mirror of
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* refactor: move the protocol schema to protocol/schema.json (RL-09)
The WebSocket message-type schema is the one artifact in this repository that
neither component owns: `Server/ws/message_types.go` and
`Client/src/lib/protocolTypes.ts` are both generated from it, and neither may
be hand-edited. It nonetheless lived at `docs/protocol-schema.json` — filed
under the directory for prose, whose own README calls it "Reference" material
— and its generator lived at `Server/scripts/genprotocol/`, i.e. inside one of
the two consumers. Ownership was legible from neither location.
The obvious fix — move the generator to the repository root alongside the
schema, so the whole tool is at the cross-component boundary — is wrong here.
The generator is a Go `package main`, and Go modules are directory-rooted:
`Server/go.mod` roots at `Server/`, so a root-level Go program needs a second
module or a `go.work`. That second module would sit outside every path filter
this repository already has — `golangci-lint` runs with `working-directory:
Server/` (ci.yml), `go vet ./...` runs from `Server/` (scripts/run.mjs,
.githooks/pre-commit), `.githooks/pre-commit` selects Go files with
`^Server/.*\.go$`, `.githooks/pre-push` sets `server_changed` on `^Server/`,
setup-go caches on `Server/go.sum`, and dependabot has one gomod block for
`/Server`. Six gates would silently stop covering the generator, each failing
open. The schema is data and moves freely; the generator is Go and stays where
the Go toolchain already runs.
Done instead:
- `docs/protocol-schema.json` -> `protocol/schema.json`. A new top-level
`protocol/` is the cross-component boundary, with a `README.md` naming the
two generated consumers, the one command, and the four gates.
- `Server/scripts/genprotocol/` -> `Server/cmd/genprotocol/`, the module's
conventional home for an executable. This also empties `Server/scripts/` of
Go entry points except `seed.go`, which RL-10 moves next.
- `Server/cmd/` added to `Server/.dockerignore` and `Server/.air.toml`, which
both already excluded `Server/scripts/`. Without this the move would have
silently widened the Docker build context and the air watch set.
27 files, 115 insertions, 76 deletions. Two runtime path resolvers re-pointed
(`cmd/genprotocol/main.go:41` `-schema` default, `ws/protocol_contract_test.go:67`
`filepath.Join`); two git-hook grep patterns (`pre-commit:53`, `pre-push:57`);
eight generator call sites across five files (Makefile x2, scripts/run.mjs x2,
pre-commit x2, ci-check skill, bughunt-fix.js); two broken relative markdown
links (docs/README.md:47, docs/protocol.md:1497); two generated files
regenerated, header lines only, zero constants changed; two ledger prose hits
plus a `render-ledger.mjs` re-render. No new verify was written: the
regenerate-and-diff check is already enforced three times (CI `make
protocol-verify`, `.githooks/pre-commit`, `npm run check:server`) and
`ws/protocol_contract_test.go` independently checks the schema against the
constants a fourth time.
Verified: both directions, for both resolvers. With `protocol/schema.json`
removed, `go test ./ws/ -run TestProtocol` fails with `reading protocol schema
at /home/user/OwnCord/protocol/schema.json: no such file or directory` (two
tests) and `go run ./cmd/genprotocol` exits 1 with `read schema: open
../protocol/schema.json: no such file or directory`; with the file restored
both pass. So the new path is genuinely resolved, not merely spelled in a
comment. The hook patterns were exercised directly: the pre-commit pattern
matches `protocol/schema.json` and `Server/cmd/genprotocol/main.go` and no
longer matches `docs/protocol-schema.json`; the pre-push pattern matches
`protocol/schema.json`. `go run ./cmd/genprotocol` twice in a row leaves
`git diff --exit-code ws/message_types.go ../Client/src/lib/protocolTypes.ts`
clean, so the committed outputs are exactly what the generator emits.
`go build ./...` and `go vet ./...` pass; `npx prettier --check .`,
`npm run typecheck` and `npm run lint` pass; `node .superpowers/render-ledger.mjs
--check` reports 348 findings valid.
Not included: the four dated `docs/audit-*.md` files, the older
`docs/plans/*`, and `CHANGELOG.md` keep the old path — they are point-in-time
records, and `.prettierignore` and `scripts/check-doc-counts.mjs` already
treat them as deliberately unmaintained. The B1 plan itself keeps its own
wording, since it states intent rather than current state. `Server/scripts/`
is not deleted: it still holds `seed.go` (RL-10), `k6/`, `toxiproxy/` and two
shell scripts. `Server/telemetry/metrics.go:19` declares a scope for a
`Server/voice` package that does not exist — spotted here, unrelated to this
move, left for RL-13's sweep to carry forward verbatim rather than fixed
inside a relocation. No `seed:` Make target was added.
