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* refactor(ws): split handleVoiceJoin into cohesive join-stage helpers handleVoiceJoin was 130 statements / cyclomatic 59 / nestif 11, breaking all three complexity budgets at once. Split along the stage boundaries the doc comment already described: precheck, leave-current, persist, restore moderator flags, grant token, complete. The publish-permission derivation becomes its own helper because it is the one branch-heavy block inside the token grant. Pure move: every statement is preserved verbatim. The only edits are bare `return`s becoming the typed returns of their new helper, `c.userID` becoming the `userID` parameter inside voiceJoinPublishPerms, and voiceJoinComplete re-reading `ch.VoiceMaxUsers` instead of receiving it — `ch` is never mutated, so the value is identical. Verified by normalising both revisions of the region to sorted, comment- and whitespace-stripped statements and diffing: the only deltas are the ones listed above. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: collapse the three duplicated sibling pairs dupl flagged three pairs of adjacent near-identical functions. Each pair is now one parameterised implementation plus two thin, still-greppable wrappers. - ws/voice_controls.go: handleVoiceMuteV2 / handleVoiceDeafenV2 share voiceSelfToggleV2; handleVoiceCameraV2 / handleVoiceScreenshareV2 share voiceStreamToggleV2. Camera and screenshare drawing from one voice_max_video budget (OC-0023) was a bug caused by exactly this duplication drifting, so one body is the point, not a side effect. - db/mention_queries.go: ListMentionTargetsByRoles / ListMentionTargetsByUserIDs share listMentionTargets. The matched column is a closed named type (mentionTargetColumn) rather than a bare string, so the value interpolated into the SELECT cannot become caller-supplied. Behaviour is unchanged: every rate-limit key, error code, error string, slog message and slog key is preserved verbatim, including the two "failed to update <kind> state" messages, which are now assembled the same way enableVideoSlot already assembled them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): extract readEmojiUpload from handleCreateEmoji handleCreateEmoji was 101 lines against a 100-line budget. The upload-bytes stage — pull the file out of the parsed form, cap its size, sniff its MIME type and sniff its dimensions — is the one self-contained block in it, and it already wrote its own refusals, so it moves out whole as readEmojiUpload. The permission-before-parse ordering the doc comment calls out is unchanged; so is every error string. file.Close() now runs when the helper returns rather than when the handler does, which is strictly earlier and unobservable: the bytes are already copied into raw and nothing else touches the handle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract one cohesive block from three single-budget offenders Each of these was over exactly one budget, so each gets exactly one extraction rather than a restructure: - api/totp_handler.go handleVerifyTOTP (102 lines / 100): the block that resolves the user behind the partial-auth challenge and decrypts their TOTP secret becomes totpChallengeSecret. The ban-inside-the-partial-window check moves with it. - service/message_reactions.go handleReaction (cyclop 21 / 20): the whole authorisation chain — channel lookup, archived gate, DM participant and block checks, non-DM permission check — becomes reactionAudience, which also returns the DM fan-out audience it already resolved. Check order is unchanged and load-bearing. - db/admin_queries.go BackupToSafe (cyclop 21 / 20): the character allowlist loop and the SQL-comment rejection become validateBackupPathChars. That loop alone was most of the branch count. No error string, no check and no ordering changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(plugin): split InstallFromZip into staged install helpers 104 statements / cyclomatic 44 / nestif 12. Split along the stages the code already had: installZipExtract (the per-entry write loop, with installZipEntryDest holding the mode/symlink/zip-slip guard chain and installZipWriteEntry the size-capped copy), installZipStagedManifest, installZipPromote, and installZipReactivate for the :399 nested block. Every zip-slip, symlink, entry-mode and uncompressed-size check is preserved in the same order relative to the writes it guards. The 19 inline `cleanup(); return` sites collapse to 4 in the orchestrator, one per stage, because each helper now returns an error instead of unwinding itself — the staging directory is still removed on exactly the same set of failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): split newWAFMiddleware into engine build and per-phase helpers 184 lines / cyclomatic 38, and the request-body block at :382 was the worst nested site in the tree at nestif 17. Engine construction moves out of the closure (wafInlineEngine, wafCRSEngine — the Coraza directive string is lifted verbatim), and each request phase becomes its own helper: wafInlineRequestHeaders, wafCRSRequestHeaders (including the Host/Transfer-Encoding re-add for CRS 920280), wafFeedCRSBody and wafInspectRequestBody, which is the old :382 block. The three `handleWAFInterruption(w, it); return` sites inside the body block become one: the helper now returns the interruption and the orchestrator handles it. No statement runs between the two points on either side, so the verdict is honoured identically — in particular a CRS body interruption still returns without replacing r.Body. