mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
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* fix: enhance bugfix workflow documentation with detailed clustering and staging instructions * fix(voice): 6 defect(s) (OC-0001, OC-0006, OC-0009, OC-0010, OC-0015, OC-0029) * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0005) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0007) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0011) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0012) * fix(admin): 1 defect(s) (OC-0013) * fix(client): 3 defect(s) (OC-0014, OC-0024, OC-0031) * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0018) * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0019) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0021) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0025) * fix(ws): 1 defect(s) (OC-0026) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0027) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0028) * fix(identity): 1 defect(s) (OC-0030) * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0016) * fix(client): 2 defect(s) (OC-0002, OC-0020) OC-0002: chain offer handling behind the announce chain so an offer that arrives immediately behind its sender's announce is not dropped as an unknown peer. OC-0020: retire a departing peer's ECDH key on participant-left so a replayed pre-leave announce cannot overwrite the fresh key they rejoined with. * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0008) handleVoiceJoin handed the client its LiveKit token before checking whether the join had been superseded by a concurrent eviction (moderator kick/move, the CONNECT_VOICE revocation sweep, CleanupVoiceForChannel). Those evictors delete the voice_states row, clear the client's in-memory state, and call RemoveParticipant — which no-ops because the join has not reached the SFU yet. The client was left holding a live 5-minute RoomJoin credential for a membership the server had just torn down. Re-check the client's voice state immediately after GenerateToken and withhold the credential if the join was superseded, with a best-effort RemoveParticipant to match every other eviction path. * fix(ws): 2 defect(s) (OC-0017, OC-0022) OC-0017: sweepStaleVoiceStates re-checks the live client immediately before deleting a snapshotted-stale voice_states row. voice_join commits the row before calling c.setVoiceState, so a join that lands inside that window was snapshotted as a ghost and had its just-committed row deleted, leaving the client in voice in memory with no DB row. OC-0022: CleanupVoiceForChannel resolves its voice_leave audience with a variant of channelReadAudience that skips the archived short-circuit. Both production callers archive the channel before evicting, so the plain resolver always returned an empty audience and only the evicted participants learned the call ended. * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0023) Camera and screenshare now draw from the same per-channel voice_max_video budget. handleVoiceScreenshareV2 performed no cap check at all, and the camera gate's slot-count subquery counted only `camera = 1` rows, so a screensharing occupant was invisible to it. Both gates now count `camera = 1 OR screenshare = 1` via a shared enableVideoSlot helper. * fix(client): 2 defect(s) (OC-0032, OC-0033) OC-0033: voice_disconnected staleness guard swallowed the kick toast when the sibling voice_leave had already cleared currentChannelId. Treat a cleared store as not-stale. OC-0032: VIDEO_LIMIT rollback assumed the camera, tearing down a working camera and leaving refused screen tracks published. Correlate by envelope id and roll back the kind that was actually refused. * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0034) * fix(client): 1 defect(s) (OC-0035) A superseded video-enable id makes rollbackPendingVideo return undefined. The dispatcher's ternary treated undefined as "not screen" and called disableCamera(), tearing down a working camera the user never touched. Return early instead: undefined means there is nothing to roll back. * fix(voice): 1 defect(s) (OC-0036) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
750 lines
31 KiB
Go
750 lines
31 KiB
Go
package ws
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import (
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"context"
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"log/slog"
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"github.com/owncord/server/db"
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"github.com/owncord/server/permissions"
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)
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// broadcastMsg is an internal message queued for delivery.
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type broadcastMsg struct {
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channelID int64 // 0 = send to all connected clients
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msg []byte
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// recipients, when non-nil, replaces topic fan-out with direct delivery to
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// exactly these user IDs. Used by voice_state/voice_leave: they are global
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// in scope (every sidebar shows them) but must not disclose a channel the
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// recipient's role may not READ, and the audience is resolved off the hub
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// goroutine so deliverBroadcast stays free of permission queries.
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recipients []int64
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}
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// BroadcastToChannel enqueues msg for delivery to all clients subscribed to
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// channelID. When channelID is 0 the message is sent to every connected client.
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// Non-blocking: if the broadcast channel is full the message is dropped with a warning.
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func (h *Hub) BroadcastToChannel(channelID int64, msg []byte) {
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select {
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case h.broadcast <- broadcastMsg{channelID: channelID, msg: msg}:
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default:
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h.broadcastDrops.Add(1)
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slog.Warn("hub: broadcast channel full, dropping message",
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"channel_id", channelID, "msg_len", len(msg))
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}
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}
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// BroadcastToAll enqueues msg for delivery to every connected client.
