Files
OwnCord/Server/api/waf.go
T
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 7b178ff30b fix(security): harden server against verified code-review findings
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase
security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is
clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a
pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes).

High severity:
- auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt
  atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user
  brute-force cap.
- plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a
  WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the
  configured budget was previously parsed but never applied.
- api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests
  so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed.
- ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which
  fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects.

Medium severity:
- api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to
  remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle.
- ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound
  to the body hash (kills forgery/replay).
- authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command
  broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess.
- api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint.
- service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead
  of silently reporting success.
- api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the
  client-controllable leftmost one.
- plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked
  RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials
  (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU).
- api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin.

Low severity:
- auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth
  (was returning the ciphertext as plaintext).
- api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too.
- service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR).
- admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the
  update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU).
- service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban.

chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact.

Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and
make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 21:08:54 +02:00

137 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

// Package api provides the HTTP router and handlers for the OwnCord server.
//
// waf.go implements Coraza WAF middleware for OWASP CRS protection.
// Toggle via config: server.waf_enabled (default: false).
package api
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/types"
)
// NewWAFMiddleware creates a Coraza WAF middleware with OWASP CRS rules.
// paranoiaLevel controls rule sensitivity (1=low, 2=default, 3=strict, 4=paranoid).
// Returns nil middleware if WAF creation fails (logged as error, server continues).
func NewWAFMiddleware(paranoiaLevel int) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if paranoiaLevel < 1 || paranoiaLevel > 4 {
paranoiaLevel = 2
}
waf, err := coraza.NewWAF(
coraza.NewWAFConfig().
WithDirectives(fmt.Sprintf(`
SecRuleEngine On
SecRequestBodyAccess On
SecResponseBodyAccess Off
SecRequestBodyLimit 1048576
# Paranoia level
SecAction "id:900000,phase:1,pass,t:none,nolog,setvar:tx.blocking_paranoia_level=%d"
# Core rules — SQL injection
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY "@detectSQLi" \
"id:942100,phase:2,deny,status:403,log,msg:'SQL Injection detected',tag:'OWASP_CRS',tag:'attack-sqli'"
# Core rules — XSS
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY "@detectXSS" \
"id:941100,phase:2,deny,status:403,log,msg:'XSS detected',tag:'OWASP_CRS',tag:'attack-xss'"
# Path traversal
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_URI "@contains ../" \
"id:930100,phase:2,deny,status:403,log,msg:'Path traversal detected',tag:'OWASP_CRS',tag:'attack-lfi'"
# Command injection patterns
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?:;|\||\x60|&&|\$\()" \
"id:932100,phase:2,deny,status:403,log,msg:'Command injection detected',tag:'OWASP_CRS',tag:'attack-rce'"
# Block common scanners
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@rx (?:nikto|sqlmap|nmap|masscan|dirbuster)" \
"id:913100,phase:1,deny,status:403,log,msg:'Scanner blocked',tag:'OWASP_CRS',tag:'automation'"
# Exclude WebSocket upgrade and health endpoints from body inspection
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /ws" "id:900001,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveById=942100;941100;932100"
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@streq /api/v1/health" "id:900002,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveById=942100;941100;932100"
# Exclude file upload endpoint from body inspection (binary content)
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /api/v1/uploads" "id:900003,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyAccess=Off"
`, paranoiaLevel)),
)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("waf: failed to create WAF engine, continuing without WAF", "error", err)
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler { return next }
}
slog.Info("waf: Coraza WAF enabled", "paranoia_level", paranoiaLevel)
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
tx := waf.NewTransaction()
defer func() {
tx.ProcessLogging()
if err := tx.Close(); err != nil {
slog.Debug("waf: error closing transaction", "error", err)
}
}()
// Process request headers
tx.ProcessConnection(r.RemoteAddr, 0, "", 0)
tx.ProcessURI(r.URL.String(), r.Method, r.Proto)
for name, values := range r.Header {
for _, value := range values {
tx.AddRequestHeader(name, value)
}
}
if it := tx.ProcessRequestHeaders(); it != nil {
handleWAFInterruption(w, it)
return
}
// Process request body (if applicable). Use ContentLength != 0 so
// chunked requests (Transfer-Encoding: chunked → ContentLength == -1)
// are inspected too; otherwise the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules are silently
// skipped for them. The read is bounded by SecRequestBodyLimit inside
// Coraza. ContentLength == 0 (no body) still skips inspection.
if r.Body != nil && r.ContentLength != 0 {
if it, _, err := tx.ReadRequestBodyFrom(r.Body); it != nil {
handleWAFInterruption(w, it)
return
} else if err != nil {
slog.Debug("waf: error reading request body", "error", err)
}
if it, err := tx.ProcessRequestBody(); it != nil {
handleWAFInterruption(w, it)
return
} else if err != nil {
slog.Debug("waf: error processing request body", "error", err)
}
// Replace body with buffered version so downstream handlers can read it
reader, err := tx.RequestBodyReader()
if err == nil && reader != nil {
r.Body = io.NopCloser(reader)
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
func handleWAFInterruption(w http.ResponseWriter, it *types.Interruption) {
slog.Warn("waf: request blocked",
"status", it.Status,
"action", it.Action,
"rule_id", it.RuleID,
)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(it.Status)
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"error":"request blocked by security rules"}`)
}