Refs RL-09, L-09
* refactor: move the seed tool under Server/cmd/seed (RL-10)
`Server/scripts/seed.go` was a `package main` sitting directly in
`Server/scripts/`, which made `Server/scripts` itself one of the module's
three main packages — a developer tool in the module's build graph under a
directory name that says "loose scripts". It also did filesystem work in
`func init()`: `os.MkdirAll("data", 0o750)` ran before `flag.Parse()`, so the
directory appeared even when the tool immediately refused to run.
The audit row (RL-10) claims that `init()` fires "during test discovery". It
does not, and the obvious fix aimed at that claim would be aimed at nothing:
`Server/scripts/` contains zero `_test.go` files, so Go never builds a test
binary there and `go test ./...` never runs the `init()`. The residual defect
is narrower and real — an untagged `package main` in the build graph, plus a
side effect on a path (`go run ./cmd/seed -h`) that has nothing to do with
tests.
Done:
- `Server/scripts/seed.go` -> `Server/cmd/seed/main.go`, joining
`cmd/genprotocol/` from RL-09. `Server/scripts/` now holds shell and JS
tooling only (docker-smoke.sh, k6/, toxiproxy/, voice-test.sh) and no Go
entry point at all.
- The `os.MkdirAll` moved out of `init()` to immediately before `db.Open` in
`main()` — the one call that needs the directory, since `db.Open` ->
`OpenWithMaxReaders` -> `openFile` creates no intermediate directories.
- The package doc comment's usage lines were wrong in two ways, not one: they
named `go run scripts/seed.go`, which no longer exists, and they omitted
the mandatory `-confirm-dev`, so neither documented command could ever have
run. Both corrected, and `seed.go is a standalone tool` became the
conventional `Command seed populates ...`.
- `Server/CLAUDE.md`'s Layout list now names `cmd/` and states that no Go
entry point lives in `scripts/`.
Two files, 20 insertions, 17 deletions. `go list` main packages go from
`{server, server/cmd/genprotocol, server/scripts}` to `{server,
server/cmd/genprotocol, server/cmd/seed}` — the count is unchanged at three,
which is the honest framing: this relocates a main package to a conventional
path, it does not remove one from the build graph.
Verified: both directions, by building the pre-change file and the
post-change file and running each in a fresh empty directory. Before, `seed`
with no flags exits 1 *and leaves a `data/` directory behind*; `seed -h`
exits 0 and also leaves `data/` behind. After, both exit the same way and
create nothing — `data/ exists=NO` in each case. The happy path is unchanged:
`seed -confirm-dev` in an empty directory creates `data/` at mode 0750,
writes `data/chatserver.db`, and reports 4 users / 5 channels / 31 messages;
a second run reports 0 new rows, so idempotence survives. The old documented
invocation now fails loudly (`go run scripts/seed.go` -> `stat
scripts/seed.go: no such file or directory`) and the new one is what the
comment says. All four build-tag variants compile, `go vet ./...` passes,
`gofmt -l` is clean outside `db/dbgen`, and `npx prettier --check .` passes.
Behaviour delta, called out rather than left silent: the two cases above
(`-h`, and a missing `-confirm-dev`) no longer create `./data`. That is a
change, not a pure relocation. It is the change RL-10 asks for — the remedy
text is "remove import/test-time filesystem side effects" — and the
alternative that preserves the old behaviour exactly, making the `MkdirAll`
the first statement of `main()` before `flag.Parse()`, would keep precisely
the side effect the item exists to remove.
Not included: `Server/scripts/genprotocol` was moved to `Server/cmd/` by the
RL-09 commit rather than here, so the "executable tooling under conventional
command ownership" class is closed across the two commits, not this one
alone. `filepath.Dir(*dbPath)` was evaluated for the `MkdirAll` and rejected:
it would fix a real gap (`-db /elsewhere/x.db` still creates a useless
`./data` and does not create `/elsewhere`) but it means creating an arbitrary
directory from CLI input, and that is a behaviour change past "shift it out
of `init()`" — worth its own item. No `make seed` target was added, and the
dated `docs/audit-*.md` rows naming `Server/scripts/seed.go` keep the old
path. The findings ledger has zero references to this file, so no re-render
was needed.
Refs RL-10, L-10
* test: give the cross-stack contracts a named tier (RL-11)
`Client/tests/unit/admin-static-channel-perms.test.ts` reads and executes
`Server/admin/static/index.html`. Filed under `tests/unit`, nothing about its
location or name said it locks a server-owned artifact, so a Go developer
editing the admin SPA got a red check called "Client Unit Tests" with no clue
why.