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// Non-blocking: if the broadcast channel is full the message is dropped with a warning.
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func (h *Hub) BroadcastToAll(msg []byte) {
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select {
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case h.broadcast <- broadcastMsg{channelID: 0, msg: msg}:
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default:
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h.broadcastDrops.Add(1)
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slog.Warn("hub: broadcast channel full, dropping global message",
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"msg_len", len(msg))
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}
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}
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// broadcastVoiceEvent enqueues a voice_state / voice_leave message for the
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// connected clients whose current role may READ channelID.
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//
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// These events used to go out via BroadcastToAll, which handed every
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// authenticated client the membership and camera/mute state of voice channels
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// that channel_overrides hides from their role — while the equivalent read path
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// (buildReady) deliberately filters voice states to readable channels. Tagging
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// the event with its real channel id also makes reconnect replay filter it,
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// where a channelID of 0 was replayed unconditionally.
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//
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// The audience is resolved here, on the caller's goroutine, so the hub's
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// dispatch loop never blocks on permission lookups.
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func (h *Hub) broadcastVoiceEvent(ctx context.Context, channelID int64, msg []byte) {
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// A room's own participants must always receive its voice_state /
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// voice_leave: voice membership is gated on CONNECT_VOICE alone, so the
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// READ filter can exclude a live participant — whose client then keeps a
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// stale E2EE key holder, stalling rotation and locking new joiners out
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// until e2ee_timeout. Union the READ audience with the room's current
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// participants; what outsiders may observe is unchanged.
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audience := h.channelReadAudience(ctx, channelID)
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seen := make(map[int64]struct{}, len(audience))
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for _, uid := range audience {
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seen[uid] = struct{}{}
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}
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h.mu.RLock()
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for uid, c := range h.clients {
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if _, ok := seen[uid]; !ok && c.getVoiceChID() == channelID {
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audience = append(audience, uid)
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}
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}
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h.mu.RUnlock()
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h.broadcastChannelScopedTo(channelID, msg, audience, "voice event")
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}
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// broadcastVoiceEventWithLeaver is broadcastVoiceEvent extended to guarantee
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// leaverID is in the audience even though the caller has already cleared
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// their client-side voice state — which means broadcastVoiceEvent's own
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// still-in-the-room participant union can no longer see them. Every path
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// that tears down a voice participant whose client state is cleared before
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// the voice_leave goes out needs this: voice membership is gated on
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// CONNECT_VOICE alone, so a leaver without READ_MESSAGES on the channel
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// would otherwise never learn the server already ended their call. Mirrors
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// CleanupVoiceForChannel's per-batch leaver union, for the single-leaver case.
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func (h *Hub) broadcastVoiceEventWithLeaver(ctx context.Context, channelID int64, msg []byte, leaverID int64) {
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audience := h.channelReadAudience(ctx, channelID)
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seen := make(map[int64]struct{}, len(audience)+1)
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for _, uid := range audience {
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seen[uid] = struct{}{}
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}
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h.mu.RLock()
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for uid, c := range h.clients {
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if _, ok := seen[uid]; !ok && c.getVoiceChID() == channelID {
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seen[uid] = struct{}{}
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audience = append(audience, uid)
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}
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}
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h.mu.RUnlock()
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if _, ok := seen[leaverID]; !ok {
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audience = append(audience, leaverID)
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}
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h.broadcastChannelScopedTo(channelID, msg, audience, "voice event")
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}
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// broadcastChannelScoped enqueues msg for exactly the connected clients whose
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// current role may READ channelID, tagged with that channel id so reconnect
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// replay filters it too (EventsSinceFiltered replays a channelID of 0
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// unconditionally). kind only labels the drop warning.
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func (h *Hub) broadcastChannelScoped(ctx context.Context, channelID int64, msg []byte, kind string) {
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h.broadcastChannelScopedTo(channelID, msg, h.channelReadAudience(ctx, channelID), kind)
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}
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// broadcastChannelScopedTo enqueues msg for a pre-resolved audience. Callers
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// that fan out several messages for the same channel in one operation
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// (CleanupVoiceForChannel) resolve the audience once via channelReadAudience
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// and reuse it here, instead of re-running the role/override lookups per
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// message. recipients is only read after enqueue, so sharing one slice across
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// messages is safe.
