mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
* docs(plans): phased remediation plan for the 2026-08-19 audit Executes the audit's §8 MUST-fix verdict and §9.1 fix order: one phase per finding group, statuses updated in place as phases land. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ * test(client): give the renderWindow-breaker test its own timeout (audit F-5) 30 synchronous 100-row jsdom rebuilds can exceed vitest's default 5s on a loaded runner; the test timed out once under CI-like load and passes in isolation, so it now carries an explicit 20s budget. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ * docs: fix the ten wrong reference-doc statements from audit 2026-08-19 (B-01..B-10) schema.md: migrations 030/031 documented, attachments ON DELETE SET NULL (matching 030's rebuild), index inventory rewritten from cumulative migration state, writer/reader pool split described, default-roles table made a consistent post-migration snapshot, dbgen preamble updated. protocol.md: DM chat events documented as sequenced/ring-buffered/replayable (they are), plugin_broadcast seq flipped to Yes, retry_after claim removed (no WS error carries it), the five enforced-but-documented-as-None rate limits added (channel_focus, mark_read, call_decline, chat_command, ping), E2EE announce/offer budgets corrected incl. the per-target inner cap, BAD_PAYLOAD and NOT_KEY_HOLDER added to the error table, ready voice_states/ roles field lists completed, member_join top-level status documented. api.md: diagnostics endpoint is ADMINISTRATOR-only (H-8) with a per-IP limiter and host:port livekit_url, error-code table now matches emitted codes (INTERNAL_ERROR, STORAGE_ERROR 507; oversize upload is 400), body-cap exemptions listed, identity_public_key documented on PATCH /users/me, plugin endpoints' plain-text errors + X-Plugin-Runtime header documented, /health 503 degraded state documented, metrics/LiveKit CIDR keys named, updates/apply restart-conflict 409s added. Also folds in the audit's D-04/D-05 comment and plan-header staleness fixes (buildReady comment, e2e spec-count comments, logctx stray word, three plan status headers). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ * fix(server): log the five silently-discarded persistence errors (audit F-3/F-4/D-16) Lockout Upsert/Delete/Cleanup failures (auth/ratelimit.go), the H-6 session-cap eviction failure in CreateSession (db/auth_queries.go), and the channel_focus read-state write failure (service/channel.go) all discarded their errors with no trace — a brute-force lockout could silently fail to survive a restart. In-memory behavior is unchanged (warn-and-continue); the lockout write paths are pinned by tests mirroring OC-0061's load-path test. The session-cap and read-state sites are log-only additions on seams the existing suites already exercise on the success path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ * fix(dm): blocking a user evicts them from the pair's live 1:1 DM voice call (audit F-1) The block gate ran only at voice_join and voluntary voice_token_refresh, so a blocked user already in the shared 1:1 DM call kept their session indefinitely — the same guard-asymmetry family as A-2026-08-03. handleBlockUser now severs the call through the dmVoiceEvictor capability handleCloseDM already exercises, using a new find-only FindDMChannelIDBetween lookup (sqlc-generated; mirrors GetOrCreateDMChannel's is_group=0 clause so group DM calls stay exempt, matching requireDMNotBlocked). Pinned by three handler tests: shared-DM eviction, no-DM no-op, group-only no-op. