Files
OwnCord/docs/schema.md
T
J3vbandClaude Fable 5 03fcb7d518 fix: execute the 2026-08-19 audit fix order (docs refresh + five FRAGILE fixes) (#1396)
* docs(plans): phased remediation plan for the 2026-08-19 audit

Executes the audit's §8 MUST-fix verdict and §9.1 fix order: one phase per
finding group, statuses updated in place as phases land.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ

* test(client): give the renderWindow-breaker test its own timeout (audit F-5)

30 synchronous 100-row jsdom rebuilds can exceed vitest's default 5s on a
loaded runner; the test timed out once under CI-like load and passes in
isolation, so it now carries an explicit 20s budget.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ

* docs: fix the ten wrong reference-doc statements from audit 2026-08-19 (B-01..B-10)

schema.md: migrations 030/031 documented, attachments ON DELETE SET NULL
(matching 030's rebuild), index inventory rewritten from cumulative migration
state, writer/reader pool split described, default-roles table made a
consistent post-migration snapshot, dbgen preamble updated.

protocol.md: DM chat events documented as sequenced/ring-buffered/replayable
(they are), plugin_broadcast seq flipped to Yes, retry_after claim removed
(no WS error carries it), the five enforced-but-documented-as-None rate
limits added (channel_focus, mark_read, call_decline, chat_command, ping),
E2EE announce/offer budgets corrected incl. the per-target inner cap,
BAD_PAYLOAD and NOT_KEY_HOLDER added to the error table, ready voice_states/
roles field lists completed, member_join top-level status documented.

api.md: diagnostics endpoint is ADMINISTRATOR-only (H-8) with a per-IP
limiter and host:port livekit_url, error-code table now matches emitted codes
(INTERNAL_ERROR, STORAGE_ERROR 507; oversize upload is 400), body-cap
exemptions listed, identity_public_key documented on PATCH /users/me, plugin
endpoints' plain-text errors + X-Plugin-Runtime header documented, /health
503 degraded state documented, metrics/LiveKit CIDR keys named, updates/apply
restart-conflict 409s added.

Also folds in the audit's D-04/D-05 comment and plan-header staleness fixes
(buildReady comment, e2e spec-count comments, logctx stray word, three plan
status headers).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ

* fix(server): log the five silently-discarded persistence errors (audit F-3/F-4/D-16)

Lockout Upsert/Delete/Cleanup failures (auth/ratelimit.go), the H-6
session-cap eviction failure in CreateSession (db/auth_queries.go), and the
channel_focus read-state write failure (service/channel.go) all discarded
their errors with no trace — a brute-force lockout could silently fail to
survive a restart. In-memory behavior is unchanged (warn-and-continue); the
lockout write paths are pinned by tests mirroring OC-0061's load-path test.
The session-cap and read-state sites are log-only additions on seams the
existing suites already exercise on the success path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ

* fix(dm): blocking a user evicts them from the pair's live 1:1 DM voice call (audit F-1)

The block gate ran only at voice_join and voluntary voice_token_refresh, so
a blocked user already in the shared 1:1 DM call kept their session
indefinitely — the same guard-asymmetry family as A-2026-08-03. handleBlockUser
now severs the call through the dmVoiceEvictor capability handleCloseDM
already exercises, using a new find-only FindDMChannelIDBetween lookup
(sqlc-generated; mirrors GetOrCreateDMChannel's is_group=0 clause so group
DM calls stay exempt, matching requireDMNotBlocked). Pinned by three handler
tests: shared-DM eviction, no-DM no-op, group-only no-op.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ

* fix(ws): close the role-reassignment/handshake race (audit F-2)

A role reassignment landing mid-handshake was invisible for the socket's
whole life: both handshake paths resolved permissions from the auth-time
c.user snapshot, revokeUnreadableChannels early-returns for a user not yet
in h.clients, and its Unsubscribe no-ops on the pubsub identity guard once a
reconnect replaced the client.

Three coordinated fixes: (1) refreshUserSnapshot re-reads the user row (and
role name) in reconnectPrecheck and handleFreshConnect, fail-closed; (2) the
resume-fallback path re-reads the role once more after registerNow and runs
the revocation pass when it moved, so the reassignment-vs-registration
orderings meet in the middle; (3) revokeUnreadableChannels re-resolves the
live client immediately before acting, mirroring RefreshChannelVisibility.
Pinned by four tests driving real WS handshakes through the existing race
hooks plus a new pre-register/pre-act hook pair; ws suite green under the
default and deadlock builds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ

* refactor(client): remove the inert replay-dedup machinery (audit F-6)