The register describes this as one file. It is not, and the measured set does
not match the description in either direction:
- Client -> Server: exactly ONE test crosses by filesystem read, not two.
`main-page.test.ts` was named in the plan but only carries a prose comment
citing `Server/admin/update_handlers.go:181` at line 1046 — no read, no
import, nothing to move.
- Server -> Client: the four tests the plan named do not cross.
`waf_test.go`/`waf_crs_test.go` set a `User-Agent: OwnCordClient/1.0`
literal that appears nowhere under `Client/`; `ws_integration_test.go:289`
and `sanitize_content_fuzz_test.go:46` are comments. The real crossing is
one the register never named: `Server/updater/updater_test.go:630` does
`os.ReadFile` on `Client/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json`.
The obvious fixes are both wrong. Moving the invariant "to the owning server
test" cannot work: `Server/go.mod` carries no JavaScript engine (no goja,
otto, v8go, quickjs, rogchap, duktape), so a Go port could only assert at the
text level like `admin/perm_grid_test.go` does — and that is not a
substitute. Flipping the guard at `admin/static/index.html:1182` to
`targetIsTouchedRole=false` reintroduces OC-0154 in full while leaving every
greppable identifier intact, so a text-level test passes on a broken file.
Relocating it to the e2e admin journey is worse: that job is
`continue-on-error: true` and deliberately unpinned ("requiring it is
theatre" — `docs/plans/b0-dev-branch-protection.sh`), so it would convert a
blocking, pinned gate into one that is green regardless. And the journey does
not cover the invariant today: `grep -Eic "perm|access|role|override|matrix"`
over its 142 lines returns 0, so the "if e2e already covers it, delete"
branch never fires.
Done — one tier, applied to the whole set, defined by artifact coupling and
placed by runtime capability:
- New `Client/tests/contract/`, holding
`server-admin-static-channel-perms.test.ts`. Same directory depth, so
`../../../Server/...` still resolves; the body is byte-identical apart from
a header naming the owner and the runner.
- `Server/updater/tauri_key_contract_test.go` splits the one cross-component
Go test out of `updater_test.go` verbatim, same `package updater`. It stays
in Go — placement follows capability, and Go parses JSON fine — so only the
file name has to declare the crossing. Without this the item would have
been "moved one file and declared the class closed".
- `npm run test:contract`, and the tier, the membership rule and a
blocking/non-blocking table in `docs/contributing.md#testing`, which
previously described no tiers at all.
- `Client/CLAUDE.md`'s tier list was missing `tests/e2e/admin` and
`tests/e2e/native` before this; it now lists all seven and states the rule.
`Server/CLAUDE.md` records why the SPA's execution-level invariant is
locked from the client tree, so nobody "fixes" it into a regex.
- Ledger `OC-0154.fix.test` re-pointed and `FINDINGS.md` re-rendered;
`.claude/workflows/bughunt.js` — the workflow that produced OC-0154 — no
longer describes the TS test surface as `tests/unit/*.test.ts` only.
- Three stale cross-stack pointers of exactly the class this item is about:
`tests/e2e/helpers.ts:348,351` and `tests/unit/types.test.ts:13` named
`docs/brain/06-Specs/PROTOCOL.md`, which does not exist (`docs/brain/` is a
gitignored path); all now name `docs/protocol.md`.
15 files, 125 insertions, 33 deletions. No CI job, workflow, vitest,
tsconfig, eslint, knip or stryker change, and no new pinned check —
`ci.yml`'s `npx vitest run --coverage` has no path filter and
`vitest.config.ts` includes `tests/**/*.test.ts`, so enforcement after the
move is bit-identical to enforcement before it. That is deliberate: `dev`
pins 11 contexts and a 12th is a branch-protection API write, not something a
PR can do, so any new job would be advisory until someone separately changed
repository settings — strictly less protection than today.
Verified: both directions, and the assertion was not weakened. Flipping
`admin/static/index.html:1182` to `const targetIsTouchedRole=false;` makes
the moved test fail (`AssertionError: expected 'DELETE' not to be 'DELETE'`);
`git checkout` of that file makes it pass again — so the invariant survived
the move intact rather than becoming a test that passes anywhere. The split
Go test's cross-boundary read is live too: with
`Client/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json` moved away, `go test ./updater/` fails
with `ReadFile(../../Client/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json): no such file or
directory` from `tauri_key_contract_test.go:20`, and passes once restored.
The full client suite is 192 files / 5257 tests passing, identical to the
count before the move; `npm run typecheck` passes, which proves
`tests/contract/` is inside the tsconfig graph and that `tests/types/jsdom.d.ts`
still resolves the moved test's `import { JSDOM }`. `npm run lint`,
`npx prettier --check .`, `go vet ./...` and `go test ./updater/` all pass.