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ * fix(ws): close the role-reassignment/handshake race (audit F-2) A role reassignment landing mid-handshake was invisible for the socket's whole life: both handshake paths resolved permissions from the auth-time c.user snapshot, revokeUnreadableChannels early-returns for a user not yet in h.clients, and its Unsubscribe no-ops on the pubsub identity guard once a reconnect replaced the client. Three coordinated fixes: (1) refreshUserSnapshot re-reads the user row (and role name) in reconnectPrecheck and handleFreshConnect, fail-closed; (2) the resume-fallback path re-reads the role once more after registerNow and runs the revocation pass when it moved, so the reassignment-vs-registration orderings meet in the middle; (3) revokeUnreadableChannels re-resolves the live client immediately before acting, mirroring RefreshChannelVisibility. Pinned by four tests driving real WS handshakes through the existing race hooks plus a new pre-register/pre-act hook pair; ws suite green under the default and deadlock builds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ * refactor(client): remove the inert replay-dedup machinery (audit F-6) The server writes auth_ok before the replay burst, so replayDedup — created on socket-open and cleared when auth_ok is processed — could never be active for a real replayed frame, and the dispatcher's isReplaying() unread gates never fired. Their no-op behavior is the correct behavior (a buffer/db resume has no ready payload, so replayed frames must count as unread), so the machinery, the gates, and the misleading comments are removed rather than repaired. The pinning tests injected replay frames in an order a spec-compliant server never produces; they are replaced by a test pinning the real contract (frames after auth_ok are dispatched verbatim; duplicate handling belongs to the stores). Client suite green: 5036/5036. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ * docs(plans): mark remediation phases 1-6 done Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ * fix(ws): nolint the context-less revoke call golangci-lint flags revokeUnreadableChannels takes no context by design (admin HubBroadcaster interface); annotate the one call site inside a ctx-taking function, matching the RefreshChannelVisibility precedent. golangci-lint v2.11.3: 0 issues. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtkxwdqE4pUv82GQPRsTeQ --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
867 lines
36 KiB
Markdown
867 lines
36 KiB
Markdown
# Database Schema Reference
|
||
|
||
OwnCord uses a single SQLite database file (`data/chatserver.db`) with the pure-Go driver `modernc.org/sqlite` (no CGO). Migrations run automatically on startup.
|
||
|
||
> **Data-access layers:** most `Server/db` methods delegate to the
|
||
> sqlc-generated layer (`Server/db/dbgen`, from `Server/db/queries/`) per
|
||
> decision D2 in
|
||
> [plans/audit-2026-07-19-decisions.md](plans/audit-2026-07-19-decisions.md);
|
||
> a deliberate remainder (variable `IN` lists, FTS, multi-statement
|
||
> transactions) still runs as hand-written SQL — tracked in
|
||
> [plans/sqlc-adoption.md](plans/sqlc-adoption.md). See
|
||
> [architecture/data-model.md](architecture/data-model.md) for the full
|
||
> picture.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Database Configuration
|
||
|
||
| PRAGMA | Value | Purpose |
|
||
|--------|-------|---------|
|
||
| `journal_mode` | `WAL` | Write-Ahead Logging for concurrent readers |
|
||
| `foreign_keys` | `ON` | Enforces all `REFERENCES` constraints |
|
||
| `busy_timeout` | `5000` | Waits up to 5 seconds for the write lock |
|
||
| `synchronous` | `NORMAL` | Safe with WAL mode, reduces fsync calls |
|
||
| `temp_store` | `MEMORY` | Temporary tables stored in RAM |
|
||
| `mmap_size` | `268435456` | 256 MB memory-mapped I/O |
|
||
| `cache_size` | `-64000` | 64 MB page cache |
|
||
|
||
SQLite only allows one writer at a time. File-backed databases (the production
|
||
mode) therefore run a split pool: a single-connection writer pool
|
||
(`SetMaxOpenConns(1)`) plus a multi-connection read-only pool sized
|
||
`max(4, NumCPU)` and clamped to 1–64, configurable via `database.max_readers`
|
||
(`Server/db/db.go`). Only in-memory databases (tests) keep the historical
|
||
single shared connection.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Migration System
|
||
|
||
Migrations are embedded `.sql` files applied in lexicographic order. Each migration runs in a transaction and is tracked in `schema_versions`.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_versions (
|
||
version TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
|
||
