DM permission check — becomes reactionAudience, which
  also returns the DM fan-out audience it already resolved. Check order is
  unchanged and load-bearing.
- db/admin_queries.go BackupToSafe (cyclop 21 / 20): the character allowlist
  loop and the SQL-comment rejection become validateBackupPathChars. That
  loop alone was most of the branch count.

No error string, no check and no ordering changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(plugin): split InstallFromZip into staged install helpers

104 statements / cyclomatic 44 / nestif 12. Split along the stages the code
already had: installZipExtract (the per-entry write loop, with
installZipEntryDest holding the mode/symlink/zip-slip guard chain and
installZipWriteEntry the size-capped copy), installZipStagedManifest,
installZipPromote, and installZipReactivate for the :399 nested block.

Every zip-slip, symlink, entry-mode and uncompressed-size check is preserved
in the same order relative to the writes it guards. The 19 inline
`cleanup(); return` sites collapse to 4 in the orchestrator, one per stage,
because each helper now returns an error instead of unwinding itself — the
staging directory is still removed on exactly the same set of failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): split newWAFMiddleware into engine build and per-phase helpers

184 lines / cyclomatic 38, and the request-body block at :382 was the worst
nested site in the tree at nestif 17.

Engine construction moves out of the closure (wafInlineEngine, wafCRSEngine —
the Coraza directive string is lifted verbatim), and each request phase
becomes its own helper: wafInlineRequestHeaders, wafCRSRequestHeaders
(including the Host/Transfer-Encoding re-add for CRS 920280), wafFeedCRSBody
and wafInspectRequestBody, which is the old :382 block.

The three `handleWAFInterruption(w, it); return` sites inside the body block
become one: the helper now returns the interruption and the orchestrator
handles it. No statement runs between the two points on either side, so the
verdict is honoured identically — in particular a CRS body interruption still
returns without replacing r.Body.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(service): split SendMessage and lift EditMessage's access check

SendMessage was 79 statements / cyclomatic 35 with an 11-deep nested
attachment block at :101; EditMessage was one point over cyclop.

SendMessage becomes sendMessagePrecheck (permission and DM-block gates,
content sanitisation), sendMessageLinkAttachments (the :101 block: attachment
ownership, claim and link) and sendMessageDMSideEffects. EditMessage gets
editMessageCheckAccess and nothing else — one budget over earns one
extraction.

The sanitizeContent fixpoint and the attachment ownership check are unchanged,
as is the order of every gate. The DM side effects run behind
`isDM && !s.sendMessageDMSideEffects(...)`, so a non-DM never enters them;
inside, only the GetDMParticipantIDs failure returns false, matching the one
error the original early-returned on.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(admin): split handlePatchUser into per-field apply helpers

106 lines / cyclomatic 29, with the ban block at :154 nested 9 deep.

Each optional field of the partial edit becomes its own helper —
patchUserPrecheck, patchUserAuthorizeRole, patchUserApplyBan (the :154 block,
including the session disconnect and the broadcast) and patchUserApplyRole.
Each returns a bool meaning "keep going"; none of them writes a success
response, so the single response site in the orchestrator is unchanged.

Field application order, the permission-cache invalidation on a role change
and the disconnect-and-broadcast on a ban are all preserved, as are the three
fail-closed `mod == nil` guards, which now sit at the top of their own helper
and still fire on exactly the same conditions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(admin): split handleSetup into first-run setup stages

143 lines / cyclomatic 30, with the optional-wizard block at :219 sitting
exactly on the nestif threshold.

Split into the stages the endpoint already had: request gating (rate limit and
origin check, which run before any auth exists on a fresh server), owner
account creation, and the wizard application that was the :219 block.

Every gate in front of the handler is a security control on an unauthenticated
endpoint; none moved relative to the work it protects. setup_wizard.go is
untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: split run() into named bootstrap and shutdown steps

131 statements / cyclomatic 57, with the executable-path fallback at :126
nested 9 deep.