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func (h *Hub) broadcastChannelScopedTo(channelID int64, msg []byte, recipients []int64, kind string) {
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bm := broadcastMsg{
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channelID: channelID,
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msg: msg,
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recipients: recipients,
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}
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select {
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case h.broadcast <- bm:
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default:
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h.broadcastDrops.Add(1)
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slog.Warn("hub: broadcast channel full, dropping "+kind,
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"channel_id", channelID, "msg_len", len(msg))
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}
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}
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// channelReadAudience returns the connected user IDs whose current role may READ
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// channelID. Always non-nil, so an empty result means "deliver to nobody"
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// rather than "no filter". Each user's verdict comes from the cached
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// PermissionService when the hub has one (one in-memory lookup per connected
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// user; a miss repopulates from the user's CURRENT role, so a mid-session
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// reassignment is still honored). Caching is safe here because revocation is
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// delivered synchronously at every mutation site: a role change calls
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// InvalidateUser (admin/handlers_users.go) and a channel-override change calls
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// InvalidateAll (admin/handlers_channel_perms.go) before the hub fan-out runs,
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// with the 30s cache TTL as a backstop; the F6 gen-counter guard in the service
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// prevents a populate racing an invalidation from caching stale data. Fails
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// closed: a client whose role cannot be resolved is left out. Bare test hubs
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// without a service fall back to live per-call lookups, memoised for the
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// duration of the call. Mirrors RefreshChannelVisibility, which resolves
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// visibility the same way.
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func (h *Hub) channelReadAudience(ctx context.Context, channelID int64) []int64 {
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return h.channelReadAudienceImpl(ctx, channelID, false)
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}
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// channelReadAudienceIgnoringArchived is channelReadAudience without the
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// Archived short-circuit (OC-0022). CleanupVoiceForChannel's only two
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// callers (admin/handlers_channels.go's archive and delete paths) always
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// commit archived=1 to the channel before evicting its voice participants —
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// deliberately, per admin/api_test.go's
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// TestAdminAPI_DeleteChannel_ArchivesBeforeVoiceCleanup, so a concurrent
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// voice_join sees the archived gate. That means channelReadAudience's own
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// Archived check, evaluated from CleanupVoiceForChannel, always sees the
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// channel already archived and always returns nobody: the voice_leave that
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// should tell every bystander who could see the room a moment ago that the
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// call ended never reaches them, only the evicted participants themselves
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// (added back by CleanupVoiceForChannel's own loop). This resolves that same
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// pre-archival READ audience for exactly that one broadcast, leaving every
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// other channelReadAudience call site (and its archived-channel behavior)
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// untouched.
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func (h *Hub) channelReadAudienceIgnoringArchived(ctx context.Context, channelID int64) []int64 {
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return h.channelReadAudienceImpl(ctx, channelID, true)
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}
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func (h *Hub) channelReadAudienceImpl(ctx context.Context, channelID int64, ignoreArchived bool) []int64 {
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h.mu.RLock()
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userIDs := make([]int64, 0, len(h.clients))
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for uid := range h.clients {
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userIDs = append(userIDs, uid)
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}
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h.mu.RUnlock()
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// A DM channel carries no channel_overrides rows, so every connected
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// user whose base role holds READ_MESSAGES would otherwise pass the role
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// scan below — leaking a private DM call's voice_state/voice_leave
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// events to the whole server. Resolve the DM's real audience (its
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// participants, intersected with who is actually connected) instead,
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// mirroring the IsDMParticipant membership rule hasChannelAccess uses.
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if h.db != nil {
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ch, err := h.db.GetChannel(ctx, channelID)
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if err != nil {
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// Fail closed: an unresolvable channel must not fall through to
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// the role scan, which would treat it as a readable non-DM channel.
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slog.Error("ws: channelReadAudience GetChannel failed, denying",
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"channel_id", channelID, "err", err)
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return []int64{}
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}
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// Archived channels are hidden from every client regardless of
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// permissions, mirroring RefreshChannelVisibility and VisibleChannelIDs.
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// Without this, an admin edit to an archived channel (or a voice
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// teardown inside one) fans out straight to every connected user whose
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// base role holds READ_MESSAGES, none of whom have the channel in their
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// ready payload or sidebar. ignoreArchived opts a caller out of this
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// specific check only — see channelReadAudienceIgnoringArchived.