applied_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Migration History
|
||
|
||
| File | Description |
|
||
|------|-------------|
|
||
| `001_initial_schema.sql` | All core tables, default roles and settings |
|
||
| `002_voice_states.sql` | Adds `voice_states` table |
|
||
| `003_audit_log.sql` | Recreates `audit_log` with canonical column names (via a transient `audit_log_v6` rename) |
|
||
| `004_voice_optimization.sql` | Adds `camera`, `screenshare` to voice_states; voice settings to channels |
|
||
| `005_fix_member_permissions.sql` | Fixes Member role permissions |
|
||
| `006_channel_overrides_index.sql` | Adds composite index on channel_overrides |
|
||
| `007_member_video_permissions.sql` | Adds USE_VIDEO and SHARE_SCREEN to Member role |
|
||
| `008_attachment_dimensions.sql` | Adds `width` and `height` to attachments |
|
||
| `009_dm_tables.sql` | Adds `dm_participants` and `dm_open_state` tables |
|
||
| `010_attachment_uploader.sql` | Adds `attachments.uploader_id` + index for upload-ownership checks |
|
||
| `011_rate_lockouts.sql` | Adds `rate_lockouts` so rate-limit lockouts survive restarts |
|
||
| `012_user_blocks.sql` | Adds `user_blocks` (blocks DM creation/messaging between users) |
|
||
| `013_channel_type_constraint.sql` | INSERT/UPDATE triggers restricting `channels.type` to `text`/`voice`/`dm` |
|
||
| `014_events_table.sql` | Adds `events` — persistent broadcast log for reconnect cold-tier replay |
|
||
| `015_plugins.sql` | Adds `plugins` and `plugin_kv` for the WASM plugin runtime |
|
||
| `016_announcement_channel_type.sql` | Recreates the channel-type triggers to allow `announcement` |
|
||
| `017_user_identity_key.sql` | Adds `users.identity_public_key` (long-term E2EE identity key for voice TOFU) |
|
||
| `018_api_tokens.sql` | Adds `api_tokens` — long-lived, revocable bearer tokens for headless clients (bot/service auth) |
|
||
| `019_perf_indexes.sql` | Adds hot-path indexes |
|
||
| `020_drop_redundant_indexes.sql` | Drops indexes duplicating UNIQUE auto-indexes |
|
||
| `021_voice_server_moderation.sql` | Adds `server_muted`, `server_deafened` to voice_states (moderator-imposed) |
|
||
| `022_message_mentions.sql` | Adds `message_mentions` + `messages.mentions_everyone`, and grants `MENTION_EVERYONE` (bit 21) to the seeded Owner/Admin/Moderator roles |
|
||
| `023_role_management.sql` | Adds `idx_roles_name_nocase` — role names become unique case-insensitively, matching how they are looked up |
|
||
| `024_channel_user_overrides.sql` | Adds `channel_user_overrides` — per-member channel permission overrides, the last layer of the resolution order |
|
||
| `025_channel_nsfw.sql` | Adds `channels.nsfw` — the age-gate flag the server stores and broadcasts but imposes no behaviour of its own on |
|
||
| `026_emoji_mime.sql` | Adds `emoji.mime_type` — the sniffed image type, so the emoji image route can send a Content-Type without re-reading the file |
|
||
| `027_user_profile_fields.sql` | Adds `users.display_name`, `users.about`, `users.custom_status`, and a partial index on `users(avatar)` for the file route's avatar-authorization probe |
|
||
| `028_group_dms.sql` | Adds `channels.is_group` + a partial index — marks a DM channel as a group so group-ness survives people leaving |
|
||
| `029_drop_sounds_table.sql` | Drops `sounds` — dead since 001; the soundboard it was created for was never built (A-2026-07-13) |
|
||
| `030_attachments_unlink_on_message_delete.sql` | Rebuilds `attachments` with `message_id ON DELETE SET NULL` (was CASCADE) — cascaded message deletes now unlink rows instead of removing them, so the periodic orphan sweep can still find and reclaim the stored files |
|
||
| `031_sessions_expiry_index.sql` | Normalizes legacy `sessions.expires_at` values to RFC3339 UTC and adds `idx_sessions_expires_at` so the 15-minute expiry sweep is sargable |
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Tables
|
||
|
||
### roles
|
||
|
||
Defines permission tiers.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE roles (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
name TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||
color TEXT,
|
||