The server writes auth_ok before the replay burst, so replayDedup — created
on socket-open and cleared when auth_ok is processed — could never be active
for a real replayed frame, and the dispatcher's isReplaying() unread gates
never fired. Their no-op behavior is the correct behavior (a buffer/db
resume has no ready payload, so replayed frames must count as unread), so
the machinery, the gates, and the misleading comments are removed rather
than repaired. The pinning tests injected replay frames in an order a
spec-compliant server never produces; they are replaced by a test pinning
the real contract (frames after auth_ok are dispatched verbatim; duplicate
handling belongs to the stores). Client suite green: 5036/5036.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ

* docs(plans): mark remediation phases 1-6 done

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ

* fix(ws): nolint the context-less revoke call golangci-lint flags

revokeUnreadableChannels takes no context by design (admin HubBroadcaster
interface); annotate the one call site inside a ctx-taking function, matching
the RefreshChannelVisibility precedent. golangci-lint v2.11.3: 0 issues.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 03:49:13 +02:00

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# Database Schema Reference
OwnCord uses a single SQLite database file (`data/chatserver.db`) with the pure-Go driver `modernc.org/sqlite` (no CGO). Migrations run automatically on startup.
> **Data-access layers:** most `Server/db` methods delegate to the
> sqlc-generated layer (`Server/db/dbgen`, from `Server/db/queries/`) per
> decision D2 in
> [plans/audit-2026-07-19-decisions.md](plans/audit-2026-07-19-decisions.md);
> a deliberate remainder (variable `IN` lists, FTS, multi-statement
> transactions) still runs as hand-written SQL — tracked in
> [plans/sqlc-adoption.md](plans/sqlc-adoption.md). See
> [architecture/data-model.md](architecture/data-model.md) for the full
> picture.
---
## Database Configuration
| PRAGMA | Value | Purpose |
|--------|-------|---------|
| `journal_mode` | `WAL` | Write-Ahead Logging for concurrent readers |
| `foreign_keys` | `ON` | Enforces all `REFERENCES` constraints |
| `busy_timeout` | `5000` | Waits up to 5 seconds for the write lock |
| `synchronous` | `NORMAL` | Safe with WAL mode, reduces fsync calls |
| `temp_store` | `MEMORY` | Temporary tables stored in RAM |
| `mmap_size` | `268435456` | 256 MB memory-mapped I/O |
| `cache_size` | `-64000` | 64 MB page cache |
SQLite only allows one writer at a time. File-backed databases (the production
mode) therefore run a split pool: a single-connection writer pool
(`SetMaxOpenConns(1)`) plus a multi-connection read-only pool sized
`max(4, NumCPU)` and clamped to 164, configurable via `database.max_readers`
(`Server/db/db.go`). Only in-memory databases (tests) keep the historical
single shared connection.
---
## Migration System
Migrations are embedded `.sql` files applied in lexicographic order. Each migration runs in a transaction and is tracked in `schema_versions`.
```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_versions (
version TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
applied_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
);
```
### Migration History
| File | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `001_initial_schema.sql` | All core tables, default roles and settings |
| `002_voice_states.sql` | Adds `voice_states` table |
| `003_audit_log.sql` | Recreates `audit_log` with canonical column names (via a transient `audit_log_v6` rename) |
| `004_voice_optimization.sql` | Adds `camera`, `screenshare` to voice_states; voice settings to channels |
| `005_fix_member_permissions.sql` | Fixes Member role permissions |
| `006_channel_overrides_index.sql` | Adds composite index on channel_overrides |
| `007_member_video_permissions.sql` | Adds USE_VIDEO and SHARE_SCREEN to Member role |
| `008_attachment_dimensions.sql` | Adds `width` and `height` to attachments |
| `009_dm_tables.sql` | Adds `dm_participants` and `dm_open_state` tables |
| `010_attachment_uploader.sql` | Adds `attachments.uploader_id` + index for upload-ownership checks |
| `011_rate_lockouts.sql` | Adds `rate_lockouts` so rate-limit lockouts survive restarts |
| `012_user_blocks.sql` | Adds `user_blocks` (blocks DM creation/messaging between users) |
| `013_channel_type_constraint.sql` | INSERT/UPDATE triggers restricting `channels.type` to `text`/`voice`/`dm` |
| `014_events_table.sql` | Adds `events` — persistent broadcast log for reconnect cold-tier replay |
| `015_plugins.sql` | Adds `plugins` and `plugin_kv` for the WASM plugin runtime |
| `016_announcement_channel_type.sql` | Recreates the channel-type triggers to allow `announcement` |
| `017_user_identity_key.sql` | Adds `users.identity_public_key` (long-term E2EE identity key for voice TOFU) |
| `018_api_tokens.sql` | Adds `api_tokens` — long-lived, revocable bearer tokens for headless clients (bot/service auth) |
| `019_perf_indexes.sql` | Adds hot-path indexes |
| `020_drop_redundant_indexes.sql` | Drops indexes duplicating UNIQUE auto-indexes |
| `021_voice_server_moderation.sql` | Adds `server_muted`, `server_deafened` to voice_states (moderator-imposed) |