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if ch != nil && ch.Archived && !ignoreArchived {
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return []int64{}
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}
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if ch != nil && ch.Type == "dm" {
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participantIDs, err := h.db.GetDMParticipantIDs(ctx, channelID)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("ws: channelReadAudience GetDMParticipantIDs failed, denying",
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"channel_id", channelID, "err", err)
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return []int64{}
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}
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connected := make(map[int64]struct{}, len(userIDs))
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for _, uid := range userIDs {
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connected[uid] = struct{}{}
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}
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audience := make([]int64, 0, len(participantIDs))
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for _, uid := range participantIDs {
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if _, ok := connected[uid]; ok {
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audience = append(audience, uid)
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}
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}
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return audience
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}
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}
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audience := make([]int64, 0, len(userIDs))
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if h.perms != nil {
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for _, uid := range userIDs {
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if h.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, uid, channelID, permissions.ReadMessages) {
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audience = append(audience, uid)
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}
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}
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return audience
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}
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if h.db == nil || h.permChecker == nil {
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return audience
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}
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// Resolved per USER, not memoised per role: channel_user_overrides is the
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// last layer of the resolution order, so two members of the same role can
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// legitimately disagree about one channel and a per-role memo would hand
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// one of them the other's verdict.
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for _, uid := range userIDs {
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role, err := h.db.GetRoleForUser(ctx, uid)
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if err != nil || role == nil {
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continue
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}
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if h.permChecker.HasChannelPerm(ctx, role.Permissions, role.ID, uid, channelID, permissions.ReadMessages) {
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audience = append(audience, uid)
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}
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}
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return audience
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}
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// BroadcastServerRestart sends a server_restart message to all connected clients.
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// reason describes why the server is restarting (e.g., "update").
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// delaySeconds tells clients how long until the server actually shuts down.
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func (h *Hub) BroadcastServerRestart(reason string, delaySeconds int) {
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h.BroadcastToAll(buildServerRestartMsg(reason, delaySeconds))
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}
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// BroadcastChannelCreate sends a channel_create message to the connected
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// clients whose current role may READ ch. It used to go out via BroadcastToAll,
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// which handed every authenticated client the name, category and topic of a
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// channel that channel_overrides hides from their role — metadata the ready
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// payload (buildReady/VisibleChannelIDs) deliberately withholds.
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//
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// The admin HubBroadcaster interface carries no context, so — like
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// RefreshChannelVisibility — the audience is resolved against Background: the
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// fan-out must complete regardless of the triggering request.
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func (h *Hub) BroadcastChannelCreate(ch *db.Channel) {
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h.broadcastChannelScoped(context.Background(), ch.ID, buildChannelCreate(ch), "channel_create")
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}
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// BroadcastChannelUpdate sends a channel_update message to the connected
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// clients whose current role may READ ch. Same disclosure as
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// BroadcastChannelCreate; same filtered fan-out.
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func (h *Hub) BroadcastChannelUpdate(ch *db.Channel) {
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h.broadcastChannelScoped(context.Background(), ch.ID, buildChannelUpdate(ch), "channel_update")
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}
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// BroadcastChannelDelete sends a channel_delete message to all connected clients.
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//
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// Deliberately unfiltered: the payload is the bare channel id, with none of the
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// metadata create/update carry, and by the time the admin handler calls this the
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// channel row — and with it the ON DELETE CASCADE'd channel_overrides — is
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// already gone, so a permission check here would answer from base role perms
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// and could drop the delete for exactly the users who saw the channel via a
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// positive override, stranding it in their sidebar.
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func (h *Hub) BroadcastChannelDelete(channelID int64) {
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h.BroadcastToAll(buildChannelDelete(channelID))
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}
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// RefreshChannelVisibility re-evaluates which connected clients may see ch
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// after a channel_overrides change and sends targeted channel_create /
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// channel_delete messages so sidebars converge without a reconnect. Clients
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// that lose visibility are also unsubscribed from the channel topic and have
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// their focused channel cleared so live messages stop flowing.
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//
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// The sends deliberately bypass the sequenced broadcast/replay path: a
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// replayed channel_delete would be filtered by the allowed-channel set
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// computed at replay time, which after an override change is exactly the
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// inverse of the intended audience. Clients tolerate seq-less messages.
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func (h *Hub) RefreshChannelVisibility(ch *db.Channel) {
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if ch == nil {
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return
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}
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h.mu.RLock()
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clients := make([]*Client, 0, len(h.clients))
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for _, c := range h.clients {
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clients = append(clients, c)
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}
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h.mu.RUnlock()
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// Called via the admin HubBroadcaster interface, which carries no context;
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// the targeted re-sync must complete regardless of the triggering request.
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ctx := context.Background()
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// Visibility is resolved per user. With a PermissionService it comes from
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// the per-user cache — safe because the admin handlers invalidate
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// (InvalidateAll on override change, InvalidateUser on role change) before
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// calling into the hub, so the lookups below repopulate from post-change
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// data; the 30s TTL is only a backstop and the F6 gen-counter guard keeps
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// a racing populate from caching stale rows. Without a service (bare test
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// hubs) each client is resolved live.