`git grep "tests/unit/admin-static-channel-perms"` finds no survivor outside
the B1 plan itself.
Not included: nothing was deleted, because no e2e sibling covers OC-0154.
`Client/tests/types/jsdom.d.ts` was neither moved nor deleted — it is still
the only type source for the moved test's `jsdom` import. `capabilities-scope.test.ts`
and `tauri-conf-webview2-args.test.ts` read `src-tauri/` and stay in
`tests/unit`: `src-tauri` is inside the `Client` component, so they are not
contract tests, and the rule earns that rather than hand-waving it — moving
them would have forced repoints of ledger entry OC-0089 and
`docs/security.md:64` for no gain. Each gained a one-line header saying why.
`Server/admin/perm_grid_test.go` and `emoji_section_test.go` read their own
package's embedded asset and are unchanged; they are the text-level
complement to the execution-level test, not duplicates. No JS engine was
added to `go.mod`, no npm root was created under `Server/`, and no root-level
`tests/` tier was created — there is no runner for one and no way to make it
blocking from a PR. Separately noticed and NOT fixed here:
`docs/contributing.md:221` still says "All ten required checks" while
`docs/plans/b0-dev-branch-protection.sh` pins eleven since B1-3 added
`Repository Hygiene`, and `docs/plans/hp-0-scorecard-2026-08-25.md:109` is
stale the same way — that is the branch-protection item's to fix, not this
one's, and one register item per commit.
Refs RL-11, L-11
* refactor: rename the Go module to github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server (RL-13)
`Server/go.mod` declared `github.com/owncord/server` while the public
repository is `github.com/J3vb/OwnCord`. Nothing resolves that path — there is
no `owncord` GitHub org and no vanity-import host serving go-import metadata
for it — so every import line in the tree named a location that does not
exist. It compiles because a main module's own path is never fetched, which is
exactly why it went unnoticed.
The obvious fix — an AST-aware import rewriter (`gomvpkg`, `go mod edit`) —
is wrong here, and provably so. Six of the 722 occurrences are not imports at
all: `api/main_test.go:20` (a goleak `IgnoreTopFunction` pattern),
`telemetry/metrics.go:17-19` (three OTel instrumentation-scope names),
`invariants/syncutil_locks.go:73` (a diagnostic message), and
`invariants/syncutil_locks_test.go:56` (an import line inside a raw-string Go
fixture). An import rewriter touches none of them, and the compiler cannot
see any of them either.
Done as one scripted substitution over `git ls-files`, anchored on the full
`github.com/owncord/server` string. The anchor matters: `owncord-server` is a
different identifier — the OTel `service.name` (`config/config.go`,
`telemetry/telemetry_otel.go`) and the GHCR image name
(`.github/workflows/release.yml`, `docker-compose.yml`) — and a looser pattern
would have moved it. It is untouched: 10 occurrences across 9 files, before
and after.
350 files, 728 insertions, 728 deletions. 722 occurrences in 344 Go files,
plus `go.mod:1`, the `sed` at `Makefile:67`, `Server/CLAUDE.md:3`,
`docs/architecture/server.md:5`, and the ledger pair
(`findings-ledger.json:3758` plus a `render-ledger.mjs` re-render of
`FINDINGS.md`). Zero in any workflow, zero in the Dockerfile, zero in
`Server/.golangci.yml` (no `local-prefixes`, `gci`, `importas` or `depguard`
rule keys on the module path, so import grouping is not configured anywhere).
The plan's blast-radius estimate missed one thing, and it is the one that
would have gone red: **gofmt**. `J` (0x4A) sorts before every lowercase
letter, so in the 36 files where a module-local import shares a contiguous
group with a third-party one, the module's imports must move above
`github.com/go-chi/...`. `gofmt -l` was clean before the substitution and
listed exactly 36 files after it; `gofmt -w` on those 36 restores it to
clean. `gofmt` is an enforced gate — the `formatters` block in
`Server/.golangci.yml`, which is S-05 — so a substitution-only commit fails
Lint.