| `022_message_mentions.sql` | Adds `message_mentions` + `messages.mentions_everyone`, and grants `MENTION_EVERYONE` (bit 21) to the seeded Owner/Admin/Moderator roles |
| `023_role_management.sql` | Adds `idx_roles_name_nocase` — role names become unique case-insensitively, matching how they are looked up |
| `024_channel_user_overrides.sql` | Adds `channel_user_overrides` — per-member channel permission overrides, the last layer of the resolution order |
| `025_channel_nsfw.sql` | Adds `channels.nsfw` — the age-gate flag the server stores and broadcasts but imposes no behaviour of its own on |
| `026_emoji_mime.sql` | Adds `emoji.mime_type` — the sniffed image type, so the emoji image route can send a Content-Type without re-reading the file |
| `027_user_profile_fields.sql` | Adds `users.display_name`, `users.about`, `users.custom_status`, and a partial index on `users(avatar)` for the file route's avatar-authorization probe |
| `028_group_dms.sql` | Adds `channels.is_group` + a partial index — marks a DM channel as a group so group-ness survives people leaving |
| `029_drop_sounds_table.sql` | Drops `sounds` — dead since 001; the soundboard it was created for was never built (A-2026-07-13) |
| `030_attachments_unlink_on_message_delete.sql` | Rebuilds `attachments` with `message_id ON DELETE SET NULL` (was CASCADE) — cascaded message deletes now unlink rows instead of removing them, so the periodic orphan sweep can still find and reclaim the stored files |
| `031_sessions_expiry_index.sql` | Normalizes legacy `sessions.expires_at` values to RFC3339 UTC and adds `idx_sessions_expires_at` so the 15-minute expiry sweep is sargable |
---
## Tables
### roles
Defines permission tiers.
```sql
CREATE TABLE roles (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
name TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
color TEXT,
permissions INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
position INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
is_default INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
);
```
**Default roles** — current values after the full migration set (001 seeds
different masks: 005/007 raise Member's, 022 grants `MENTION_EVERYONE` to
Owner/Admin/Moderator). Not fixed at runtime — see *Role semantics* below:
| id | name | color | permissions | position | Notes |
|----|------|-------|-------------|----------|-------|
| 1 | Owner | `#E74C3C` | `0x7FFFFFFF` | 100 | All 31 permission bits set |
| 2 | Admin | `#F39C12` | `0x3FFFFFFF` | 80 | Everything except ADMINISTRATOR |
| 3 | Moderator | `#3498DB` | `0x002FFFFF` | 60 | All message + voice + moderation + mention-everyone |
| 4 | Member | NULL | `0x1E63` | 40 | Send, read, attach, react, voice, video, screen share |
**Role semantics:**
- **`name`** is unique case-insensitively. The column's own `UNIQUE` constraint
uses SQLite's default BINARY collation, so migration `023` adds
`idx_roles_name_nocase` (`UNIQUE … ON roles(name COLLATE NOCASE)`) —
otherwise "Moderator" and "moderator" would be two roles the client, which
resolves names case-insensitively, could not tell apart. Max 32 characters.
- **`color`** is `#rgb` or `#rrggbb` (stored uppercase) or `NULL`. It is
rendered directly into a style attribute by the desktop client and the admin
panel, so no other form is accepted.
- **`position`** is the hierarchy rank — higher outranks lower. Every
moderation and role-management check is "actor's position strictly greater
than the target's". Positions are not required to be contiguous, but
`PATCH /admin/api/roles/reorder` normalizes the roles below the actor to
`N…1`, which keeps them unique. Position `100`
(`permissions.OwnerRolePosition`) is the top: nothing outranks it, which is
what makes the seeded Owner role uneditable and undeletable.
- **`is_default`** marks the single fallback role. New users are created on it
and members of a deleted role are moved onto it, so it cannot itself be
deleted. It is set by migration and is not writable through the API — which
role is the fallback is a schema decision, not an operator one.
- Roles are created, edited, deleted and reordered through
`/admin/api/roles` (`MANAGE_ROLES` + hierarchy; see `docs/api.md`). Deleting
a role reassigns its members and drops its `channel_overrides` rows in one
transaction. `users.role_id` is a single role per user — there is no
many-to-many membership table.
---
### users
```sql
CREATE TABLE users (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE COLLATE NOCASE,
password TEXT NOT NULL,
avatar TEXT,
role_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 4 REFERENCES roles(id),
totp_secret TEXT,
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'offline',
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
last_seen TEXT,
banned INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
ban_reason TEXT,
ban_expires TEXT,
identity_public_key TEXT,
display_name TEXT,
about TEXT,
custom_status TEXT
);
CREATE INDEX idx_users_avatar ON users(avatar) WHERE avatar IS NOT NULL;
```
Valid status values: `online`, `idle`, `dnd`, `invisible`, `offline`.
`status` holds the status the user **chose**, `invisible` included — it is
deliberately not collapsed to `offline` at the write, because the server has to
be able to tell "chose to appear offline" from "is not connected" on the next