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//
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// Deliberately NOT memoised per role: channel_user_overrides is the last
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// layer of the resolution order, so two members of the same role can
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// legitimately disagree about one channel — exactly the case a per-user
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// override edit creates, and exactly the fan-out this function targets.
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userVisible := func(userID, roleID int64) bool {
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role, err := h.db.GetRoleByID(ctx, roleID)
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if err != nil || role == nil {
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return false
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}
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// Single visibility predicate shared with buildReady / REST
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// ListVisibleChannels; the checker fails closed on a lookup error
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// and bypasses for admins, matching the other sites exactly.
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return h.permChecker.HasChannelPerm(ctx, role.Permissions, roleID, userID, ch.ID, permissions.ReadMessages)
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}
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// userCanSend mirrors channelCanSend (serve_ready.go) — the value the ready
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// payload ships per channel — but expressed as per-user permission checks
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// so it works in both the service and bare-hub branches without needing a
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// resolved *db.Role. HasChannelPerm already bypasses for admins and fails
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// closed on a lookup error, matching channelCanSend's own admin shortcut.
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//
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// Without this, can_send is only ever computed at connect time, so a role
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// edit or override edit leaves every connected client's composer stuck on
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// its stale connect-time verdict until the socket is rebuilt.
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userCanSend := func(userID, roleID int64) bool {
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has := func(perm int64) bool {
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if h.perms != nil {
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return h.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, userID, ch.ID, perm)
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}
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role, err := h.db.GetRoleByID(ctx, roleID)
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if err != nil || role == nil {
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return false
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}
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return h.permChecker.HasChannelPerm(ctx, role.Permissions, roleID, userID, ch.ID, perm)
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}
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if !has(permissions.ReadMessages) || !has(permissions.SendMessages) {
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return false
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}
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if ch.Type == "announcement" {
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return has(permissions.ManageMessages)
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, c := range clients {
|
|
if c.user == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
var visible bool
|
|
switch {
|
|
case ch.Archived:
|
|
// Archived channels are hidden from every client regardless of
|
|
// permissions, mirroring VisibleChannelIDs.
|
|
visible = false
|
|
case h.perms != nil:
|
|
// The service resolves the user's CURRENT role internally (c.user
|
|
// is a connect-time snapshot), failing closed — an unresolvable
|
|
// role loses visibility rather than keeping a stale grant.
|
|
visible = h.perms.HasChannelPerm(ctx, c.user.ID, ch.ID, permissions.ReadMessages)
|
|
default:
|
|
// c.user is a connect-time snapshot; an admin may have changed the
|
|
// user's role mid-session, so resolve the current role from the DB.
|
|
// Fail closed: on error send nothing rather than mis-target.
|
|
fresh, err := h.db.GetUserByID(ctx, c.user.ID)
|
|
if err != nil || fresh == nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("hub: RefreshChannelVisibility could not resolve user role",
|
|
"user_id", c.user.ID, "err", err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
visible = userVisible(fresh.ID, fresh.RoleID)
|
|
}
|
|
if visible {
|
|
// Idempotent add on the client; also refreshes channel metadata.
|
|
// Addressed per client so it can carry this recipient's own
|
|
// can_send verdict — the whole point of this fan-out is that a
|
|
// permission change just made those verdicts diverge.
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildChannelCreateFor(ch, userCanSend(c.user.ID, c.user.RoleID)))
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildChannelDelete(ch.ID))
|
|
h.pubsub.Unsubscribe(c, ChannelTopic(ch.ID))
|
|
c.mu.Lock()
|
|
if c.channelID == ch.ID {
|
|
c.channelID = 0
|
|
}
|
|
c.mu.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Clients not connected right now missed the targeted sends above. Move
|
|
// the watermark so any resume from a seq at or before this point is
|
|
// forced onto the full-ready path instead of replay. Ratcheted upward
|
|
// only — see bumpVisibilityWatermark — so a concurrent writer that read
|
|
// an older seq cannot regress a watermark another writer already pushed
|
|
// higher.
|
|
h.bumpVisibilityWatermark()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RefreshAllChannelVisibility re-runs RefreshChannelVisibility for every
|
|
// non-DM channel. A role's permission mask is the base every channel's
|
|
// effective permission is computed from, so editing or deleting a role can
|
|
// change visibility of *any* channel at once — where a channel_overrides edit
|
|
// touches exactly one. DM channels are skipped: their access is participant-
|
|
// based and no role change can alter it.