Verified: both directions, and the line accounting is exact. Every added line
in this diff contains the new module path (728) and every removed line
contains the old one (728); the count of changed lines containing neither is
**zero**, so the gofmt re-sort moved module-path lines only and touched no
third-party import. The residual check
(`git ls-files -z | xargs -0 grep -n 'github\.com/owncord/server'`) returns
exactly two hits, both deliberately out of scope: the RL-13 row in
`docs/audit-2026-08-23-repository-layout.md` and the measurement row in this
phase's own plan. The compiler-invisible half was proven by reverting *only*
`api/main_test.go:20` to the old path on the otherwise-renamed tree:
`go build ./...` and `go vet ./api/` both still pass — they see nothing wrong
— while `go test ./api/` FAILS, because the runtime function name now carries
the new path and goleak stops ignoring `ws.(*Hub).Run.func1`. Restoring the
line makes it pass. `go.sum` is byte-identical (no `go mod tidy` was run and
none was needed). All four build-tag variants compile; `go vet ./...`,
`go vet -tags otel,wazero ./...` and `go vet -tags deadlock ./...` pass;
`go test -race ./...` is 16/16 packages green; `go test -tags deadlock ./...`
passes; the tag-gated `./plugin/...` (wazero) and `./telemetry/...` (otel)
runs pass. `golangci-lint` v2.11.3 — the pinned CI version, rebuilt locally
against Go 1.26 because the packaged binary cannot load a 1.26 config —
reports **0 issues**. `go run ./cmd/genprotocol` leaves
`git diff --exit-code ws/message_types.go ../Client/src/lib/protocolTypes.ts`
clean, so the rename does not reach the generated protocol constants.
`npx prettier --check .` and `node .superpowers/render-ledger.mjs --check`
pass.
Not included: `docs/audit-2026-08-23-repository-layout.md` and
`docs/plans/b1-repository-foundation-2026-08-25.md` keep the old path — they
are the audit row and the measurement that motivated this change, and
rewriting them would erase the record of what was measured. They are why the
residual check needs a two-path allowance rather than being empty; that
allowance is stated above rather than hidden in a pathspec.
`telemetry/metrics.go:19` declares `scopeVoice` for a `Server/voice` package
that does not exist; the substitution carried the dead path forward verbatim
as `github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/voice` rather than fixing it, because
correcting a real observability bug inside a mechanical rename would hide it
in a 350-file diff. It needs its own item. No `go.work`, no second module,
and no vanity-import host was set up — the new path resolves against the real
repository, but nothing imports this module as a library, so `go get`
reachability was not exercised either way.
Refs RL-13, L-12
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
487 lines
18 KiB
Go
487 lines
18 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/db"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/service"
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"github.com/J3vb/OwnCord/Server/ws"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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)
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// DMBroadcaster is the interface needed to send WebSocket events from REST
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// handlers. Satisfied by *ws.Hub.
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type DMBroadcaster interface {
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SendToUser(userID int64, msg []byte) bool
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}
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// dmVisibilityMarker is an optional DMBroadcaster capability: bump the hub's
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// visibility watermark after an unsequenced, targeted event so a client that
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// warm-reconnects across the gap takes the full-ready path instead of a
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// sequenced-only replay that can never redeliver it. Reached by type
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// assertion rather than being added to DMBroadcaster directly so the
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// SendToUser-only test doubles in this package keep working. Satisfied in
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// production by ws.Hub.MarkVisibilityChanged, which forwards to the same
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// bumpVisibilityWatermark the WS-side dm_channel_open emitter uses
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// (ws/emit.go).
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type dmVisibilityMarker interface {
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MarkVisibilityChanged()
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}
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// The production broadcaster must keep satisfying it: a type assertion that
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// silently stops matching would turn the watermark bump back into the no-op
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// this fixed, with nothing failing to say so — mirrors the dmVoiceEvictor
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// assertion below for its sibling capability.
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var _ dmVisibilityMarker = (*ws.Hub)(nil)
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// markDMVisibilityChanged bumps the visibility watermark if broadcaster
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// supports it. dm_channel_open/close are unsequenced and targeted, so a
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// client that misses one via a dropped connection and then warm-reconnects
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// never gets it redelivered by the ordinary seq-replay path — mirroring why
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// the WS emitter of the same event (ws/emit.go DMChannelOpenEvent) forces
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// this bump unconditionally, regardless of whether the send itself
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// succeeded.
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func markDMVisibilityChanged(broadcaster DMBroadcaster) {
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if vm, ok := broadcaster.(dmVisibilityMarker); ok {
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vm.MarkVisibilityChanged()
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}
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}
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// dmVoiceEvictor is the DMBroadcaster capability used to evict a user's
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// voice-call connection for one specific channel, leaving an unrelated call
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// they may currently be in untouched (which the unconditional
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// DisconnectFromVoice would not). It is kept out of DMBroadcaster itself and
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// reached by type assertion so the handler stays usable with the
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// SendToUser-only test doubles the package already has.