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(service): split SendMessage and lift EditMessage's access check SendMessage was 79 statements / cyclomatic 35 with an 11-deep nested attachment block at :101; EditMessage was one point over cyclop. SendMessage becomes sendMessagePrecheck (permission and DM-block gates, content sanitisation), sendMessageLinkAttachments (the :101 block: attachment ownership, claim and link) and sendMessageDMSideEffects. EditMessage gets editMessageCheckAccess and nothing else — one budget over earns one extraction. The sanitizeContent fixpoint and the attachment ownership check are unchanged, as is the order of every gate. The DM side effects run behind `isDM && !s.sendMessageDMSideEffects(...)`, so a non-DM never enters them; inside, only the GetDMParticipantIDs failure returns false, matching the one error the original early-returned on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(admin): split handlePatchUser into per-field apply helpers 106 lines / cyclomatic 29, with the ban block at :154 nested 9 deep. Each optional field of the partial edit becomes its own helper — patchUserPrecheck, patchUserAuthorizeRole, patchUserApplyBan (the :154 block, including the session disconnect and the broadcast) and patchUserApplyRole. Each returns a bool meaning "keep going"; none of them writes a success response, so the single response site in the orchestrator is unchanged. Field application order, the permission-cache invalidation on a role change and the disconnect-and-broadcast on a ban are all preserved, as are the three fail-closed `mod == nil` guards, which now sit at the top of their own helper and still fire on exactly the same conditions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(admin): split handleSetup into first-run setup stages 143 lines / cyclomatic 30, with the optional-wizard block at :219 sitting exactly on the nestif threshold. Split into the stages the endpoint already had: request gating (rate limit and origin check, which run before any auth exists on a fresh server), owner account creation, and the wizard application that was the :219 block. Every gate in front of the handler is a security control on an unauthenticated endpoint; none moved relative to the work it protects. setup_wizard.go is untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split run() into named bootstrap and shutdown steps 131 statements / cyclomatic 57, with the executable-path fallback at :126 nested 9 deep. The five anonymous `defer func(){...}()` blocks become named functions — telemetryStop, runClosePlugins, runStopEventPersistence, runStopAuditWriter, maintenanceStop — and the bootstrap stages move out likewise. Every defer is still registered in run() itself, at the same point in the sequence, so the LIFO teardown order is unchanged; that order is documented in the surrounding comments and is load-bearing (the audit-writer stop must follow database.Close's registration, the event-persistence stop must precede it). runStopEventPersistence is now registered unconditionally with a nil persister meaning "disabled", where the old code registered its defer inside the enabled branch — a no-op occupying that slot cannot change the relative order of the others. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ws): split handleReconnect into resume stages 77 statements / cyclomatic 41, plus the replay block at :199 and, in handleFreshConnect, the voice-state restore at :622. handleReconnect becomes reconnectPrecheck, reconnectSelectReplay (with reconnectVetColdTail for the cold-tier gap check), reconnectRegister and reconnectWriteReplay. handleFreshConnect's stale-voice cleanup moves to its own helper, where the `if h.livekit != nil` wrapper becomes a guard clause — that block was the tail of its scope, so returning early and falling off the end are the same. The parts that carry the invariants are moved verbatim: reconnectRegister still takes h.seqMu, still calls registerNow inside that same critical section (BUG-123 / OC-0206), still unlocks on every exit, and still emits the "full" tier counter and telemetry on each of its three re-check failures. handleReconnect's two-boolean contract is unchanged — the collapsed `return false, false` sites are all fall-through-to-full-ready, and the single `return true, false` is still the handshake-write-failure path whose teardown already ran (OC-0051). