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* feat(service): settings family — SettingsService over the Store seam The B3-8 settings/audit family's service: List, Patch (whitelist, boolean normalization, the require_2fa preconditions incl. the TOTP census and the unrelated-key guard, atomic apply, one audit row per changed key) and Setting (the read the hub and the backup scheduler consume; wraps db.ErrNotFound as the store reports it). db gains ApplySettings — the handler's raw upsert loop as one hand-written transactional wrapper where raw SQL belongs — and Store carries it. parseSettingsPatchBool duplicates auth.go's parseBooleanSettingValue with the admin surface's own pinned error wording; both messages are test-pinned, so the twins stay separate. Service-level characterization in settings_test.go mirrors the admin/api_test.go PATCH rows and adds the service-only contracts (ErrNotFound wrap, audit rows, multi-key apply). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4 * refactor(admin): settings handlers thin over SettingsService; scheduler reads via it handleGetSettings/handlePatchSettings become adapters (decode, delegate, map ErrBadRequest to 400 with the service's prefix-free message); the whitelist and every precondition now live only in the service, so admin/types.go's copy is gone. MaintainBackups reads backup_schedule and backup_retention through the service — its backup mechanics keep the handle — and the maintenance chain threads Settings from the runtime the hub stage built. NewHandler/NewAdminAPI gain the settings parameter; all 207 construction sites wired via the newTestSettingsService helper. Behavior parity pinned by the existing TestAdminAPI_*Settings* rows (all green); the only unpinned change is the PATCH 500 path collapsing its four stage-specific internal messages into one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4 * refactor(ws): hub settings cache reads through a SettingsReader The hub's server_name/motd cache consumes a consumer-side SettingsReader interface (service.SettingsService satisfies it; HubOptions.Settings is required and validated like DB and Limiter — the RequiredCollaborators pin gains the refusal case). hub_settings.go no longer touches db at all, so the import pin from the B3-5 finisher goes, and its allowlist row goes with it; the thinned admin settings handler's row is deleted too — two allowlist rows down, the settings family's persistence now lives only in db/ and service/. Test helpers (both ws package namespaces) default the reader over the test database; newBareHub wires it explicitly; production passes Services.Settings from StartRuntime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4 * docs(boundaries,b3): settings/audit family re-measure and evidence The backup pair takes its forecast boundary disposition; the family's two deleted rows and the disposition counts (28/18/15 -> 24/18/17) re-derived from the tool. Family evidence block appended to the B3-8 section; README B3 row records B3-5 complete and the family opened. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4 * fix(service): prefix-free ErrBadRequest wraps for the pinned admin bodies The %.0w rework was meant to ride the service commit but was left unstaged: with the plain %w wrap the PATCH error bodies carry a 'bad request: ' prefix the admin pins reject. Zero-width wrapping keeps errors.Is(ErrBadRequest) while err.Error() stays exactly the pinned message. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4 * test(app): lifecycle hub fixtures wire the required Settings reader The two direct ws.NewHub sites in lifecycle_test predate Settings becoming required; race across internal/app is green again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4 * test(db): cover ApplySettings — the db coverage floor caught the gap CI's coverage floor failed db at 78.9% against 79.3%: ApplySettings was exercised only from service tests, which do not count toward db's own figure. Four db-side rows cover the apply, the empty no-op, the in-transaction failure rollback and the begin failure, using the package's full-migration opener. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4 * chore(coverage): raise the service floor to the branch's measured 69.2 The settings family's tested service code raised the Linux figure from the 67.8 floor to 69.2; the ratchet raises the floor in the same PR (service is not in the run-varying set). db stays at 79.3 — this PR restores its figure (79.5 with the ApplySettings tests), it did not set out to raise it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
185 lines
8.9 KiB
Go
185 lines
8.9 KiB
Go
package admin
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import (
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/auth"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/permissions"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/service"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/updater"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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)
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// setupLimiterReapInterval and setupLimiterReapMaxWindow control how often
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// the setup endpoint's dedicated rate limiter reaps stale window entries.
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// Vars, not consts, so tests can shrink them instead of waiting on the real
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// interval (see export_test.go).
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var (
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setupLimiterReapInterval = 5 * time.Minute
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setupLimiterReapMaxWindow = 15 * time.Minute
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)
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// setupLimiterHook, when non-nil, receives the *auth.RateLimiter NewAdminAPI
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// creates for the /setup endpoint. Test-only seam: NewAdminAPI returns only
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// an http.Handler, so tests otherwise have no way to reach that limiter to
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// verify it gets reaped.
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var setupLimiterHook func(*auth.RateLimiter)
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// startSetupLimiterReap keeps rl's window map bounded for the life of the
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// process. Every distinct source IP that ever hits POST /setup leaves an
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// entry that Allow itself only prunes on a repeat call from that same key —
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// a one-shot caller's entry sits forever unless something sweeps the whole
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// map. api/router.go reaps its own limiter with RateLimiter.StartCleanup, a
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// goroutine parked in a ticker select until a stop channel closes — but
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// NewAdminAPI has no shutdown hook and is called directly by ~180 tests that
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// never capture one, so a parked goroutine here would leak under every
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// test's goleak check. time.AfterFunc self-rescheduling avoids that: between
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// fires there is no live goroutine, only a runtime timer, so nothing needs
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// to stop it.
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func startSetupLimiterReap(rl *auth.RateLimiter) {
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// Capture the timing once, synchronously, on the caller's goroutine.
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// The rescheduled AfterFunc callbacks below must never re-read the
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// package vars themselves: those callbacks run on their own goroutine
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// indefinitely (nothing stops the chain), so a later test's
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// SetSetupLimiterReapTiming restoring the vars on its own goroutine
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// would otherwise race an in-flight reap here.