connect. The collapse happens at read time instead (`db.BroadcastStatus` /
`StatusForViewer`): every payload another user can see maps `invisible` to
`offline`, while the owner's own payloads keep the true value.
A chosen `idle`/`dnd`/`invisible` therefore survives a disconnect (only
`online` is cleared, by `MarkUserDisconnected`) and survives a server restart
(`ResetAllUserStatuses` clears only `online`). It cannot render as "present" in
the meantime because the ready payload treats a member with no live connection
as `offline` regardless of the column.
`identity_public_key` (added in migration 017) is the user's long-term E2EE
identity public key (base64 ECDSA P-256) used for TOFU pinning of voice E2EE
announces; `NULL` = not published (legacy client).
`display_name`, `about` and `custom_status` (migration 027) are the profile
fields, all `NULL` when unset. Bounds — 32, 300 and 128 characters
respectively — are enforced in the service layer, where the HTML sanitizer runs
and a violation can answer `400` instead of a constraint error. `display_name`
is display only: `@mentions` resolve against `username`, which is the unique,
case-insensitive key.
`idx_users_avatar` covers the file route's authorization probe. An avatar
uploaded through `POST /api/v1/users/me/avatar` is an attachment with no
channel — private to its uploader by default — and `GET /api/v1/files/{id}`
additionally admits one that some user's `avatar` currently equals, so an
avatar is readable by every authenticated user for exactly as long as it is in
use.
---
### sessions
```sql
CREATE TABLE sessions (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
token TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
device TEXT,
ip_address TEXT,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
last_used TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
```
Session TTL: 30 days. Token is stored as SHA-256 hash.
---
### api_tokens
```sql
CREATE TABLE api_tokens (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
label TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
last_used_at TEXT,
expires_at TEXT,
revoked_at TEXT
);
```
Long-lived, revocable bearer tokens for headless clients (bots, CI, the introspection
MCP tool). A token authenticates as `user_id`, inheriting that user's role/permissions,
and is resolved by the same middleware as sessions (see `auth.ResolveTokenHash`). Only the
SHA-256 hash is stored; the raw token is shown once at creation. `expires_at` NULL = never
expires; `revoked_at` NULL = active. Mint/list/revoke via `server token …`. Separate from
`sessions` so bulk logout and the per-user session cap never affect these.
---
### channels
```sql
CREATE TABLE channels (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
name TEXT NOT NULL,
type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'text',
category TEXT,
topic TEXT,
position INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
slow_mode INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
archived INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
voice_max_users INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
voice_quality TEXT,
mixing_threshold INTEGER,
voice_max_video INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 25,
nsfw INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
is_group INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
);
```
Channel types: `text`, `voice`, `announcement`, `dm`. Migration 013 installs
INSERT/UPDATE triggers restricting the value to this set (migration 016 added
`announcement`). Announcement channels are readable like text channels but
posting is restricted to users with `MANAGE_MESSAGES` (enforced in the service
layer, `Server/service/message.go`).
`nsfw` (migration 025) is the age-restriction flag, stored 0/1 like `archived`
because SQLite has no boolean type. **It drives nothing server-side.** The
server stores it, ships it in `ready` and in the `channel_create` /
`channel_update` broadcasts, and audits an operator flipping it — it does not
filter content, check anyone's age, or restrict who may read or post in a
flagged channel. Clients decide what the flag means to them; the desktop client
shows a one-time-per-session warning before rendering the channel and marks it
in the sidebar.
`voice_max_users` and `voice_max_video` (0 = unlimited) are the only channel
columns that *are* enforced by the server, on voice join and on video publish
respectively (`CHANNEL_FULL` / `VIDEO_LIMIT`). They exist on every row but are
meaningless on a non-voice channel.
`is_group` (migration 028) marks a `dm` channel as a group DM. It is decided
once at creation and **never recomputed from the live participant count**,
because that count changes underneath you:
- A group of three that two people leave has two participants, and the 1:1
lookup — "the dm channel both of these users are in" — would then match it.
"Message Bob" would silently deliver into the remnants of a group, in front of
whoever else is still there.
- Leaving is destructive for a group (removal from `dm_participants`) and
non-destructive for a 1:1 (hide only). Deriving which one to run from the live
count means the third-from-last leaver runs a different operation than the
second-from-last, for no reason the user can see.
`name` carries the optional group name; it is `''` for every 1:1 DM (a