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(server): fold in the adversarial review of the complexity refactors Eleven skeptic passes over the refactor commits on this branch found no blocker and no major — behaviour is preserved throughout. They did find comment and accuracy defects worth correcting: - db/mention_queries.go: the mentionTargetColumn rationale claimed the named type made the interpolated column "only ever one of the two constants". A Go named type is not closed, so that is a convention the type makes visible, not one it enforces. Reworded, gosec justification included. - ws/voice_controls.go: the dupl collapse generalised away three specifics — that a server deafen is the moderator's to lift (now on the serverDeafen field), the concrete voice_states.camera / voice_states.screenshare column names, and the half of the OC-0023 rationale about neither stream kind hiding from the other's count. All three restored. - ws/voice_join.go: `maxUsers := ch.VoiceMaxUsers` had been hoisted to the top of voiceJoinComplete, moving a read across the tail supersession guard. The read is inert, but it was the one statement in that commit whose position relative to a security guard changed; it now sits at its use, as before. - ws/*_test.go: three test comments cited voice_join.go line numbers that the split invalidated. They now cite the helper by name instead. - service/message_reactions.go: reactionAudience's doc claimed to enforce "every gate on reacting"; it enforces the channel-scoped ones, and the doc now says which gates stay with the caller. - api/emoji_handler.go: the readEmojiUpload call reused the outer `ok` from the auth check by assignment; it gets its own readOK. - admin/setup_handler.go: a moved comment kept a "the response above" deictic that no longer had a response above it. No behaviour change. Build, vet, full tests and -race on five packages green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ws): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the hub Eight files, thirteen findings. Each function is split at the stages it already had; no branch is reordered, merged or inverted. - handlers.go handleMessage (cyclop 28, 88 stmts): session re-check, frame decode and result application become handleMessageSessionRecheck, handleMessageDecode and handleMessageApply. The V2 constructor lookup -> DispatchV2 -> Result resolution order is untouched. - serve_ready.go buildReady (cyclop 26, 61 stmts): the per-section fetches split out, readyChannelPayloads among them. Every visibility predicate is preserved verbatim — this is the payload that decides what a client may see. - serve_pumps.go writePump (cyclop 31): writePumpWrite, writePumpDeliver, writePumpDrainChannel and writePumpDrainAndClose. Every channel receive stays in the same select statement, so scheduling is unchanged. - hub_sweep.go sweepStaleVoiceStates (cyclop 22, 56 stmts): the staleness predicate, the hub-lock ordering and the position of the race hook are all as they were — handleVoiceJoin's BUG-088 ordering depends on them. - hub_broadcast.go channelReadAudienceImpl and RefreshChannelVisibility (cyclop 22 each, 57 stmts): channelReadAudienceDM and refreshChannelVisibilityCanSend. The audience predicate is the OC-0090 group-DM leak surface, so it is extracted, never simplified. - livekit_webhook.go (nestif 13 and 14): webhookJoinedEnforceVoiceState, webhookLeftCleanupClient and webhookLeftFinishLeave. DB delete still precedes broadcast on every path. - livekit_download.go EnsureLiveKitBinary (52 stmts): one extraction, ensureLiveKitStageBinary, keeping every archive path check intact. - voice_moderation.go (nestif 8): voiceModDeafenRollback. The persisted server_muted flag remains the authority. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): clear the remaining complexity budgets across the HTTP layer - router.go NewRouter (cyclop 28, 84 stmts): split by wiring concern into routerTOTPKey, routerHealthDeps, routerMiddleware, routerUploadRoutes, routerPluginWiring, routerVoiceRoutes and routerMetricsRoutes. Middleware ORDER is a security property (auth before handler, WAF before body parse, rate limit before work) and is unchanged; the returned cleanup func still closes over and releases everything it did before. - auth_handler.go handleRegister (133 lines) and handleLogin (cyclop 21, 152 lines): registerPolicyGate, registerReadRequest, loginReadRequest and loginAuthenticate. The always-compare posture, every rate-limit key, every counter reset and the ban-check-versus-password-compare order are all preserved — including loginUserFailureThreshold staying unscaled by scaledAuthLimit, which is deliberate and commented. - upload_handler.go handleServeFile (cyclop 31, 128 lines): serveFileResolve and serveFileAuthorize. Every header this sets — Content-Disposition included, which is what stops a stored file being served as active content — is still set with the same value in the same circumstances. - profile_handler.go handleUploadAvatar (120 lines): avatarUploadReadImage, mirroring readEmojiUpload in shape but with the avatar caps and MIME set. The two deliberately do not share a helper. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: clear the last complexity budgets in db and admin - db/account.go DeleteAccount (cyclop 28, 55 stmts): grouped by subsystem into deleteAccountAdminGuard, deleteAccountDMChannels and deleteAccountCloseDMChannels, each taking the same transaction. The transaction boundary, the delete ORDER (which foreign keys depend on) and the rollback path are unchanged. - admin/logstream.go handleLogStream (cyclop 24): logStreamAuthorize. Flush cadence, heartbeat and disconnect detection untouched. - admin/setup_wizard.go validateWizard (cyclop 23): grouped by section into wizardValidateIdentity, wizardValidateNetwork and wizardValidateMedia. Every message and bound is unchanged — this is the first input-validation boundary on a fresh server, before any auth exists. With this the tree is at zero: golangci-lint run reports 0 issues against the budgets set in #1384 (funlen 100/50, cyclop 20, nestif 8, dupl 150), with no //nolint and no exclusion added anywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
371 lines
14 KiB
Go
371 lines
14 KiB
Go
package admin
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/microcosm-cc/bluemonday"
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"github.com/owncord/server/auth"
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"github.com/owncord/server/config"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db"
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)
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// setupSanitizer strips all HTML from user input during setup.
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var setupSanitizer = bluemonday.StrictPolicy()
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// ownerRoleID is the role ID assigned to the first user (Owner).
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const ownerRoleID = 1
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// setupStatusResponse is the JSON shape returned by GET /api/setup/status.
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type setupStatusResponse struct {
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NeedsSetup bool `json:"needs_setup"`
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// Defaults prefills the setup wizard. Present only while setup is needed
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// and the server was wired with its running config (see SetupOptions).
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Defaults *setupDefaults `json:"defaults,omitempty"`
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}
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// setupRequest is the JSON body for POST /api/setup.
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type setupRequest struct {
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Username string `json:"username"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
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// Wizard carries the optional first-run configuration. Absent = legacy
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// behaviour: create the owner account only.
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Wizard *setupWizardRequest `json:"wizard,omitempty"`
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}
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// setupResponse is the JSON shape returned on successful setup.
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type setupResponse struct {
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Token string `json:"token"`
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UserID int64 `json:"user_id"`
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Username string `json:"username"`
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InviteCode string `json:"invite_code"`
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// RestartRequired is true when wizard values that are only read at
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// startup differ from the running config; the server restarts itself
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// right after this response is sent.
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RestartRequired bool `json:"restart_required"`
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// RestartURL is where the admin panel will be reachable after the
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// restart (scheme/port may have changed). Empty when no restart happens.
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RestartURL string `json:"restart_url,omitempty"`
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// Warnings lists non-fatal problems (e.g. config.yaml not writable).
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// The account exists whenever this response is returned.
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Warnings []string `json:"warnings,omitempty"`
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}
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// handleSetupStatus returns whether initial setup is needed (no users exist).