The five anonymous `defer func(){...}()` blocks become named functions —
telemetryStop, runClosePlugins, runStopEventPersistence, runStopAuditWriter,
maintenanceStop — and the bootstrap stages move out likewise.

Every defer is still registered in run() itself, at the same point in the
sequence, so the LIFO teardown order is unchanged; that order is documented
in the surrounding comments and is load-bearing (the audit-writer stop must
follow database.Close's registration, the event-persistence stop must precede
it). runStopEventPersistence is now registered unconditionally with a nil
persister meaning "disabled", where the old code registered its defer inside
the enabled branch — a no-op occupying that slot cannot change the relative
order of the others.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(ws): split handleReconnect into resume stages

77 statements / cyclomatic 41, plus the replay block at :199 and, in
handleFreshConnect, the voice-state restore at :622.

handleReconnect becomes reconnectPrecheck, reconnectSelectReplay (with
reconnectVetColdTail for the cold-tier gap check), reconnectRegister and
reconnectWriteReplay. handleFreshConnect's stale-voice cleanup moves to its
own helper, where the `if h.livekit != nil` wrapper becomes a guard clause —
that block was the tail of its scope, so returning early and falling off the
end are the same.

The parts that carry the invariants are moved verbatim: reconnectRegister
still takes h.seqMu, still calls registerNow inside that same critical
section (BUG-123 / OC-0206), still unlocks on every exit, and still emits the
"full" tier counter and telemetry on each of its three re-check failures.
handleReconnect's two-boolean contract is unchanged — the collapsed
`return false, false` sites are all fall-through-to-full-ready, and the
single `return true, false` is still the handshake-write-failure path whose
teardown already ran (OC-0051).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(server): fold in the adversarial review of the complexity refactors

Eleven skeptic passes over the refactor commits on this branch found no
blocker and no major — behaviour is preserved throughout. They did find
comment and accuracy defects worth correcting:

- db/mention_queries.go: the mentionTargetColumn rationale claimed the named
  type made the interpolated column "only ever one of the two constants". A
  Go named type is not closed, so that is a convention the type makes visible,
  not one it enforces. Reworded, gosec justification included.
- ws/voice_controls.go: the dupl collapse generalised away three specifics —
  that a server deafen is the moderator's to lift (now on the serverDeafen
  field), the concrete voice_states.camera / voice_states.screenshare column
  names, and the half of the OC-0023 rationale about neither stream kind
  hiding from the other's count. All three restored.
- ws/voice_join.go: `maxUsers := ch.VoiceMaxUsers` had been hoisted to the top
  of voiceJoinComplete, moving a read across the tail supersession guard. The
  read is inert, but it was the one statement in that commit whose position
  relative to a security guard changed; it now sits at its use, as before.
- ws/*_test.go: three test comments cited voice_join.go line numbers that the
  split invalidated. They now cite the helper by name instead.
- service/message_reactions.go: reactionAudience's doc claimed to enforce
  "every gate on reacting"; it enforces the channel-scoped ones, and the doc
  now says which gates stay with the caller.
- api/emoji_handler.go: the readEmojiUpload call reused the outer `ok` from
  the auth check by assignment; it gets its own readOK.
- admin/setup_handler.go: a moved comment kept a "the response above" deictic
  that no longer had a response above it.

No behaviour change. Build, vet, full tests and -race on five packages green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(ws): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the hub

Eight files, thirteen findings. Each function is split at the stages it
already had; no branch is reordered, merged or inverted.