two-person DM is named by who is in it) and for an unnamed group.
`PATCH /admin/api/channels/{id}` (`MANAGE_CHANNELS`) is the write path for
`slow_mode` (0…21600), `nsfw` and both voice limits (0…99 each); values outside
those ranges are refused rather than clamped.
---
### channel_overrides
Per-channel permission overrides for specific roles.
```sql
CREATE TABLE channel_overrides (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
role_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES roles(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
allow INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
deny INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
UNIQUE(channel_id, role_id)
);
```
Effective permission calculation for this layer:
`effective = (base_permissions & ~deny) | allow`
This is the ROLE layer. The per-member layer (`channel_user_overrides`) is
applied on top of the result — see "Permission Checking Logic" below.
---
### channel_user_overrides
Per-channel permission overrides for a single **member**, independent of their
role. This is Discord's narrowest override layer: it grants or refuses one
person a bit in one channel without minting a role for them.
```sql
CREATE TABLE channel_user_overrides (
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
allow INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
deny INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
PRIMARY KEY (channel_id, user_id)
);
```
The shape mirrors `channel_overrides` (allow/deny masks, cascade on both
parents) so both layers are fetched and merged by the same code
(`db.GetChannelOverridesFor`). The composite PRIMARY KEY replaces the surrogate
`id` + `UNIQUE` pair `channel_overrides` carries — nothing references an
override row by id.
Only members who actually carry an override have a row: an all-inherit override
is deleted rather than stored as `(0, 0)`.
---
### messages
```sql
CREATE TABLE messages (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
content TEXT NOT NULL,
reply_to INTEGER REFERENCES messages(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
edited_at TEXT,
deleted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
pinned INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
timestamp TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
mentions_everyone INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
);
```
Messages are soft-deleted (`deleted = 1`), never physically removed by user action.
`mentions_everyone` (migration 022) is set when the message carried `@everyone`
or `@here` **and** the author held `MENTION_EVERYONE` on that channel. It is a
column rather than a sentinel row in `message_mentions` so that table never
holds a `mentioned_user_id` that is not a real user. The message row and its
mention rows are written in one writer transaction, and an edit rewrites both.
---
### message_mentions
```sql
CREATE TABLE message_mentions (
message_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES messages(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
mentioned_user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
PRIMARY KEY (message_id, mentioned_user_id)
);
CREATE INDEX idx_message_mentions_user ON message_mentions(mentioned_user_id);
```
The user IDs a message resolved from its `@username` tokens, capped at 20 rows
per message. Resolution is case-insensitive whole-word matching against
`users.username` (which is `UNIQUE COLLATE NOCASE`); a token that matches no
username is not stored and stays plain text. The primary key serves the
per-message lookup that message history and search batch on; the index serves
the per-user direction.
---
### messages_fts (FTS5 Virtual Table)
Full-text search index synchronized via triggers.
```sql
CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE messages_fts USING fts5(
content,
content='messages',
content_rowid='id'
);
```
Supports FTS5 query syntax: simple terms, phrase queries, prefix queries, boolean operators (`AND`, `OR`, `NOT`).
---
### attachments
```sql
CREATE TABLE attachments (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
message_id INTEGER REFERENCES messages(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
filename TEXT NOT NULL,
stored_as TEXT NOT NULL,
mime_type TEXT NOT NULL,
size INTEGER NOT NULL,
uploaded_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
width INTEGER,
height INTEGER,
uploader_id INTEGER REFERENCES users(id)
);
```
Uses UUID primary keys. `message_id` is NULL during upload, linked when the
message is sent. `uploader_id` (added by migration 010) records who uploaded
the file and backs the ownership check when attaching an upload to a message.
`ON DELETE SET NULL` (migration 030, was CASCADE) means a cascaded message
delete unlinks the row instead of removing it, leaving the periodic orphan
sweep (`DeleteOrphanedAttachments`) a handle on the stored file so the bytes
are reclaimed rather than stranded.
---
### reactions
```sql
CREATE TABLE reactions (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
message_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES messages(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
emoji TEXT NOT NULL,
UNIQUE(message_id, user_id, emoji)
);
```
---
### invites
```sql