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func handleSetupStatus(database *db.DB, opts SetupOptions) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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count, err := database.UserCount(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to check user count")
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return
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}
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resp := setupStatusResponse{NeedsSetup: count == 0}
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// Prefill defaults are only exposed pre-setup: after the first user
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// exists this endpoint reveals nothing about the configuration.
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if resp.NeedsSetup && opts.RunningCfg != nil {
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cfg := opts.RunningCfg
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d := &setupDefaults{
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ServerName: cfg.Server.Name,
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Motd: "Welcome!",
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Port: cfg.Server.Port,
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TLSMode: cfg.TLS.Mode,
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TLSDomain: cfg.TLS.Domain,
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UploadMaxSizeMB: cfg.Upload.MaxSizeMB,
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VoiceQuality: cfg.Voice.Quality,
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VoiceAutoDownload: cfg.Voice.AutoDownloadLiveKit,
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}
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// The settings table is authoritative for the values the app
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// reads live; fall back to the config/seed values on error.
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if v, err := database.GetSetting(r.Context(), "server_name"); err == nil && v != "" {
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d.ServerName = v
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}
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if v, err := database.GetSetting(r.Context(), "motd"); err == nil {
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d.Motd = v
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}
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if v, err := database.GetSetting(r.Context(), "registration_open"); err == nil {
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d.RegistrationOpen = v == "1" || strings.EqualFold(v, "true")
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}
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resp.Defaults = d
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
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}
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}
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// handleSetup creates the first owner account and, when the request carries
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// a wizard payload, applies the chosen settings (DB + config.yaml) and
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// restarts the server if startup-only values changed. It only works when no
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// users exist in the database, preventing abuse after initial setup.
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func handleSetup(database *db.DB, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, allowedOrigins []string, hub HubBroadcaster, opts SetupOptions) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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req, host, ok := setupPrecheck(w, r, limiter, allowedOrigins)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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uid, token, inviteCode, ok := setupCreateOwner(w, r, database, req, host)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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warnings, restartRequired, restartURL := setupApplyWizard(r.Context(), database, req.Wizard, uid, r.Host, opts)
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slog.Info("server setup completed", "owner", req.Username, "user_id", uid, "wizard", req.Wizard != nil, "restart", restartRequired)
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db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), database, uid, "server_setup", "server", 0,
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"initial setup: owner account created, default channel and invite generated")
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, setupResponse{
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Token: token,
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UserID: uid,
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Username: req.Username,
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InviteCode: inviteCode,
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RestartRequired: restartRequired,
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RestartURL: restartURL,
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Warnings: warnings,
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})
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if restartRequired {
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setupRestartAfterResponse(hub, opts)
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}
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}
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}
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// setupPrecheck runs every gate in front of the first-run setup endpoint —
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// origin check, rate limit, body decode, credential and wizard validation —
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// before any state is created. It writes the error response itself; ok=false
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// means the caller must return immediately. The returned host is the
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// rate-limit bucket key, reused as the session IP.
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func setupPrecheck(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, limiter *auth.RateLimiter, allowedOrigins []string) (setupRequest, string, bool) {
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var req setupRequest
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// CSRF protection: reject cross-origin requests (BUG-097).
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// A request is accepted when it is same-origin, or when its Origin is
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// explicitly allowlisted. Absent Origin = non-browser client (allow).
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if origin := r.Header.Get("Origin"); origin != "" {
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if !isSameOrigin(origin, r.Host) && !isSetupOriginAllowed(origin, allowedOrigins) {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "cross-origin setup request blocked")
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return req, "", false
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}
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}
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// Rate limit: 5 attempts per minute per IP.
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// Strip the port so that different source ports from the same IP
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// are correctly grouped under a single rate-limit bucket.
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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host = r.RemoteAddr
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}
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setupKey := "setup:" + host
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if !limiter.Allow(setupKey, 5, time.Minute) {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "RATE_LIMITED", "too many setup attempts, try again later")
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return req, "", false
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}
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "invalid request body")
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return req, "", false
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}
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req.Username = strings.TrimSpace(setupSanitizer.Sanitize(req.Username))
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if req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", "username and password are required")
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return req, "", false
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}
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// Validate username format (length, no control/invisible chars).