- handlers.go handleMessage (cyclop 28, 88 stmts): session re-check, frame
  decode and result application become handleMessageSessionRecheck,
  handleMessageDecode and handleMessageApply. The V2 constructor lookup ->
  DispatchV2 -> Result resolution order is untouched.
- serve_ready.go buildReady (cyclop 26, 61 stmts): the per-section fetches
  split out, readyChannelPayloads among them. Every visibility predicate is
  preserved verbatim — this is the payload that decides what a client may see.
- serve_pumps.go writePump (cyclop 31): writePumpWrite, writePumpDeliver,
  writePumpDrainChannel and writePumpDrainAndClose. Every channel receive
  stays in the same select statement, so scheduling is unchanged.
- hub_sweep.go sweepStaleVoiceStates (cyclop 22, 56 stmts): the staleness
  predicate, the hub-lock ordering and the position of the race hook are all
  as they were — handleVoiceJoin's BUG-088 ordering depends on them.
- hub_broadcast.go channelReadAudienceImpl and RefreshChannelVisibility
  (cyclop 22 each, 57 stmts): channelReadAudienceDM and
  refreshChannelVisibilityCanSend. The audience predicate is the OC-0090
  group-DM leak surface, so it is extracted, never simplified.
- livekit_webhook.go (nestif 13 and 14): webhookJoinedEnforceVoiceState,
  webhookLeftCleanupClient and webhookLeftFinishLeave. DB delete still
  precedes broadcast on every path.
- livekit_download.go EnsureLiveKitBinary (52 stmts): one extraction,
  ensureLiveKitStageBinary, keeping every archive path check intact.
- voice_moderation.go (nestif 8): voiceModDeafenRollback. The persisted
  server_muted flag remains the authority.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the HTTP layer

- router.go NewRouter (cyclop 28, 84 stmts): split by wiring concern into
  routerTOTPKey, routerHealthDeps, routerMiddleware, routerUploadRoutes,
  routerPluginWiring, routerVoiceRoutes and routerMetricsRoutes. Middleware
  ORDER is a security property (auth before handler, WAF before body parse,
  rate limit before work) and is unchanged; the returned cleanup func still
  closes over and releases everything it did before.
- auth_handler.go handleRegister (133 lines) and handleLogin (cyclop 21,
  152 lines): registerPolicyGate, registerReadRequest, loginReadRequest and
  loginAuthenticate. The always-compare posture, every rate-limit key, every
  counter reset and the ban-check-versus-password-compare order are all
  preserved — including loginUserFailureThreshold staying unscaled by
  scaledAuthLimit, which is deliberate and commented.
- upload_handler.go handleServeFile (cyclop 31, 128 lines): serveFileResolve
  and serveFileAuthorize. Every header this sets — Content-Disposition
  included, which is what stops a stored file being served as active content —
  is still set with the same value in the same circumstances.
- profile_handler.go handleUploadAvatar (120 lines): avatarUploadReadImage,
  mirroring readEmojiUpload in shape but with the avatar caps and MIME set.
  The two deliberately do not share a helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: clear the last complexity budgets in db and admin

- db/account.go DeleteAccount (cyclop 28, 55 stmts): grouped by subsystem into
  deleteAccountAdminGuard, deleteAccountDMChannels and
  deleteAccountCloseDMChannels, each taking the same transaction. The
  transaction boundary, the delete ORDER (which foreign keys depend on) and
  the rollback path are unchanged.
- admin/logstream.go handleLogStream (cyclop 24): logStreamAuthorize. Flush
  cadence, heartbeat and disconnect detection untouched.
- admin/setup_wizard.go validateWizard (cyclop 23): grouped by section into
  wizardValidateIdentity, wizardValidateNetwork and wizardValidateMedia. Every
  message and bound is unchanged — this is the first input-validation boundary
  on a fresh server, before any auth exists.

With this the tree is at zero: golangci-lint run reports 0 issues against the
budgets set in #1384 (funlen 100/50, cyclop 20, nestif 8, dupl 150), with no
//nolint and no exclusion added anywhere.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 20:39:45 +02:00