permissions INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
position INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
is_default INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**Default roles** — current values after the full migration set (001 seeds
|
||
different masks: 005/007 raise Member's, 022 grants `MENTION_EVERYONE` to
|
||
Owner/Admin/Moderator). Not fixed at runtime — see *Role semantics* below:
|
||
|
||
| id | name | color | permissions | position | Notes |
|
||
|----|------|-------|-------------|----------|-------|
|
||
| 1 | Owner | `#E74C3C` | `0x7FFFFFFF` | 100 | All 31 permission bits set |
|
||
| 2 | Admin | `#F39C12` | `0x3FFFFFFF` | 80 | Everything except ADMINISTRATOR |
|
||
| 3 | Moderator | `#3498DB` | `0x002FFFFF` | 60 | All message + voice + moderation + mention-everyone |
|
||
| 4 | Member | NULL | `0x1E63` | 40 | Send, read, attach, react, voice, video, screen share |
|
||
|
||
**Role semantics:**
|
||
|
||
- **`name`** is unique case-insensitively. The column's own `UNIQUE` constraint
|
||
uses SQLite's default BINARY collation, so migration `023` adds
|
||
`idx_roles_name_nocase` (`UNIQUE … ON roles(name COLLATE NOCASE)`) —
|
||
otherwise "Moderator" and "moderator" would be two roles the client, which
|
||
resolves names case-insensitively, could not tell apart. Max 32 characters.
|
||
- **`color`** is `#rgb` or `#rrggbb` (stored uppercase) or `NULL`. It is
|
||
rendered directly into a style attribute by the desktop client and the admin
|
||
panel, so no other form is accepted.
|
||
- **`position`** is the hierarchy rank — higher outranks lower. Every
|
||
moderation and role-management check is "actor's position strictly greater
|
||
than the target's". Positions are not required to be contiguous, but
|
||
`PATCH /admin/api/roles/reorder` normalizes the roles below the actor to
|
||
`N…1`, which keeps them unique. Position `100`
|
||
(`permissions.OwnerRolePosition`) is the top: nothing outranks it, which is
|
||
what makes the seeded Owner role uneditable and undeletable.
|
||
- **`is_default`** marks the single fallback role. New users are created on it
|
||
and members of a deleted role are moved onto it, so it cannot itself be
|
||
deleted. It is set by migration and is not writable through the API — which
|
||
role is the fallback is a schema decision, not an operator one.
|
||
- Roles are created, edited, deleted and reordered through
|
||
`/admin/api/roles` (`MANAGE_ROLES` + hierarchy; see `docs/api.md`). Deleting
|
||
a role reassigns its members and drops its `channel_overrides` rows in one
|
||
transaction. `users.role_id` is a single role per user — there is no
|
||
many-to-many membership table.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### users
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE users (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE COLLATE NOCASE,
|
||
password TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
avatar TEXT,
|
||
role_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 4 REFERENCES roles(id),
|
||
totp_secret TEXT,
|
||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'offline',
|
||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
last_seen TEXT,
|
||
banned INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
ban_reason TEXT,
|
||
ban_expires TEXT,
|
||
identity_public_key TEXT,
|
||
display_name TEXT,
|
||
about TEXT,
|
||
custom_status TEXT
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
CREATE INDEX idx_users_avatar ON users(avatar) WHERE avatar IS NOT NULL;
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Valid status values: `online`, `idle`, `dnd`, `invisible`, `offline`.
|
||
|
||
`status` holds the status the user **chose**, `invisible` included — it is
|
||
deliberately not collapsed to `offline` at the write, because the server has to
|
||
be able to tell "chose to appear offline" from "is not connected" on the next
|
||
connect. The collapse happens at read time instead (`db.BroadcastStatus` /
|
||
`StatusForViewer`): every payload another user can see maps `invisible` to
|
||
`offline`, while the owner's own payloads keep the true value.