CREATE TABLE invites (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
code TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
created_by INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
redeemed_by INTEGER REFERENCES users(id),
max_uses INTEGER,
use_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
expires_at TEXT,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
);
```
Invite codes are 8 random bytes encoded as hex. Uses are validated and incremented atomically.
---
### read_states
```sql
CREATE TABLE read_states (
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
last_message_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
mention_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
PRIMARY KEY (user_id, channel_id)
);
```
`mention_count` is incremented on message insert for every mentioned user who
can read the channel, except the author and except users who have blocked the
author. `@everyone` counts every reader; `@here` counts only readers whose
*broadcast* status is not `offline` — the column stores the status the user
chose, so a reader who picked `invisible` is collapsed to `offline` here and is
skipped, exactly as they appear to everyone else. Edits never increment it — a badge is only
raised by the original send, so an edit cannot double-count a mention. The
`channel_focus` read-state upsert resets it to 0, and the `ready` payload ships
it per channel.
---
### audit_log
```sql
CREATE TABLE audit_log (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
actor_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
action TEXT NOT NULL,
target_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
target_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
detail TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
);
```
---
### voice_states
Ephemeral -- all rows deleted on server startup.
```sql
CREATE TABLE voice_states (
user_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
muted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
deafened INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
speaking INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
camera INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
screenshare INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
server_muted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
server_deafened INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
joined_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
);
```
`server_muted` / `server_deafened` are moderator-imposed (`MUTE_MEMBERS`) and,
unlike `muted` / `deafened`, the user cannot clear them. They survive a channel
switch (the join upsert does not reset them) but not a leave, which deletes the
row.
---
### dm_participants
```sql
CREATE TABLE dm_participants (
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
PRIMARY KEY (channel_id, user_id)
);
```
N rows per channel: two for a 1:1 DM, three to ten for a group
(`db.MaxGroupDMParticipants`). Every DM authorization check is a lookup on
`(user_id, channel_id)`, which is why group DMs needed no new authorization
path — only `channels.is_group` to tell the two kinds apart.
A group leave deletes the row. When the last one goes, the `channels` row is
deleted with it: a DM nobody is in is reachable by nobody, and its messages and
attachments cascade off the channel.
---
### dm_open_state
```sql
CREATE TABLE dm_open_state (
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
opened_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
PRIMARY KEY (user_id, channel_id)
);
```
---
### login_attempts
Login attempt log used for IP-based rate limiting and lockouts.
```sql
CREATE TABLE login_attempts (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
ip_address TEXT NOT NULL,
username TEXT,
success INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
timestamp TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
);
```
---
### settings
Generic key/value store for server settings (`server_name`, `motd`,
`registration_open`, …). Written by the admin API; read by the REST layer and
the WebSocket hub (cached with a short TTL).
```sql
CREATE TABLE settings (
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
value TEXT NOT NULL
);
```
---
### emoji
Server-wide custom emoji: one row per `:shortcode:`.
```sql
CREATE TABLE emoji (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
shortcode TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
filename TEXT NOT NULL,
uploaded_by INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
mime_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'image/png' -- migration 026
);
```
`filename` holds the **storage UUID** the image bytes were written under (the
same convention as `attachments.stored_as`); the column name is inherited from
the initial schema. It is never derived from anything the uploader sent and is
never shown to a user.
`shortcode` is always lowercase — `[a-z0-9_]{2,32}` is the only spelling the
validator admits — which is what makes the plain `UNIQUE` index a
case-insensitive one without a `COLLATE NOCASE` change.
`mime_type` (migration 026) is the type **sniffed from the file's own bytes** at
upload, restricted to `image/png`, `image/jpeg`, `image/gif` and `image/webp`.
It exists so `GET /api/v1/emoji/{id}/image` can set a Content-Type without