|
|
//
|
|
// Called via the admin HubBroadcaster interface (no context), so the channel
|
|
// list is read against Background — the re-sync must complete regardless of the
|
|
// triggering request. The caller invalidates the permission cache first, as the
|
|
// channel-override handlers do, so the per-client lookups below repopulate from
|
|
// post-change data.
|
|
func (h *Hub) RefreshAllChannelVisibility() {
|
|
if h.db == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
channels, err := h.db.ListChannels(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("hub: RefreshAllChannelVisibility could not list channels", "err", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
for i := range channels {
|
|
if channels[i].Type == "dm" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
h.RefreshChannelVisibility(&channels[i])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BroadcastRolesUpdate sends the full role list to every connected client so
|
|
// name colors and permission-gated affordances converge without a reconnect.
|
|
//
|
|
// Unfiltered on purpose: the role list is already in every client's ready
|
|
// payload, so it discloses nothing a connected client cannot already read.
|
|
func (h *Hub) BroadcastRolesUpdate(roles []*db.Role) {
|
|
h.BroadcastToAll(buildRolesUpdate(roles))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BroadcastEmojiUpdate sends the full custom-emoji set to every connected
|
|
// client so a newly uploaded (or deleted) emoji renders in messages, the
|
|
// picker and reaction pills without a reconnect.
|
|
//
|
|
// Unfiltered, like BroadcastRolesUpdate: emoji are server-wide with no channel
|
|
// scope, and every client may already GET the same list.
|
|
func (h *Hub) BroadcastEmojiUpdate(list []*db.Emoji) {
|
|
h.BroadcastToAll(buildEmojiUpdate(list))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BroadcastChatBulkDeleted sends one chat_bulk_deleted message carrying every
|
|
// purged message id to the subscribers of channelID, replacing the N separate
|
|
// chat_deleted broadcasts a loop of single deletes would produce. Fan-out goes
|
|
// through the ordinary sequenced channel path, so the event replays on
|
|
// reconnect exactly like chat_deleted does.
|
|
func (h *Hub) BroadcastChatBulkDeleted(channelID int64, messageIDs []int64) {
|
|
h.BroadcastToChannel(channelID, buildChatBulkDeleted(channelID, messageIDs))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BroadcastMemberBan sends a member_ban message to all connected clients
|
|
// and immediately disconnects the banned user's WebSocket connection (BUG-113).
|
|
func (h *Hub) BroadcastMemberBan(userID int64) {
|
|
h.BroadcastToAll(buildMemberBan(userID))
|
|
h.DisconnectUser(userID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DisconnectUser forcibly disconnects the client identified by userID.
|
|
// No-op if the user is not currently connected.
|
|
func (h *Hub) DisconnectUser(userID int64) {
|
|
h.mu.RLock()
|
|
c, ok := h.clients[userID]
|
|
h.mu.RUnlock()
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
slog.Info("hub: disconnecting user", "user_id", userID)
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildErrorMsg(ErrCodeBanned, "you are banned"))
|
|
h.kickClient(c)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BroadcastUserUpdate sends a user_update message to all connected clients
|
|
// when a user changes their profile (username, avatar, display name, about,
|
|
// identity key).
|
|
func (h *Hub) BroadcastUserUpdate(u UserUpdate) {
|
|
h.BroadcastToAll(buildUserUpdate(u))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BroadcastPresence fans a presence change out with the invisible mapping
|
|
// applied: everyone else sees db.BroadcastStatus(status), the user themselves
|
|
// sees the truth. It is the non-handler counterpart of presenceEvents, used by
|
|
// the connect and disconnect paths which write to the hub directly.
|
|
func (h *Hub) BroadcastPresence(userID int64, status string, customStatus *string) {
|
|
public := db.BroadcastStatus(status)
|
|
if public == status {
|
|
h.BroadcastToAll(buildPresenceMsg(userID, status, customStatus))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
h.broadcastExcludeLow(0, userID, buildPresenceMsg(userID, public, customStatus))
|
|
h.SendToUser(userID, buildPresenceMsg(userID, status, customStatus))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BroadcastMemberUpdate sends a member_update message to all connected clients
|
|
// and re-evaluates the reassigned user's live channel subscriptions.
|
|
func (h *Hub) BroadcastMemberUpdate(userID int64, roleName string) {
|
|
h.BroadcastToAll(buildMemberUpdate(userID, roleName))
|
|
h.revokeUnreadableChannels(userID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// revokeUnreadableChannels drops the channel-topic subscriptions the user's new
|
|
// role may no longer READ. READ_MESSAGES is checked once, at channel_focus, and
|
|
// then becomes a durable pub/sub subscription, so without this a demoted user
|
|
// keeps receiving every chat_message / chat_edited / reaction_update posted in
|
|
// the channels their old role could read for as long as the socket stays open.