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type dmVoiceEvictor interface {
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DisconnectFromVoiceInChannel(ctx context.Context, userID, channelID int64) bool
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}
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// The production broadcaster must keep satisfying it: a type assertion that
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// silently stops matching would turn the eviction back into the no-op this
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// fixed, with nothing failing to say so.
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var _ dmVoiceEvictor = (*ws.Hub)(nil)
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// MountDMRoutes registers DM-related routes onto r.
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// All routes require authentication.
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// hub is used to send real-time WebSocket events on DM close.
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func MountDMRoutes(r chi.Router, database *db.DB, svc *service.Services, broadcaster DMBroadcaster) {
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r.Route("/api/v1/dms", func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(AuthMiddleware(database))
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r.Post("/", handleCreateDM(svc, broadcaster))
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r.Post("/group", handleCreateGroupDM(svc, broadcaster))
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r.Get("/", handleListDMs(svc))
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r.Patch("/{channelId}", handleRenameGroupDM(svc, broadcaster))
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r.Delete("/{channelId}", handleCloseDM(svc, broadcaster))
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})
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// User blocking routes — prevent DM creation and messaging.
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r.Route("/api/v1/blocks", func(r chi.Router) {
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r.Use(AuthMiddleware(database))
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r.Get("/", handleListBlocks(svc))
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r.Put("/{userId}", handleBlockUser(svc, broadcaster))
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r.Delete("/{userId}", handleUnblockUser(svc))
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// createDMRequest is the JSON body for POST /api/v1/dms.
|
|
type createDMRequest struct {
|
|
RecipientID int64 `json:"recipient_id"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// createDMResponse is the JSON response for POST /api/v1/dms.
|
|
type createDMResponse struct {
|
|
ChannelID int64 `json:"channel_id"`
|
|
Recipient db.DMUser `json:"recipient"`
|
|
Created bool `json:"created"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// createGroupDMRequest is the JSON body for POST /api/v1/dms/group.
|
|
type createGroupDMRequest struct {
|
|
RecipientIDs []int64 `json:"recipient_ids"`
|
|
Name string `json:"name"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// renameDMRequest is the JSON body for PATCH /api/v1/dms/{channelId}.
|
|
type renameDMRequest struct {
|
|
Name string `json:"name"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// listDMsResponse is the JSON response for GET /api/v1/dms.
|
|
type listDMsResponse struct {
|
|
DMChannels []db.DMChannelInfo `json:"dm_channels"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleCreateDM creates or retrieves a DM channel with a recipient.
|
|
func handleCreateDM(svc *service.Services, broadcaster DMBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
|
|
if !ok || user == nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
|
|
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var req createDMRequest
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
|
|
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "invalid request body",
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result, err := svc.DMs.CreateDM(r.Context(), user.ID, req.RecipientID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A brand-new 1:1 DM has dm_open_state pre-seeded for BOTH users by
|
|
// GetOrCreateDMChannel (db/dm_queries.go), so the recipient's first
|
|
// OpenDM call — fired later from the sender's first message — finds
|
|
// the row already present and reports opened=false. Without this,
|
|
// nothing ever tells the recipient the DM exists: no live event, and
|
|
// no visibility-watermark bump for a warm reconnect either. Only the
|
|
// creation path needs this — CreateDM re-opening an existing DM for
|
|
// the caller only touches the caller's own dm_open_state row, which
|
|
// the caller obviously already knows about.
|
|
if result.Created {
|
|
broadcastDMOpen(r.Context(), svc, broadcaster, result.Channel.ID, []int64{result.Recipient.ID})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
avatarStr := ""
|
|
if result.Recipient.Avatar != nil {
|
|
avatarStr = *result.Recipient.Avatar
|
|
}
|
|
displayName := ""
|
|
if result.Recipient.DisplayName != nil {
|
|
displayName = *result.Recipient.DisplayName
|
|
}
|
|
// PresentableStatus applies the "no live connection is offline,
|
|
// whatever the row says" half of the rule ws/serve_ready.go's
|
|
// presentableMembers documents — StatusForViewer alone only
|
|
// collapses invisible to offline and would otherwise ship a
|
|
// disconnected recipient's saved idle/dnd verbatim (OC-0304).
|
|
dmUser := db.DMUser{
|
|
ID: result.Recipient.ID,
|
|
Username: result.Recipient.Username,
|
|
Avatar: avatarStr,
|
|
Status: svc.DMs.PresentableStatus(result.Recipient.ID, db.StatusForViewer(result.Recipient.Status, result.Recipient.ID, user.ID)),
|
|
DisplayName: displayName,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status := http.StatusOK
|
|
if result.Created {
|
|
status = http.StatusCreated
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, status, createDMResponse{
|
|
ChannelID: result.Channel.ID,
|
|
Recipient: dmUser,
|
|
Created: result.Created,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleListDMs returns all open DM channels for the authenticated user.