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if err := auth.ValidateUsername(req.Username); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", err.Error())
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return req, "", false
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}
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if err := auth.ValidatePasswordStrength(req.Password); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", err.Error())
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return req, "", false
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}
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// Validate the whole wizard payload BEFORE creating the account so a
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// bad value rejects the request instead of leaving a half-configured
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// server behind an already-created owner.
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if req.Wizard != nil {
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if err := validateWizard(req.Wizard); err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "BAD_REQUEST", err.Error())
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return req, "", false
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}
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}
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return req, host, true
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}
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// setupCreateOwner creates the owner account and everything that ships with
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// it: the session token, the default channels and the bootstrap invite. It
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// writes the error response itself; ok=false means the caller must return
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// immediately.
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func setupCreateOwner(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, database *db.DB, req setupRequest, host string) (int64, string, string, bool) {
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// Hash the password.
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hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.Password)
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to hash password")
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return 0, "", "", false
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}
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// Atomically check no users exist and create the owner (BUG-119).
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// This closes the TOCTOU race between UserCount() and CreateUser().
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uid, err := database.CreateOwnerIfEmpty(r.Context(), req.Username, hash, ownerRoleID)
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if errors.Is(err, db.ErrConflict) {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "FORBIDDEN", "setup has already been completed")
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return 0, "", "", false
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}
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to create user")
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return 0, "", "", false
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}
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// Issue a session token so the user is immediately logged in.
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token, err := auth.GenerateToken()
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if err != nil {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to generate session token")
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return 0, "", "", false
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}
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|
device := r.Header.Get("User-Agent")
|
|
const maxDeviceLen = 512
|
|
if len(device) > maxDeviceLen {
|
|
device = device[:maxDeviceLen]
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := database.CreateSession(r.Context(), uid, auth.HashToken(token), device, host); err != nil {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to create session")
|
|
return 0, "", "", false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create default channels under canonical categories.
|
|
_, _ = database.CreateChannel(r.Context(), "general", "text", "Text Channels", "Welcome to the server!", 0)
|
|
_, _ = database.CreateChannel(r.Context(), "General", "voice", "Voice Channels", "", 0)
|
|
|
|
// Generate a bootstrap invite code so the owner can invite others.
|
|
// Bound it (5 uses / 24h) rather than minting an unlimited, non-expiring
|
|
// invite — the owner can create fresh invites once logged in.
|
|
bootstrapInviteExpiry := time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)
|
|
inviteCode, err := database.CreateInvite(r.Context(), uid, 5, &bootstrapInviteExpiry)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "INTERNAL_ERROR", "failed to generate invite code")
|
|
return 0, "", "", false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return uid, token, inviteCode, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// setupApplyWizard applies the wizard payload. wr == nil is the legacy
|
|
// request shape (create the owner account only) and applies nothing. reqHost
|
|
// is the request's Host header, from which the post-restart admin-panel URL
|
|
// is derived.
|
|
//
|
|
// The account exists from here on, so any
|
|
// failure downgrades to a warning — never a 5xx that would orphan the
|
|
// owner behind an opaque error.