371 lines
14 KiB
Go

package admin
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/microcosm-cc/bluemonday"
"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
"github.com/owncord/server/config"
"github.com/owncord/server/db"
)
// setupSanitizer strips all HTML from user input during setup.
var setupSanitizer = bluemonday.StrictPolicy()
// ownerRoleID is the role ID assigned to the first user (Owner).
const ownerRoleID = 1
// setupStatusResponse is the JSON shape returned by GET /api/setup/status.
type setupStatusResponse struct {
NeedsSetup bool `json:"needs_setup"`
// Defaults prefills the setup wizard. Present only while setup is needed
// and the server was wired with its running config (see SetupOptions).
Defaults *setupDefaults `json:"defaults,omitempty"`
}
// setupRequest is the JSON body for POST /api/setup.
type setupRequest struct {
Username string `json:"username"`
Password string `json:"password"`
// Wizard carries the optional first-run configuration. Absent = legacy
// behaviour: create the owner account only.
Wizard *setupWizardRequest `json:"wizard,omitempty"`
}
// setupResponse is the JSON shape returned on successful setup.
type setupResponse struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
UserID int64 `json:"user_id"`
Username string `json:"username"`
InviteCode string `json:"invite_code"`
// RestartRequired is true when wizard values that are only read at
// startup differ from the running config; the server restarts itself
// right after this response is sent.
RestartRequired bool `json:"restart_required"`
// RestartURL is where the admin panel will be reachable after the
// restart (scheme/port may have changed). Empty when no restart happens.
RestartURL string `json:"restart_url,omitempty"`
// Warnings lists non-fatal problems (e.g. config.yaml not writable).
// The account exists whenever this response is returned.
Warnings []string `json:"warnings,omitempty"`
}
// handleSetupStatus returns whether initial setup is needed (no users exist).
func handleSetupStatus(database *db.DB, opts SetupOptions) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
count, err := database.UserCount(r.Context())
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to check user count")
return
}
resp := setupStatusResponse{NeedsSetup: count == 0}
// Prefill defaults are only exposed pre-setup: after the first user
// exists this endpoint reveals nothing about the configuration.
if resp.NeedsSetup && opts.RunningCfg != nil {
cfg := opts.RunningCfg
d := &setupDefaults{
ServerName: cfg.Server.Name,
Motd: "Welcome!",
Port: cfg.Server.Port,
TLSMode: cfg.TLS.Mode,
TLSDomain: cfg.TLS.Domain,
UploadMaxSizeMB: cfg.Upload.MaxSizeMB,
VoiceQuality: cfg.Voice.Quality,
VoiceAutoDownload: cfg.Voice.AutoDownloadLiveKit,
}
// The settings table is authoritative for the values the app
// reads live; fall back to the config/seed values on error.
if v, err := database.GetSetting(r.Context(), "server_name"); err == nil && v != "" {
d.ServerName = v
}
if v, err := database.GetSetting(r.Context(), "motd"); err == nil {
d.Motd = v
}
if v, err := database.GetSetting(r.Context(), "registration_open"); err == nil {
d.RegistrationOpen = v == "1" || strings.EqualFold(v, "true")
}
resp.Defaults = d
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
}
// handleSetup creates the first owner account and, when the request carries
// a wizard payload, applies the chosen settings (DB + config.yaml) and
// restarts the server if startup-only values changed. It only works when no
// users exist in the database, preventing abuse after initial setup.
func handleSetup(database *db.DB, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, allowedOrigins []string, hub HubBroadcaster, opts SetupOptions) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
req, host, ok := setupPrecheck(w, r, limiter, allowedOrigins)
if !ok {
return
}
uid, token, inviteCode, ok := setupCreateOwner(w, r, database, req, host)
if !ok {
return
}
warnings, restartRequired, restartURL := setupApplyWizard(r.Context(), database, req.Wizard, uid, r.Host, opts)
slog.Info("server setup completed", "owner", req.Username, "user_id", uid, "wizard", req.Wizard != nil, "restart", restartRequired)
db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), database, uid, "server_setup", "server", 0,
"initial setup: owner account created, default channel and invite generated")
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, setupResponse{
Token: token,
UserID: uid,
Username: req.Username,
InviteCode: inviteCode,
RestartRequired: restartRequired,
RestartURL: restartURL,
Warnings: warnings,
})
if restartRequired {
setupRestartAfterResponse(hub, opts)
}
}
}