|
|
func handleListDMs(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
|
|
if !ok || user == nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
|
|
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
channels, err := svc.DMs.ListDMs(r.Context(), user.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, listDMsResponse{DMChannels: channels})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleCloseDM removes a DM channel from the authenticated user's open list.
|
|
func handleCloseDM(svc *service.Services, broadcaster DMBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
|
|
if !ok || user == nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
|
|
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "channelId")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result, err := svc.DMs.CloseDM(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Notify via WebSocket so sidebar updates immediately.
|
|
if broadcaster != nil {
|
|
closeMsg := fmt.Appendf(nil, `{"type":%q,"payload":{"channel_id":%d}}`, ws.MsgTypeDMChannelClose, channelID)
|
|
if ok := broadcaster.SendToUser(user.ID, closeMsg); !ok {
|
|
slog.Debug("handleCloseDM: user not connected", "user_id", user.ID, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
}
|
|
// dm_channel_close is unsequenced and targeted like
|
|
// dm_channel_open — see markDMVisibilityChanged.
|
|
markDMVisibilityChanged(broadcaster)
|
|
// A group leave changes the membership everyone else renders, so
|
|
// the survivors get a refreshed dm_channel_open rather than being
|
|
// left showing a member who has gone.
|
|
if result.Left && !result.ChannelDeleted {
|
|
broadcastDMOpen(r.Context(), svc, broadcaster, channelID, result.RemainingParticipantIDs)
|
|
}
|
|
// Leaving a group DM removes the caller from its membership but,
|
|
// without this, leaves them connected to its live voice call —
|
|
// they keep hearing and speaking to a room they are no longer a
|
|
// member of. Scoped to this channel so a leaver currently on an
|
|
// unrelated voice call is untouched. This also covers the
|
|
// last-participant case (ChannelDeleted): the row is already gone
|
|
// by now, so CleanupVoiceForChannel would read an FK-cascaded
|
|
// empty voice_states and do nothing, while the leaver — the only
|
|
// participant left — is evicted here.
|
|
if result.Left {
|
|
if ve, ok := broadcaster.(dmVoiceEvictor); ok {
|
|
ve.DisconnectFromVoiceInChannel(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), user.ID, channelID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// broadcastDMOpen sends a per-viewer dm_channel_open for channelID to each of
|
|
// targetIDs. The payload differs per addressee (`recipient`/`recipients` are
|
|
// relative to who is reading), so it is rebuilt inside the loop.
|
|
//
|
|
// Failures are logged and skipped, never surfaced: the mutation that prompted
|
|
// this has already committed, and a client that misses the event re-derives
|
|
// the same state from its next `ready`.
|
|
func broadcastDMOpen(ctx context.Context, svc *service.Services, broadcaster DMBroadcaster, channelID int64, targetIDs []int64) {
|
|
if broadcaster == nil || len(targetIDs) == 0 {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// The mutation that led here has already committed, so this fan-out must
|
|
// survive the caller's request context being cancelled after that point
|
|
// (client disconnect mid-handler) — otherwise every DMSummaryFor lookup
|
|
// below fails with context.Canceled and no participant, including ones
|
|
// otherwise unaffected by the cancellation, ever receives the open.
|
|
ctx = context.WithoutCancel(ctx)
|
|
// dm_channel_open is unsequenced and targeted — a recipient who is
|
|
// offline or drops the connection right now can never have it replayed
|
|
// to them by the ordinary seq-based resume path, so a warm reconnect must
|
|
// be forced onto the full-ready path instead. Bumped once per call,
|
|
// unconditionally (not per-recipient SendToUser result): the ws emitter
|
|
// of this same event does the same (ws/emit.go), and this covers every
|
|
// caller — group create, rename refresh, and the group-leave refresh.
|
|
markDMVisibilityChanged(broadcaster)
|
|
for _, pid := range targetIDs {
|
|
summary, pErr := svc.DMs.DMSummaryFor(ctx, pid, channelID)
|
|
if pErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Debug("broadcastDMOpen: summary unavailable", "user_id", pid, "channel_id", channelID, "err", pErr)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
msg, mErr := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
|
|
"type": "dm_channel_open",
|
|
"payload": summary,
|
|
})
|
|
if mErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("broadcastDMOpen: marshal failed", "err", mErr, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if ok := broadcaster.SendToUser(pid, msg); !ok {
|
|
slog.Debug("broadcastDMOpen: user not connected", "user_id", pid, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleCreateGroupDM creates a group DM between the caller and 2..8 others.