|
|
func setupApplyWizard(ctx context.Context, database *db.DB, wr *setupWizardRequest, uid int64, reqHost string, opts SetupOptions) ([]string, bool, string) {
|
|
var warnings []string
|
|
restartRequired := false
|
|
restartURL := ""
|
|
if wr == nil {
|
|
return warnings, restartRequired, restartURL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := applyWizardSettings(ctx, database, wr); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("setup wizard: saving settings failed", "error", err)
|
|
warnings = append(warnings,
|
|
"could not save server settings: "+err.Error()+" — adjust them later in the admin panel's Settings page")
|
|
}
|
|
if opts.ConfigPath != "" {
|
|
if err := config.Save(opts.ConfigPath, buildConfigPatch(wr, opts.RunningCfg)); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("setup wizard: writing config failed", "path", opts.ConfigPath, "error", err)
|
|
warnings = append(warnings,
|
|
"could not write "+opts.ConfigPath+": "+err.Error()+" — your account was created; edit the file manually to apply these settings")
|
|
} else {
|
|
db.WriteAudit(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), database, uid, "config_write", "server", 0,
|
|
"setup wizard wrote "+opts.ConfigPath+" ("+patchedConfigKeys(wr)+")")
|
|
if opts.RunningCfg != nil && wizardChangesRunningConfig(wr, opts.RunningCfg) {
|
|
restartRequired = true
|
|
restartURL = computeRestartURL(reqHost, wr, opts.RunningCfg)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return warnings, restartRequired, restartURL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// setupRestartAfterResponse hands the setup-wizard restart off to main.go.
|
|
//
|
|
// Called by handleSetup only after it has written its response, so the
|
|
// browser receives the token and the reconnect URL before the process
|
|
// goes away. Mirrors handleRestoreBackup / handleApplyUpdate: broadcast,
|
|
// then request the restart in a goroutine — main.go drains the server and
|
|
// performs the handoff. tryDirectRestartPending loses only to an already
|
|
// in-flight update or restore, which will itself restart the process;
|
|
// skipping is correct then, since the caller's response is written either
|
|
// way.
|
|
func setupRestartAfterResponse(hub HubBroadcaster, opts SetupOptions) {
|
|
if !tryDirectRestartPending() {
|
|
slog.Warn("setup restart skipped: another restart-sensitive operation is already in progress")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if hub != nil {
|
|
hub.BroadcastServerRestart("setup", restartBroadcastDelaySeconds)
|
|
}
|
|
restartFn := opts.Restart
|
|
if restartFn == nil {
|
|
restartFn = requestRestart
|
|
}
|
|
go restartFn("setup_wizard")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// restartBroadcastDelaySeconds is the countdown clients are told before the
|
|
// setup-wizard restart. There are normally no chat clients connected during
|
|
// first-run setup, so this is informational.
|
|
const restartBroadcastDelaySeconds = 3
|
|
|
|
// isSameOrigin reports whether a browser-supplied Origin names this same
|
|
// server, by comparing its host:port against the request's Host header.
|
|
//
|
|
// Browsers send Origin on same-origin POSTs too (Chrome and Edge always,
|
|
// Firefox since 70), so the admin panel's own first-run setup call arrives
|
|
// carrying one. Without this check it is measured against allowed_origins,
|
|
// which is empty in a freshly generated config — so setup failed with
|
|
// "cross-origin setup request blocked" on every new install.
|
|
//
|
|
// Scheme is deliberately not compared. Nothing in this server derives the
|
|
// external scheme (there is no r.TLS or X-Forwarded-Proto handling anywhere),
|
|
// so a TLS-terminating proxy in front would make a scheme check reject
|
|
// legitimate requests. Matching host:port is enough: forging it requires
|
|
// already serving content on this exact host and port, at which point the
|
|
// origin is not the attacker's to borrow. Cross-site attackers cannot set
|
|
// Origin at all — the browser does.
|
|
func isSameOrigin(origin, host string) bool {
|
|
if host == "" {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
u, err := url.Parse(origin)
|
|
// Require a scheme so a schemeless "//host:port" cannot pass as same-origin.
|
|
if err != nil || u.Scheme == "" || u.Host == "" {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.EqualFold(u.Host, host)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isSetupOriginAllowed checks if the given origin is permitted by the
|
|
// configured allowed_origins list. Wildcard "*" allows any origin.
|
|
// An empty list denies all cross-origin requests (safe default).
|
|
func isSetupOriginAllowed(origin string, allowed []string) bool {
|
|
for _, a := range allowed {
|
|
if a == "*" || strings.EqualFold(a, origin) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|