|
||
|
||
A chosen `idle`/`dnd`/`invisible` therefore survives a disconnect (only
|
||
`online` is cleared, by `MarkUserDisconnected`) and survives a server restart
|
||
(`ResetAllUserStatuses` clears only `online`). It cannot render as "present" in
|
||
the meantime because the ready payload treats a member with no live connection
|
||
as `offline` regardless of the column.
|
||
|
||
`identity_public_key` (added in migration 017) is the user's long-term E2EE
|
||
identity public key (base64 ECDSA P-256) used for TOFU pinning of voice E2EE
|
||
announces; `NULL` = not published (legacy client).
|
||
|
||
`display_name`, `about` and `custom_status` (migration 027) are the profile
|
||
fields, all `NULL` when unset. Bounds — 32, 300 and 128 characters
|
||
respectively — are enforced in the service layer, where the HTML sanitizer runs
|
||
and a violation can answer `400` instead of a constraint error. `display_name`
|
||
is display only: `@mentions` resolve against `username`, which is the unique,
|
||
case-insensitive key.
|
||
|
||
`idx_users_avatar` covers the file route's authorization probe. An avatar
|
||
uploaded through `POST /api/v1/users/me/avatar` is an attachment with no
|
||
channel — private to its uploader by default — and `GET /api/v1/files/{id}`
|
||
additionally admits one that some user's `avatar` currently equals, so an
|
||
avatar is readable by every authenticated user for exactly as long as it is in
|
||
use.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### sessions
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE sessions (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
token TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||
device TEXT,
|
||
ip_address TEXT,
|
||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
last_used TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Session TTL: 30 days. Token is stored as SHA-256 hash.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### api_tokens
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE api_tokens (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||
label TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
|
||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
last_used_at TEXT,
|
||
expires_at TEXT,
|
||
revoked_at TEXT
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Long-lived, revocable bearer tokens for headless clients (bots, CI, the introspection
|
||
MCP tool). A token authenticates as `user_id`, inheriting that user's role/permissions,
|
||
and is resolved by the same middleware as sessions (see `auth.ResolveTokenHash`). Only the
|
||
SHA-256 hash is stored; the raw token is shown once at creation. `expires_at` NULL = never
|
||
expires; `revoked_at` NULL = active. Mint/list/revoke via `server token …`. Separate from
|
||
`sessions` so bulk logout and the per-user session cap never affect these.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### channels
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE channels (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'text',
|
||
category TEXT,
|
||
topic TEXT,
|
||
position INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
slow_mode INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
archived INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
voice_max_users INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
voice_quality TEXT,
|
||
mixing_threshold INTEGER,
|
||
voice_max_video INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 25,
|
||
nsfw INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
is_group INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Channel types: `text`, `voice`, `announcement`, `dm`. Migration 013 installs
|
||
INSERT/UPDATE triggers restricting the value to this set (migration 016 added
|
||
`announcement`). Announcement channels are readable like text channels but
|
||
posting is restricted to users with `MANAGE_MESSAGES` (enforced in the service
|
||
layer, `Server/service/message.go`).
|
||
|
||
`nsfw` (migration 025) is the age-restriction flag, stored 0/1 like `archived`
|
||
because SQLite has no boolean type. **It drives nothing server-side.** The
|
||
server stores it, ships it in `ready` and in the `channel_create` /
|
||
`channel_update` broadcasts, and audits an operator flipping it — it does not
|
||
filter content, check anyone's age, or restrict who may read or post in a
|
||
flagged channel. Clients decide what the flag means to them; the desktop client
|
||
shows a one-time-per-session warning before rendering the channel and marks it
|
||
in the sidebar.
|
||
|
||
`voice_max_users` and `voice_max_video` (0 = unlimited) are the only channel
|
||
columns that *are* enforced by the server, on voice join and on video publish
|
||
respectively (`CHANNEL_FULL` / `VIDEO_LIMIT`). They exist on every row but are
|
||
meaningless on a non-voice channel.