opening and re-sniffing the file on every request. The `DEFAULT` is only there
to make the `ALTER` legal; nothing had ever written to this table before
migration 026, because the table shipped in 001 with no server code at all.
Writes are gated on `MANAGE_SERVER` (see api.md for why no new permission bit
was added), and every mutation broadcasts the whole set as `emoji_update`.
---
### rate_lockouts
Persists rate-limiter lockouts (e.g. repeated failed logins) so they survive
server restarts. Sliding-window counters themselves stay in memory.
```sql
CREATE TABLE rate_lockouts (
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
```
---
### user_blocks
User blocking (added by migration 012): a block prevents DM creation and
messaging between the two users.
```sql
CREATE TABLE user_blocks (
blocker_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
blocked_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
PRIMARY KEY (blocker_id, blocked_id),
CHECK (blocker_id != blocked_id)
);
```
---
### events
Persistent broadcast log (migration 014) — the cold tier of the reconnect
replay pipeline (see [protocol.md](protocol.md)). Written asynchronously by
the event persister, pruned by retention (configurable, default 24h). The
hub's in-memory sequence counter is seeded from `MAX(events.seq)` at startup
so sequence numbers stay monotonic across restarts.
```sql
CREATE TABLE events (
seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
payload BLOB NOT NULL,
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);
```
---
### plugins / plugin_kv
Plugin registry and per-plugin key/value storage (migration 015). `plugin_kv`
is namespaced per plugin via the composite primary key.
```sql
CREATE TABLE plugins (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
name TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
version TEXT NOT NULL,
enabled INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
manifest_json TEXT NOT NULL,
installed_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);
CREATE TABLE plugin_kv (
plugin_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES plugins(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
key TEXT NOT NULL,
value BLOB NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (plugin_id, key)
);
```
---
## Indexes
| Index Name | Table | Columns | Purpose |
|------------|-------|---------|---------|
| `idx_sessions_user` | sessions | `(user_id)` | Fast deletion of all sessions for a user |
| `idx_sessions_expires_at` | sessions | `(expires_at)` | Sargable 15-minute session-expiry sweep (031) |
| `idx_messages_channel` | messages | `(channel_id, id DESC)` | Latest messages in channel query |
| `idx_messages_user` | messages | `(user_id)` | Filter by author |
| `idx_messages_pinned` | messages | `(channel_id, id DESC)` partial: `WHERE pinned = 1 AND deleted = 0` | Pinned-message listing without scanning channel history (019) |
| `idx_audit_timestamp` | audit_log | `(created_at DESC)` | Pagination of audit log |
| `idx_audit_log_actor` | audit_log | `(actor_id)` | Filter by actor |
| `idx_login_ip` | login_attempts | `(ip_address, timestamp)` | Rate limiting queries |
| `idx_voice_states_channel` | voice_states | `(channel_id)` | All users in a voice channel |
| `idx_channel_overrides_role` | channel_overrides | `(role_id, channel_id, allow, deny)` | Covering per-role override fetch (019; replaced `idx_channel_overrides_channel_role`, which duplicated the UNIQUE auto-index) |
| `idx_dm_participants_user` | dm_participants | `(user_id)` | DM channel lookup |
| `idx_attachments_uploader` | attachments | `(uploader_id)` | Upload-ownership checks |
| `idx_attachments_message` | attachments | `(message_id)` | Message → attachments fetch (019, recreated by 030's rebuild) |
| `idx_user_blocks_blocked` | user_blocks | `(blocked_id, blocker_id)` | Reverse block lookup |
| `idx_events_channel_seq` | events | `(channel_id, seq)` | Cold-tier replay per channel |
| `idx_events_created_at` | events | `(created_at)` | Retention pruning |
| `idx_api_tokens_user` | api_tokens | `(user_id)` | Per-user token listing/revocation (018) |
| `idx_message_mentions_user` | message_mentions | `(mentioned_user_id)` | Per-user mention lookup |
| `idx_channel_user_overrides_user` | channel_user_overrides | `(user_id)` | "every override this member carries" — the direction the permission cache populates from (the PK covers the per-channel direction) |
| `idx_roles_name_nocase` | roles | `(name COLLATE NOCASE)` UNIQUE | Case-insensitive role-name uniqueness |
| `idx_users_avatar` | users | `(avatar)` partial: `WHERE avatar IS NOT NULL` | File route's avatar-authorization probe (027) |
| `idx_channels_dm_group` | channels | `(is_group)` partial: `WHERE type = 'dm'` | Group-DM filtering (028) |
Sessions are looked up by token and invites by code through their `UNIQUE`
auto-indexes; the duplicating `idx_sessions_token` / `idx_invites_code` were
dropped by migration 020.
---
## Permission Bitfield System
Permissions are stored as an integer bitfield (31 bits used) in
`roles.permissions`, `channel_overrides.allow`/`deny`, and
`channel_user_overrides.allow`/`deny`.
### Bit Map
| Bit | Hex | Name | Description |
|-----|-----|------|-------------|
| 0 | `0x1` | `SEND_MESSAGES` | Post messages in text channels |
| 1 | `0x2` | `READ_MESSAGES` | View messages in text channels |