// setupPrecheck runs every gate in front of the first-run setup endpoint —
// origin check, rate limit, body decode, credential and wizard validation —
// before any state is created. It writes the error response itself; ok=false
// means the caller must return immediately. The returned host is the
// rate-limit bucket key, reused as the session IP.
func setupPrecheck(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, allowedOrigins []string) (setupRequest, string, bool) {
var req setupRequest
// CSRF protection: reject cross-origin requests (BUG-097).
// A request is accepted when it is same-origin, or when its Origin is
// explicitly allowlisted. Absent Origin = non-browser client (allow).
if origin := r.Header.Get("Origin"); origin != "" {
if !isSameOrigin(origin, r.Host) && !isSetupOriginAllowed(origin, allowedOrigins) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "cross-origin setup request blocked")
return req, "", false
}
}
// Rate limit: 5 attempts per minute per IP.
// Strip the port so that different source ports from the same IP
// are correctly grouped under a single rate-limit bucket.
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
host = r.RemoteAddr
}
setupKey := "setup:" + host
if !limiter.Allow(setupKey, 5, time.Minute) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "RATE_LIMITED", "too many setup attempts, try again later")
return req, "", false
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "invalid request body")
return req, "", false
}
req.Username = strings.TrimSpace(setupSanitizer.Sanitize(req.Username))
if req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "username and password are required")
return req, "", false
}
// Validate username format (length, no control/invisible chars).
if err := auth.ValidateUsername(req.Username); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", err.Error())
return req, "", false
}
if err := auth.ValidatePasswordStrength(req.Password); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", err.Error())
return req, "", false
}
// Validate the whole wizard payload BEFORE creating the account so a
// bad value rejects the request instead of leaving a half-configured
// server behind an already-created owner.
if req.Wizard != nil {
if err := validateWizard(req.Wizard); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", err.Error())
return req, "", false
}
}
return req, host, true
}
// setupCreateOwner creates the owner account and everything that ships with
// it: the session token, the default channels and the bootstrap invite. It
// writes the error response itself; ok=false means the caller must return
// immediately.
func setupCreateOwner(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, database *db.DB, req setupRequest, host string) (int64, string, string, bool) {
// Hash the password.
hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.Password)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to hash password")
return 0, "", "", false
}
// Atomically check no users exist and create the owner (BUG-119).
// This closes the TOCTOU race between UserCount() and CreateUser().
uid, err := database.CreateOwnerIfEmpty(r.Context(), req.Username, hash, ownerRoleID)
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrConflict) {
writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "setup has already been completed")
return 0, "", "", false
}
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to create user")
return 0, "", "", false
}
// Issue a session token so the user is immediately logged in.
token, err := auth.GenerateToken()
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to generate session token")
return 0, "", "", false
}
device := r.Header.Get("User-Agent")
const maxDeviceLen = 512
if len(device) > maxDeviceLen {
device = device[:maxDeviceLen]
}
if _, err := database.CreateSession(r.Context(), uid, auth.HashToken(token), device, host); err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to create session")
return 0, "", "", false
}
// Create default channels under canonical categories.
_, _ = database.CreateChannel(r.Context(), "general", "text", "Text Channels", "Welcome to the server!", 0)
_, _ = database.CreateChannel(r.Context(), "General", "voice", "Voice Channels", "", 0)
// Generate a bootstrap invite code so the owner can invite others.
// Bound it (5 uses / 24h) rather than minting an unlimited, non-expiring
// invite — the owner can create fresh invites once logged in.
bootstrapInviteExpiry := time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)
inviteCode, err := database.CreateInvite(r.Context(), uid, 5, &bootstrapInviteExpiry)
if err != nil {
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to generate invite code")
