Files
OwnCord/Server/admin/api.go
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 63c87df487 refactor(b3-8): settings/audit family behind SettingsService (S-09, family 1) (#1477)
* feat(service): settings family — SettingsService over the Store seam

The B3-8 settings/audit family's service: List, Patch (whitelist,
boolean normalization, the require_2fa preconditions incl. the TOTP
census and the unrelated-key guard, atomic apply, one audit row per
changed key) and Setting (the read the hub and the backup scheduler
consume; wraps db.ErrNotFound as the store reports it). db gains
ApplySettings — the handler's raw upsert loop as one hand-written
transactional wrapper where raw SQL belongs — and Store carries it.

parseSettingsPatchBool duplicates auth.go's parseBooleanSettingValue
with the admin surface's own pinned error wording; both messages are
test-pinned, so the twins stay separate.

Service-level characterization in settings_test.go mirrors the
admin/api_test.go PATCH rows and adds the service-only contracts
(ErrNotFound wrap, audit rows, multi-key apply).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4

* refactor(admin): settings handlers thin over SettingsService; scheduler reads via it

handleGetSettings/handlePatchSettings become adapters (decode, delegate,
map ErrBadRequest to 400 with the service's prefix-free message); the
whitelist and every precondition now live only in the service, so
admin/types.go's copy is gone. MaintainBackups reads backup_schedule and
backup_retention through the service — its backup mechanics keep the
handle — and the maintenance chain threads Settings from the runtime the
hub stage built. NewHandler/NewAdminAPI gain the settings parameter;
all 207 construction sites wired via the newTestSettingsService helper.

Behavior parity pinned by the existing TestAdminAPI_*Settings* rows
(all green); the only unpinned change is the PATCH 500 path collapsing
its four stage-specific internal messages into one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4

* refactor(ws): hub settings cache reads through a SettingsReader

The hub's server_name/motd cache consumes a consumer-side SettingsReader
interface (service.SettingsService satisfies it; HubOptions.Settings is
required and validated like DB and Limiter — the RequiredCollaborators
pin gains the refusal case). hub_settings.go no longer touches db at
all, so the import pin from the B3-5 finisher goes, and its allowlist
row goes with it; the thinned admin settings handler's row is deleted
too — two allowlist rows down, the settings family's persistence now
lives only in db/ and service/.

Test helpers (both ws package namespaces) default the reader over the
test database; newBareHub wires it explicitly; production passes
Services.Settings from StartRuntime.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4

* docs(boundaries,b3): settings/audit family re-measure and evidence

The backup pair takes its forecast boundary disposition; the family's
two deleted rows and the disposition counts (28/18/15 -> 24/18/17)
re-derived from the tool. Family evidence block appended to the B3-8
section; README B3 row records B3-5 complete and the family opened.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4

* fix(service): prefix-free ErrBadRequest wraps for the pinned admin bodies

The %.0w rework was meant to ride the service commit but was left
unstaged: with the plain %w wrap the PATCH error bodies carry a
'bad request: ' prefix the admin pins reject. Zero-width wrapping keeps
errors.Is(ErrBadRequest) while err.Error() stays exactly the pinned
message.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4

* test(app): lifecycle hub fixtures wire the required Settings reader

The two direct ws.NewHub sites in lifecycle_test predate Settings
becoming required; race across internal/app is green again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4

* test(db): cover ApplySettings — the db coverage floor caught the gap

CI's coverage floor failed db at 78.9% against 79.3%: ApplySettings was
exercised only from service tests, which do not count toward db's own
figure. Four db-side rows cover the apply, the empty no-op, the
in-transaction failure rollback and the begin failure, using the
package's full-migration opener.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4

* chore(coverage): raise the service floor to the branch's measured 69.2

The settings family's tested service code raised the Linux figure from
the 67.8 floor to 69.2; the ratchet raises the floor in the same PR
(service is not in the run-varying set). db stays at 79.3 — this PR
restores its figure (79.5 with the ApplySettings tests), it did not set
out to raise it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B8dwVLEihnGZYtH9X631F4