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interval, maxWindow := setupLimiterReapInterval, setupLimiterReapMaxWindow
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var reap func()
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reap = func() {
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rl.Cleanup(maxWindow)
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time.AfterFunc(interval, reap)
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}
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time.AfterFunc(interval, reap)
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}
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// ─── NewAdminAPI ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// NewAdminAPI returns a chi router with all /admin/api/* routes. All routes
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// except the unauthenticated setup endpoints are protected by
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// adminAuthMiddleware, which admits any role holding a bit of
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// permissions.AdminPerimeter; route groups then require the specific bit
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// (requirePerm) or the Owner role (ownerOnlyMiddleware).
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//
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// The optional trailing SetupOptions enables the first-run wizard's
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// config.yaml write-back and restart; without it the setup endpoints keep
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// their legacy account-only behaviour (the case in most tests).
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func NewAdminAPI(database *db.DB, version string, hub HubBroadcaster, u *updater.Updater, logBuf *RingBuffer, allowedOrigins []string, permInvalidator PermissionInvalidator, mod *service.ModerationService, roles *service.RoleService, settings *service.SettingsService, opts ...SetupOptions) http.Handler {
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r := chi.NewRouter()
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var setupOpts SetupOptions
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if len(opts) > 0 {
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setupOpts = opts[0]
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}
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// Setup endpoints — unauthenticated, only functional when no users exist.
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setupLimiter := auth.NewRateLimiter()
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if setupLimiterHook != nil {
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setupLimiterHook(setupLimiter)
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}
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startSetupLimiterReap(setupLimiter)
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r.Get("/setup/status", handleSetupStatus(database, setupOpts))
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r.Post("/setup", handleSetup(database, setupLimiter, allowedOrigins, hub, setupOpts))
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// SSE log stream — auth is via a single-use ticket from POST /logs/ticket.
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// EventSource cannot send Authorization headers, so the client first
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// obtains a short-lived ticket via the authenticated ticket endpoint,
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// then passes it as ?ticket= to the SSE stream.
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if logBuf != nil {
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r.Get("/logs/stream", handleLogStream(database, logBuf))
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}
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// All remaining routes require authentication plus at least one
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// moderation-capable bit (permissions.AdminPerimeter). Route groups that
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// map onto a specific bit re-check it with requirePerm; the rest
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// (stats, users list, me) are perimeter-level.
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r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(adminAuthMiddleware(database))
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// Log stream ticket — issues a single-use, 30s TTL ticket for SSE auth.
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// ADMINISTRATOR-gated to match handleLogStream's own re-check: server
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// logs are not scoped to any narrower moderation bit.
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r.With(requirePerm(permissions.Administrator)).
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Post("/logs/ticket", handleLogTicket(database))
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r.Get("/stats", handleGetStats(database, hub))
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r.Get("/me", handleGetMe())
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r.Get("/users", handleListUsers(database))
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// Ban/unban and role change are authorized inside ModerationService
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// (BAN_MEMBERS / MANAGE_ROLES + hierarchy), so the route itself stays
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// perimeter-level — a moderator with only BAN_MEMBERS must reach it.
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r.Patch("/users/{id}", handlePatchUser(database, hub, permInvalidator, mod))
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r.With(requirePerm(permissions.KickMembers)).
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Delete("/users/{id}/sessions", handleForceLogout(mod))
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r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageChannels))
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r.Get("/channels", handleListChannels(database))
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r.Post("/channels", handleCreateChannel(database, hub))
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r.Patch("/channels/{id}", handlePatchChannel(database, hub))
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r.Delete("/channels/{id}", handleDeleteChannel(database, hub))
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r.Get("/channels/{id}/permissions", handleGetChannelPermissions(database))
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r.Put("/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}", handlePutChannelPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
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r.Delete("/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}", handleDeleteChannelPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
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// Per-user overrides — the last layer of the resolution order,
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// gated on the same MANAGE_CHANNELS bit as the role layer.
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r.Put("/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}", handlePutChannelUserPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
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r.Delete("/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}", handleDeleteChannelUserPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
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})
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// Role CRUD. MANAGE_ROLES gates the group; RoleService additionally
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// enforces the hierarchy (manage only roles below your own position,
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// never grant a bit your role lacks) and refuses to delete the Owner
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// or the default role.
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r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageRoles))
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r.Get("/roles", handleListRoles(roles))
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r.Post("/roles", handleCreateRole(database, hub, roles))
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// Registered before /roles/{id} so "reorder" is never parsed as an id.
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r.Patch("/roles/reorder", handleReorderRoles(hub, permInvalidator, roles))
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r.Patch("/roles/{id}", handlePatchRole(database, hub, permInvalidator, roles))
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r.Delete("/roles/{id}", handleDeleteRole(database, hub, permInvalidator, roles))
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})
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r.With(requirePerm(permissions.ViewAuditLog)).
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Get("/audit-log", handleGetAuditLog(database))
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// API tokens — Owner-only. Minting a network-reachable, revocation-
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// surviving bearer credential is gated like backups/updates.
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r.Get("/tokens", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleListAPITokens(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Post("/tokens", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleCreateAPIToken(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Delete("/tokens/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleRevokeAPIToken(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageServer))
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r.Get("/settings", handleGetSettings(settings))
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r.Patch("/settings", handlePatchSettings(settings))
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})
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r.Post("/backup", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleBackup(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Get("/backups", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleListBackups()).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Delete("/backups/{name}", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleDeleteBackup(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Post("/backups/{name}/restore", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleRestoreBackup(database, hub)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Get("/updates", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleCheckUpdate(u)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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r.Post("/updates/apply", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
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ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleApplyUpdate(u, hub, version)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
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}))
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})
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return r
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}
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