|
|
//
|
|
// The per-client work mirrors RefreshChannelVisibility, the channel_overrides
|
|
// equivalent: targeted, unsequenced channel_delete + Unsubscribe (a replayed
|
|
// channel_delete would be filtered by the allowed set computed at replay time),
|
|
// then a visibilityChangeSeq bump so a client resuming across this change takes
|
|
// the full-ready path instead of replay.
|
|
//
|
|
// Only the topics the socket actually holds are examined — a blanket sweep over
|
|
// every channel would disclose the full channel-ID list to a demoted user.
|
|
func (h *Hub) revokeUnreadableChannels(userID int64) {
|
|
// Ratcheted upward only (see bumpVisibilityWatermark), and evaluated at
|
|
// defer-RUN time — not the plain Store(Load(&h.seq)) this used to be,
|
|
// whose argument would have been evaluated at this defer STATEMENT,
|
|
// capturing entry-time seq and stomping any higher watermark stored by a
|
|
// concurrent writer during the per-topic DB loop below. Deferred because
|
|
// it must cover the early returns too: a user who is offline, or whose
|
|
// socket is closed below, converges via the full-ready path.
|
|
defer h.bumpVisibilityWatermark()
|
|
|
|
if h.db == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
h.mu.RLock()
|
|
c, ok := h.clients[userID]
|
|
h.mu.RUnlock()
|
|
if !ok || c.user == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Called via the admin HubBroadcaster interface, which carries no context;
|
|
// the re-evaluation must complete regardless of the triggering request.
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
|
|
// c.user is a connect-time snapshot and the role just changed, so resolve
|
|
// the current user — and through it the current role — from the DB.
|
|
var allowed map[int64]bool
|
|
user, err := h.db.GetUserByID(ctx, userID)
|
|
if err == nil && user != nil {
|
|
// Same predicate as the ready payload and reconnect replay filtering.
|
|
allowed, err = h.computeAllowedChannels(ctx, h.db, user)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil || user == nil {
|
|
// Visibility unresolved. Keeping the old subscriptions would leak, and
|
|
// revoking them all would hollow out a sidebar the user may still be
|
|
// entitled to, so close the socket instead: the client reconnects and
|
|
// rebuilds from a ready payload computed with the new role. kickClient
|
|
// rather than DisconnectUser — the latter sends a BANNED error, which
|
|
// makes the client clear its credentials instead of reconnecting.
|
|
slog.Warn("hub: role change visibility unresolved, closing socket",
|
|
"user_id", userID, "err", err)
|
|
h.kickClient(c)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, topic := range h.pubsub.TopicsForClient(userID) {
|
|
chID := channelTopicID(topic)
|
|
if chID == 0 || allowed[chID] {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
// DM access is gated on dm_participants, which no role change can
|
|
// alter, while allowed sources DMs from dm_open_state — a DM the user
|
|
// has closed (or every DM, if the DM lookup inside
|
|
// computeAllowedChannels failed) is missing from allowed even though
|
|
// its subscription is still legitimate. Never revoke a DM topic here;
|
|
// on a lookup error close the socket rather than guess.
|
|
ch, chErr := h.db.GetChannel(ctx, chID)
|
|
if chErr != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("hub: role change channel lookup failed, closing socket",
|
|
"user_id", userID, "channel_id", chID, "err", chErr)
|
|
h.kickClient(c)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if ch != nil && ch.Type == "dm" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
c.sendMsg(buildChannelDelete(chID))
|
|
h.pubsub.Unsubscribe(c, topic)
|
|
c.mu.Lock()
|
|
if c.channelID == chID {
|
|
c.channelID = 0
|
|
}
|
|
c.mu.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SendToUser delivers msg directly to the client identified by userID.
|
|
// Returns true if the client was found and the message was queued.
|
|
func (h *Hub) SendToUser(userID int64, msg []byte) bool {
|
|
h.mu.RLock()
|
|
c, ok := h.clients[userID]
|
|
h.mu.RUnlock()
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return c.trySendMsg(msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SendToUserHigh sends a high-priority message to a specific user.
|
|
func (h *Hub) SendToUserHigh(userID int64, msg []byte) bool {
|
|
h.mu.RLock()
|
|
c, ok := h.clients[userID]
|
|
h.mu.RUnlock()
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
c.sendHighMsg(msg)
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BroadcastToAllLow enqueues a low-priority global broadcast.