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 15:13:38 +00:00

185 lines
8.9 KiB
Go

package admin
import (
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/auth"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/permissions"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/service"
"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/updater"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
// setupLimiterReapInterval and setupLimiterReapMaxWindow control how often
// the setup endpoint's dedicated rate limiter reaps stale window entries.
// Vars, not consts, so tests can shrink them instead of waiting on the real
// interval (see export_test.go).
var (
setupLimiterReapInterval = 5 * time.Minute
setupLimiterReapMaxWindow = 15 * time.Minute
)
// setupLimiterHook, when non-nil, receives the *auth.RateLimiter NewAdminAPI
// creates for the /setup endpoint. Test-only seam: NewAdminAPI returns only
// an http.Handler, so tests otherwise have no way to reach that limiter to
// verify it gets reaped.
var setupLimiterHook func(*auth.RateLimiter)
// startSetupLimiterReap keeps rl's window map bounded for the life of the
// process. Every distinct source IP that ever hits POST /setup leaves an
// entry that Allow itself only prunes on a repeat call from that same key —
// a one-shot caller's entry sits forever unless something sweeps the whole
// map. api/router.go reaps its own limiter with RateLimiter.StartCleanup, a
// goroutine parked in a ticker select until a stop channel closes — but
// NewAdminAPI has no shutdown hook and is called directly by ~180 tests that
// never capture one, so a parked goroutine here would leak under every
// test's goleak check. time.AfterFunc self-rescheduling avoids that: between
// fires there is no live goroutine, only a runtime timer, so nothing needs
// to stop it.
func startSetupLimiterReap(rl *auth.RateLimiter) {
// Capture the timing once, synchronously, on the caller's goroutine.
// The rescheduled AfterFunc callbacks below must never re-read the
// package vars themselves: those callbacks run on their own goroutine
// indefinitely (nothing stops the chain), so a later test's
// SetSetupLimiterReapTiming restoring the vars on its own goroutine
// would otherwise race an in-flight reap here.
interval, maxWindow := setupLimiterReapInterval, setupLimiterReapMaxWindow
var reap func()
reap = func() {
rl.Cleanup(maxWindow)
time.AfterFunc(interval, reap)
}
time.AfterFunc(interval, reap)
}
// ─── NewAdminAPI ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// NewAdminAPI returns a chi router with all /admin/api/* routes. All routes
// except the unauthenticated setup endpoints are protected by
// adminAuthMiddleware, which admits any role holding a bit of
// permissions.AdminPerimeter; route groups then require the specific bit
// (requirePerm) or the Owner role (ownerOnlyMiddleware).
//
// The optional trailing SetupOptions enables the first-run wizard's
// config.yaml write-back and restart; without it the setup endpoints keep
// their legacy account-only behaviour (the case in most tests).
func NewAdminAPI(database *db.DB, version string, hub HubBroadcaster, u *updater.Updater, logBuf *RingBuffer, allowedOrigins []string, permInvalidator PermissionInvalidator, mod *service.ModerationService, roles *service.RoleService, settings *service.SettingsService, opts ...SetupOptions) http.Handler {
r := chi.NewRouter()
var setupOpts SetupOptions
if len(opts) > 0 {
setupOpts = opts[0]
}
// Setup endpoints — unauthenticated, only functional when no users exist.
setupLimiter := auth.NewRateLimiter()
if setupLimiterHook != nil {
setupLimiterHook(setupLimiter)
}
startSetupLimiterReap(setupLimiter)
r.Get("/setup/status", handleSetupStatus(database, setupOpts))
r.Post("/setup", handleSetup(database, setupLimiter, allowedOrigins, hub, setupOpts))
// SSE log stream — auth is via a single-use ticket from POST /logs/ticket.
// EventSource cannot send Authorization headers, so the client first
// obtains a short-lived ticket via the authenticated ticket endpoint,
// then passes it as ?ticket= to the SSE stream.
if logBuf != nil {
r.Get("/logs/stream", handleLogStream(database, logBuf))
}
// All remaining routes require authentication plus at least one
// moderation-capable bit (permissions.AdminPerimeter). Route groups that