|
||
|
||
`is_group` (migration 028) marks a `dm` channel as a group DM. It is decided
|
||
once at creation and **never recomputed from the live participant count**,
|
||
because that count changes underneath you:
|
||
|
||
- A group of three that two people leave has two participants, and the 1:1
|
||
lookup — "the dm channel both of these users are in" — would then match it.
|
||
"Message Bob" would silently deliver into the remnants of a group, in front of
|
||
whoever else is still there.
|
||
- Leaving is destructive for a group (removal from `dm_participants`) and
|
||
non-destructive for a 1:1 (hide only). Deriving which one to run from the live
|
||
count means the third-from-last leaver runs a different operation than the
|
||
second-from-last, for no reason the user can see.
|
||
|
||
`name` carries the optional group name; it is `''` for every 1:1 DM (a
|
||
two-person DM is named by who is in it) and for an unnamed group.
|
||
|
||
`PATCH /admin/api/channels/{id}` (`MANAGE_CHANNELS`) is the write path for
|
||
`slow_mode` (0…21600), `nsfw` and both voice limits (0…99 each); values outside
|
||
those ranges are refused rather than clamped.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### channel_overrides
|
||
|
||
Per-channel permission overrides for specific roles.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE channel_overrides (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
role_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES roles(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
allow INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
deny INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
UNIQUE(channel_id, role_id)
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Effective permission calculation for this layer:
|
||
`effective = (base_permissions & ~deny) | allow`
|
||
|
||
This is the ROLE layer. The per-member layer (`channel_user_overrides`) is
|
||
applied on top of the result — see "Permission Checking Logic" below.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### channel_user_overrides
|
||
|
||
Per-channel permission overrides for a single **member**, independent of their
|
||
role. This is Discord's narrowest override layer: it grants or refuses one
|
||
person a bit in one channel without minting a role for them.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE channel_user_overrides (
|
||
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
allow INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
deny INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
PRIMARY KEY (channel_id, user_id)
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The shape mirrors `channel_overrides` (allow/deny masks, cascade on both
|
||
parents) so both layers are fetched and merged by the same code
|
||
(`db.GetChannelOverridesFor`). The composite PRIMARY KEY replaces the surrogate
|
||
`id` + `UNIQUE` pair `channel_overrides` carries — nothing references an
|
||
override row by id.
|
||
|
||
Only members who actually carry an override have a row: an all-inherit override
|
||
is deleted rather than stored as `(0, 0)`.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### messages
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE messages (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
|
||
content TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
reply_to INTEGER REFERENCES messages(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
|
||
edited_at TEXT,
|
||
deleted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
pinned INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
timestamp TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
mentions_everyone INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Messages are soft-deleted (`deleted = 1`), never physically removed by user action.
|
||
|
||
`mentions_everyone` (migration 022) is set when the message carried `@everyone`
|
||
or `@here` **and** the author held `MENTION_EVERYONE` on that channel. It is a
|
||
column rather than a sentinel row in `message_mentions` so that table never
|
||
holds a `mentioned_user_id` that is not a real user. The message row and its
|
||
mention rows are written in one writer transaction, and an edit rewrites both.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### message_mentions
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE message_mentions (
|
||
message_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES messages(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
mentioned_user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
PRIMARY KEY (message_id, mentioned_user_id)
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
CREATE INDEX idx_message_mentions_user ON message_mentions(mentioned_user_id);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The user IDs a message resolved from its `@username` tokens, capped at 20 rows
|
||
per message. Resolution is case-insensitive whole-word matching against
|
||
`users.username` (which is `UNIQUE COLLATE NOCASE`); a token that matches no
|
||
username is not stored and stays plain text. The primary key serves the
|
||
per-message lookup that message history and search batch on; the index serves
|
||
the per-user direction.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### messages_fts (FTS5 Virtual Table)
|
||
|
||
Full-text search index synchronized via triggers.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE messages_fts USING fts5(
|
||
content,
|
||
content='messages',
|
||
content_rowid='id'
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Supports FTS5 query syntax: simple terms, phrase queries, prefix queries, boolean operators (`AND`, `OR`, `NOT`).