| 5 | `0x20` | `ATTACH_FILES` | Upload file attachments |
| 6 | `0x40` | `ADD_REACTIONS` | Add emoji reactions |
| 9 | `0x200` | `CONNECT_VOICE` | Join voice channels |
| 10 | `0x400` | `SPEAK_VOICE` | Transmit audio in voice channels |
| 11 | `0x800` | `USE_VIDEO` | Enable camera in voice channels |
| 12 | `0x1000` | `SHARE_SCREEN` | Share screen in voice channels |
| 16 | `0x10000` | `MANAGE_MESSAGES` | Delete others' messages, pin/unpin |
| 17 | `0x20000` | `MANAGE_CHANNELS` | Create, edit, delete channels, edit channel permission overrides (`/admin/api/channels*`) |
| 18 | `0x40000` | `KICK_MEMBERS` | Force-logout a lower-ranked user (`DELETE /admin/api/users/{id}/sessions`) |
| 19 | `0x80000` | `BAN_MEMBERS` | Ban/unban a lower-ranked user (`PATCH /admin/api/users/{id}`) |
| 20 | `0x100000` | `MUTE_MEMBERS` | Server-side mute/deafen in voice — admits to the admin perimeter; no route enforces it yet |
| 21 | `0x200000` | `MENTION_EVERYONE` | Give `@everyone`/`@here` real mention semantics (highlight + mention badge). Without it the token stays plain text |
| 24 | `0x1000000` | `MANAGE_ROLES` | Assign a role below the actor's own rank to a lower-ranked user (`PATCH /admin/api/users/{id}`), and create/edit/delete/reorder roles below the actor's own (`/admin/api/roles…`) |
| 25 | `0x2000000` | `MANAGE_SERVER` | Read and modify server settings (`/admin/api/settings`) |
| 26 | `0x4000000` | `MANAGE_INVITES` | Create and revoke invite codes |
| 27 | `0x8000000` | `VIEW_AUDIT_LOG` | Read the audit log (`GET /admin/api/audit-log`) |
| 30 | `0x40000000` | `ADMINISTRATOR` | Bypasses ALL permission checks |
Bits 2-4, 7, 13-15, 22-23, 28-29, 31 are reserved.
### Permission groups
The bit map above is the authority on what each bit *does*; this grouping is
how the bits are *presented* — it is the layout of the admin panel's role
permission grid (`PERM_GROUPS` in `Server/admin/static/index.html`). It carries
no semantics, but the two must stay in step: every defined bit belongs to
exactly one group, and a bit missing from the grouping is a bit no operator can
grant through the panel.
| Group | Bits |
|-------|------|
| General | `MANAGE_CHANNELS`, `MANAGE_ROLES`, `MANAGE_INVITES`, `MANAGE_SERVER`, `VIEW_AUDIT_LOG`, `ADMINISTRATOR` |
| Text | `READ_MESSAGES`, `SEND_MESSAGES`, `ATTACH_FILES`, `ADD_REACTIONS`, `MENTION_EVERYONE`, `MANAGE_MESSAGES` |
| Voice | `CONNECT_VOICE`, `SPEAK_VOICE`, `USE_VIDEO`, `SHARE_SCREEN` |
| Moderation | `KICK_MEMBERS`, `BAN_MEMBERS`, `MUTE_MEMBERS` |
### Admin perimeter
`permissions.AdminPerimeter` is the ANY-of mask that admits a principal to
`/admin/api/*`: `ADMINISTRATOR | MANAGE_CHANNELS | MANAGE_ROLES |
MANAGE_SERVER | VIEW_AUDIT_LOG | KICK_MEMBERS | BAN_MEMBERS | MUTE_MEMBERS`.
Holding one bit only gets a principal through the door — each route group
re-checks the specific bit it needs, so the seeded Moderator role can manage
channels and ban members without reading settings or the audit log. Owner-only
routes (backups, updates, API tokens) still gate on role *position*, not on a
bit. See `docs/api.md` for the per-route mapping.
### Permission Checking Logic
```
1. Get the user's role -> role.Permissions (base)
2. If (base & ADMINISTRATOR) != 0 -> ALLOW everything
3. Get channel_overrides for (channel_id, role_id) -> allow, deny
4. Get channel_user_overrides for (channel_id, user_id) -> uAllow, uDeny
5. roleLayer = (base & ~deny) | allow
6. effective = (roleLayer & ~uDeny) | uAllow
7. Check: (effective & required_permission) == required_permission
```
The order is Discord's: **base role permissions -> role override -> user
override**. Within a layer deny is applied first (strips bits) then allow (adds
bits), so allow wins when both target the same bit. Across layers the later,
narrower layer wins:
| Situation | Outcome |
|-----------|---------|
| role override allows, user override denies | denied |
| role override denies, user override allows | allowed |
| user override allows and denies the same bit | allowed |
| holder has `ADMINISTRATOR` | allowed regardless of either layer |
`permissions.EffectiveChannelPerms` is the single implementation of steps 5-6,
and `permissions.EffectivePerms` the one-layer primitive it is built from. The
`ADMINISTRATOR` bypass lives at the call sites (`Checker.HasChannelPerm`,
`Checker.HasChannelPermBatch`, and through it `VisibleChannelIDs`), not inside
the formula — it is a bypass, not a bit that survives an override.
Both layers are fetched together and per member, never per channel:
`db.GetChannelOverridesFor(roleID, userID)` runs two batch queries and merges
them, which is what keeps `buildReady`, REST `ListVisibleChannels`, reconnect
replay filtering and the cached `service.PermissionService` free of N+1 lookups
and unable to drift from each other.
DM channels bypass role permissions entirely and use participant-based authorization instead.
### Default Role Permission Values
| Role | Hex | Permissions |
|------|-----|-------------|
| Owner | `0x7FFFFFFF` | Everything including ADMINISTRATOR |
| Admin | `0x3FFFFFFF` | Everything except ADMINISTRATOR |
| Moderator | `0x002FFFFF` | All message + voice + moderation, plus `MENTION_EVERYONE` (granted by migration 022) |
| Member | `0x1E63` | Send, read, attach, react, voice, video, screen share |