// map onto a specific bit re-check it with requirePerm; the rest
// (stats, users list, me) are perimeter-level.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(adminAuthMiddleware(database))
// Log stream ticket — issues a single-use, 30s TTL ticket for SSE auth.
// ADMINISTRATOR-gated to match handleLogStream's own re-check: server
// logs are not scoped to any narrower moderation bit.
r.With(requirePerm(permissions.Administrator)).
Post("/logs/ticket", handleLogTicket(database))
r.Get("/stats", handleGetStats(database, hub))
r.Get("/me", handleGetMe())
r.Get("/users", handleListUsers(database))
// Ban/unban and role change are authorized inside ModerationService
// (BAN_MEMBERS / MANAGE_ROLES + hierarchy), so the route itself stays
// perimeter-level — a moderator with only BAN_MEMBERS must reach it.
r.Patch("/users/{id}", handlePatchUser(database, hub, permInvalidator, mod))
r.With(requirePerm(permissions.KickMembers)).
Delete("/users/{id}/sessions", handleForceLogout(mod))
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageChannels))
r.Get("/channels", handleListChannels(database))
r.Post("/channels", handleCreateChannel(database, hub))
r.Patch("/channels/{id}", handlePatchChannel(database, hub))
r.Delete("/channels/{id}", handleDeleteChannel(database, hub))
r.Get("/channels/{id}/permissions", handleGetChannelPermissions(database))
r.Put("/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}", handlePutChannelPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
r.Delete("/channels/{id}/permissions/{roleId}", handleDeleteChannelPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
// Per-user overrides — the last layer of the resolution order,
// gated on the same MANAGE_CHANNELS bit as the role layer.
r.Put("/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}", handlePutChannelUserPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
r.Delete("/channels/{id}/user-permissions/{userId}", handleDeleteChannelUserPermission(database, hub, permInvalidator))
})
// Role CRUD. MANAGE_ROLES gates the group; RoleService additionally
// enforces the hierarchy (manage only roles below your own position,
// never grant a bit your role lacks) and refuses to delete the Owner
// or the default role.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageRoles))
r.Get("/roles", handleListRoles(roles))
r.Post("/roles", handleCreateRole(database, hub, roles))
// Registered before /roles/{id} so "reorder" is never parsed as an id.
r.Patch("/roles/reorder", handleReorderRoles(hub, permInvalidator, roles))
r.Patch("/roles/{id}", handlePatchRole(database, hub, permInvalidator, roles))
r.Delete("/roles/{id}", handleDeleteRole(database, hub, permInvalidator, roles))
})
r.With(requirePerm(permissions.ViewAuditLog)).
Get("/audit-log", handleGetAuditLog(database))
// API tokens — Owner-only. Minting a network-reachable, revocation-
// surviving bearer credential is gated like backups/updates.
r.Get("/tokens", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleListAPITokens(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Post("/tokens", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleCreateAPIToken(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Delete("/tokens/{id}", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleRevokeAPIToken(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(requirePerm(permissions.ManageServer))
r.Get("/settings", handleGetSettings(settings))
r.Patch("/settings", handlePatchSettings(settings))
})
r.Post("/backup", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleBackup(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Get("/backups", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleListBackups()).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Delete("/backups/{name}", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleDeleteBackup(database)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Post("/backups/{name}/restore", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleRestoreBackup(database, hub)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Get("/updates", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleCheckUpdate(u)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
r.Post("/updates/apply", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
ownerOnlyMiddleware(handleApplyUpdate(u, hub, version)).ServeHTTP(w, req)
}))
})
return r
}