return 0, "", "", false
}
return uid, token, inviteCode, true
}
// setupApplyWizard applies the wizard payload. wr == nil is the legacy
// request shape (create the owner account only) and applies nothing. reqHost
// is the request's Host header, from which the post-restart admin-panel URL
// is derived.
//
// The account exists from here on, so any
// failure downgrades to a warning — never a 5xx that would orphan the
// owner behind an opaque error.
func setupApplyWizard(ctx context.Context, database *db.DB, wr *setupWizardRequest, uid int64, reqHost string, opts SetupOptions) ([]string, bool, string) {
var warnings []string
restartRequired := false
restartURL := ""
if wr == nil {
return warnings, restartRequired, restartURL
}
if err := applyWizardSettings(ctx, database, wr); err != nil {
slog.Error("setup wizard: saving settings failed", "error", err)
warnings = append(warnings,
"could not save server settings: "+err.Error()+" — adjust them later in the admin panel's Settings page")
}
if opts.ConfigPath != "" {
if err := config.Save(opts.ConfigPath, buildConfigPatch(wr, opts.RunningCfg)); err != nil {
slog.Error("setup wizard: writing config failed", "path", opts.ConfigPath, "error", err)
warnings = append(warnings,
"could not write "+opts.ConfigPath+": "+err.Error()+" — your account was created; edit the file manually to apply these settings")
} else {
db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), database, uid, "config_write", "server", 0,
"setup wizard wrote "+opts.ConfigPath+" ("+patchedConfigKeys(wr)+")")
if opts.RunningCfg != nil && wizardChangesRunningConfig(wr, opts.RunningCfg) {
restartRequired = true
restartURL = computeRestartURL(reqHost, wr, opts.RunningCfg)
}
}
}
return warnings, restartRequired, restartURL
}
// setupRestartAfterResponse hands the setup-wizard restart off to main.go.
//
// Called by handleSetup only after it has written its response, so the
// browser receives the token and the reconnect URL before the process
// goes away. Mirrors handleRestoreBackup / handleApplyUpdate: broadcast,
// then request the restart in a goroutine — main.go drains the server and
// performs the handoff. tryDirectRestartPending loses only to an already
// in-flight update or restore, which will itself restart the process;
// skipping is correct then, since the caller's response is written either
// way.
func setupRestartAfterResponse(hub HubBroadcaster, opts SetupOptions) {
if !tryDirectRestartPending() {
slog.Warn("setup restart skipped: another restart-sensitive operation is already in progress")
return
}
if hub != nil {
hub.BroadcastServerRestart("setup", restartBroadcastDelaySeconds)
}
restartFn := opts.Restart
if restartFn == nil {
restartFn = requestRestart
}
go restartFn("setup_wizard")
}
// restartBroadcastDelaySeconds is the countdown clients are told before the
// setup-wizard restart. There are normally no chat clients connected during
// first-run setup, so this is informational.
const restartBroadcastDelaySeconds = 3
// isSameOrigin reports whether a browser-supplied Origin names this same
// server, by comparing its host:port against the request's Host header.
//
// Browsers send Origin on same-origin POSTs too (Chrome and Edge always,
// Firefox since 70), so the admin panel's own first-run setup call arrives
// carrying one. Without this check it is measured against allowed_origins,
// which is empty in a freshly generated config — so setup failed with
// "cross-origin setup request blocked" on every new install.
//
// Scheme is deliberately not compared. Nothing in this server derives the
// external scheme (there is no r.TLS or X-Forwarded-Proto handling anywhere),
// so a TLS-terminating proxy in front would make a scheme check reject
// legitimate requests. Matching host:port is enough: forging it requires
// already serving content on this exact host and port, at which point the
// origin is not the attacker's to borrow. Cross-site attackers cannot set
// Origin at all — the browser does.
func isSameOrigin(origin, host string) bool {
if host == "" {
return false
}
u, err := url.Parse(origin)
// Require a scheme so a schemeless "//host:port" cannot pass as same-origin.
if err != nil || u.Scheme == "" || u.Host == "" {
return false
}
return strings.EqualFold(u.Host, host)
}
// isSetupOriginAllowed checks if the given origin is permitted by the
// configured allowed_origins list. Wildcard "*" allows any origin.
// An empty list denies all cross-origin requests (safe default).
func isSetupOriginAllowed(origin string, allowed []string) bool {
for _, a := range allowed {
if a == "*" || strings.EqualFold(a, origin) {
return true
}
}
return false
}