|
|
func handleCreateGroupDM(svc *service.Services, broadcaster DMBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
|
|
if !ok || user == nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
|
|
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var req createGroupDMRequest
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
|
|
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "invalid request body",
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result, err := svc.DMs.CreateGroupDM(r.Context(), user.ID, req.RecipientIDs, req.Name)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Everyone gets the DM in their sidebar immediately, the creator
|
|
// included — the REST response is only the creator's copy, and a
|
|
// second window of theirs needs the event just as much as the others.
|
|
broadcastDMOpen(r.Context(), svc, broadcaster, result.Channel.ID, result.ParticipantIDs)
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated,
|
|
db.NewDMChannelInfo(result.Channel.ID, result.Channel.Name, true, result.Participants, user.ID))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleRenameGroupDM sets or clears a group DM's name. Participants only —
|
|
// there is no owner, so every member holds the same authority over it.
|
|
func handleRenameGroupDM(svc *service.Services, broadcaster DMBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
user, ok := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
|
|
if !ok || user == nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{
|
|
Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required",
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
channelID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "channelId")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var req renameDMRequest
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errorResponse{
|
|
Error: "BAD_REQUEST", Message: "invalid request body",
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if _, err := svc.DMs.RenameGroupDM(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID, req.Name); err != nil {
|
|
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The rename has already committed at this point, so this lookup must
|
|
// survive the caller's request context being cancelled right after
|
|
// that commit (client disconnect mid-handler) — same reasoning as
|
|
// broadcastDMOpen's own context.WithoutCancel, and the failure must be
|
|
// logged rather than silently dropping the fan-out (participants would
|
|
// keep rendering the stale name with no compensating resync, since
|
|
// dm_channel_open is unsequenced/targeted and can't be replayed).
|
|
bgCtx := context.WithoutCancel(r.Context())
|
|
participantIDs, pErr := svc.Channels.GetDMParticipantIDs(bgCtx, channelID)
|
|
if pErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("handleRenameGroupDM: participant lookup failed", "err", pErr, "channel_id", channelID)
|
|
} else {
|
|
broadcastDMOpen(bgCtx, svc, broadcaster, channelID, participantIDs)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
summary, sErr := svc.DMs.DMSummaryFor(r.Context(), user.ID, channelID)
|
|
if sErr != nil {
|
|
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, sErr)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, summary)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleBlockUser blocks a user.
|
|
func handleBlockUser(svc *service.Services, broadcaster DMBroadcaster) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
|
|
if user == nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required"})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
targetID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "userId")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := svc.Blocks.BlockUser(r.Context(), user.ID, targetID); err != nil {
|
|
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The block has already committed at this point, so the rest of this
|
|
// handler must survive the caller's request context being cancelled
|
|
// right after that commit (client disconnect mid-handler) — same
|
|
// reasoning as handleRenameGroupDM's own bgCtx. Without this, a
|
|
// canceled request context makes the shared-DM lookup below fail and
|
|
// get skipped, silently defeating the eviction it gates.
|
|
bgCtx := context.WithoutCancel(r.Context())
|
|
|
|
// Revocation must evict a live session, not merely block the next
|
|
// join (the same invariant the voice sweep states): without this, a
|
|
// blocked user already in the pair's 1:1 DM voice call stays in it
|
|
// indefinitely — the block gate otherwise runs only on voice_join and
|
|
// voluntary voice_token_refresh, both of which the blocked client
|
|
// controls. Group DM calls are deliberately untouched, matching
|
|
// requireDMNotBlocked's group exemption.
|
|
if ve, evictable := broadcaster.(dmVoiceEvictor); evictable {
|
|
if chID, exists, err := svc.DMs.SharedOneToOneDM(bgCtx, user.ID, targetID); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("block: shared-DM lookup for voice eviction failed",
|
|
"blocker_id", user.ID, "target_id", targetID, "err", err)
|
|
} else if exists {
|
|
ve.DisconnectFromVoiceInChannel(bgCtx, targetID, chID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"message": "user blocked"})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleUnblockUser unblocks a user.
|
|
func handleUnblockUser(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
|
|
if user == nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required"})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
targetID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "userId")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := svc.Blocks.UnblockUser(r.Context(), user.ID, targetID); err != nil {
|
|
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"message": "user unblocked"})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleListBlocks returns all blocked user IDs.
|
|
func handleListBlocks(svc *service.Services) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
user, _ := r.Context().Value(UserKey).(*db.User)
|
|
if user == nil {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errorResponse{Error: "UNAUTHORIZED", Message: "authentication required"})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ids, err := svc.Blocks.ListBlocked(r.Context(), user.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeServiceError(r.Context(), w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"blocked_user_ids": ids})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|