|
|
// Low-priority messages are silently dropped if a client's buffer is full.
|
|
func (h *Hub) BroadcastToAllLow(msg []byte) {
|
|
// Low-priority global broadcasts bypass the sequenced broadcast channel
|
|
// and go directly through pub/sub — they don't need replay or seq numbering.
|
|
h.pubsub.PublishGlobalLow(msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sendSequencedToUsers stamps msg with a monotonic seq, stores it in the
|
|
// replay buffer under channelID, and fans the wrapped payload out to the
|
|
// provided users on the normal-priority queue.
|
|
//
|
|
// Sequenced frames must all share one per-client FIFO: writePump drains
|
|
// sendHigh before send, so a seq-stamped frame on the high queue would reach
|
|
// the socket ahead of lower-seq frames still queued in send. The client acks
|
|
// max(seq) and replay is strictly seq > last_seq, so a disconnect in that
|
|
// window would silently lose the overtaken events. The high queue remains for
|
|
// unsequenced targeted messages only.
|
|
func (h *Hub) sendSequencedToUsers(channelID int64, userIDs []int64, msg []byte) {
|
|
h.seqMu.Lock()
|
|
defer h.seqMu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
seq := h.nextSeq()
|
|
wrapped := wrapWithSeq(msg, seq)
|
|
h.replayBuf.Push(seq, channelID, wrapped)
|
|
h.persistEvent(seq, channelID, wrapped)
|
|
|
|
for _, userID := range userIDs {
|
|
h.SendToUser(userID, wrapped)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// deliverBroadcast stamps bm.msg with a monotonic sequence number, stores it
|
|
// in the replay buffer, and sends it to the appropriate clients via pub/sub.
|
|
func (h *Hub) deliverBroadcast(bm broadcastMsg) {
|
|
// The channel-broadcast debug log is emitted after seqMu is released
|
|
// (below) so a slow logging sink never extends the critical section that
|
|
// serializes every broadcast.
|
|
seq, delivered, channelSend := func() (seq uint64, delivered int, channelSend bool) {
|
|
h.seqMu.Lock()
|
|
defer h.seqMu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Channel-scoped sends consult the topic limiter BEFORE a seq is
|
|
// allocated: a shed frame that consumed a seq would sit in the replay
|
|
// buffer as a number no client ever saw live, and since clients ack
|
|
// only max(seq), it could never be requested back.
|
|
if bm.recipients == nil && bm.channelID != 0 {
|
|
if !h.topicLimiter.Allow(ChannelTopic(bm.channelID)) {
|
|
slog.Warn("hub: topic rate limit exceeded, dropping message",
|
|
"channel_id", bm.channelID)
|
|
return 0, 0, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
seq = h.nextSeq()
|
|
msg := wrapWithSeq(bm.msg, seq)
|
|
|
|
// Store in replay buffer for reconnection recovery.
|
|
h.replayBuf.Push(seq, bm.channelID, msg)
|
|
h.persistEvent(seq, bm.channelID, msg)
|
|
|
|
// Fan out to plugins subscribed to this event type (Phase C Step 9).
|
|
// Dispatch is a no-op in the default build; the wazero build calls into
|
|
// the WASM module. Dispatch is called outside seqMu after we release it
|
|
// conceptually — but since seqMu is still held here, the call MUST NOT
|
|
// re-enter the hub. The default build is safe; the wazero build should
|
|
// dispatch asynchronously once the runtime is real.
|
|
if sink := h.pluginSink.Load(); sink != nil {
|
|
eventType := extractEventType(msg)
|
|
if eventType == "" {
|
|
eventType = "broadcast"
|
|
}
|
|
sink.Dispatch(context.Background(), eventType, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
case bm.recipients != nil:
|
|
// Visibility-filtered fan-out: the audience was resolved by the caller.
|
|
for _, userID := range bm.recipients {
|
|
h.SendToUser(userID, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
case bm.channelID == 0:
|
|
// Global broadcast — deliver to every connected client.
|
|
h.pubsub.PublishGlobal(msg)
|
|
default:
|
|
// Channel-scoped broadcast — deliver to subscribers of the channel
|
|
// topic. The rate limiter already passed above, before the seq
|
|
// was allocated.
|
|
delivered = h.pubsub.Publish(ChannelTopic(bm.channelID), msg, 0)
|
|
channelSend = true
|
|
}
|
|
return seq, delivered, channelSend
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
if channelSend {
|
|
slog.Debug("hub: channel broadcast",
|
|
"channel_id", bm.channelID, "delivered", delivered, "seq", seq)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|