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### attachments
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE attachments (
|
||
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
|
||
message_id INTEGER REFERENCES messages(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
|
||
filename TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
stored_as TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
mime_type TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
size INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||
uploaded_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
width INTEGER,
|
||
height INTEGER,
|
||
uploader_id INTEGER REFERENCES users(id)
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Uses UUID primary keys. `message_id` is NULL during upload, linked when the
|
||
message is sent. `uploader_id` (added by migration 010) records who uploaded
|
||
the file and backs the ownership check when attaching an upload to a message.
|
||
`ON DELETE SET NULL` (migration 030, was CASCADE) means a cascaded message
|
||
delete unlinks the row instead of removing it, leaving the periodic orphan
|
||
sweep (`DeleteOrphanedAttachments`) a handle on the stored file so the bytes
|
||
are reclaimed rather than stranded.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### reactions
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE reactions (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
message_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES messages(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
emoji TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
UNIQUE(message_id, user_id, emoji)
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### invites
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE invites (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
code TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||
created_by INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
|
||
redeemed_by INTEGER REFERENCES users(id),
|
||
max_uses INTEGER,
|
||
use_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
expires_at TEXT,
|
||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Invite codes are 8 random bytes encoded as hex. Uses are validated and incremented atomically.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### read_states
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE read_states (
|
||
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
last_message_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
mention_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
PRIMARY KEY (user_id, channel_id)
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`mention_count` is incremented on message insert for every mentioned user who
|
||
can read the channel, except the author and except users who have blocked the
|
||
author. `@everyone` counts every reader; `@here` counts only readers whose
|
||
*broadcast* status is not `offline` — the column stores the status the user
|
||
chose, so a reader who picked `invisible` is collapsed to `offline` here and is
|
||
skipped, exactly as they appear to everyone else. Edits never increment it — a badge is only
|
||
raised by the original send, so an edit cannot double-count a mention. The
|
||
`channel_focus` read-state upsert resets it to 0, and the `ready` payload ships
|
||
it per channel.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### audit_log
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE audit_log (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
actor_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
action TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
target_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
|
||
target_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
detail TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
|
||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### voice_states
|
||
|
||
Ephemeral -- all rows deleted on server startup.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE voice_states (
|
||
user_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
muted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
deafened INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
speaking INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
camera INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
screenshare INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
server_muted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
server_deafened INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
joined_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`server_muted` / `server_deafened` are moderator-imposed (`MUTE_MEMBERS`) and,
|
||
unlike `muted` / `deafened`, the user cannot clear them. They survive a channel
|
||
switch (the join upsert does not reset them) but not a leave, which deletes the
|
||
row.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### dm_participants
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE dm_participants (
|
||
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
PRIMARY KEY (channel_id, user_id)
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
N rows per channel: two for a 1:1 DM, three to ten for a group
|
||
(`db.MaxGroupDMParticipants`). Every DM authorization check is a lookup on
|
||
`(user_id, channel_id)`, which is why group DMs needed no new authorization
|
||
path — only `channels.is_group` to tell the two kinds apart.
|
||
|
||
A group leave deletes the row. When the last one goes, the `channels` row is
|
||
deleted with it: a DM nobody is in is reachable by nobody, and its messages and
|
||
attachments cascade off the channel.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### dm_open_state
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE dm_open_state (
|
||
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES channels(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
opened_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
PRIMARY KEY (user_id, channel_id)
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### login_attempts
|
||
|
||
Login attempt log used for IP-based rate limiting and lockouts.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE login_attempts (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
ip_address TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
username TEXT,
|
||
success INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
timestamp TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### settings
|
||
|
||
Generic key/value store for server settings (`server_name`, `motd`,
|
||
`registration_open`, …). Written by the admin API; read by the REST layer and
|
||
the WebSocket hub (cached with a short TTL).
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE settings (
|
||
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
|
||
value TEXT NOT NULL
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### emoji
|
||
|
||
Server-wide custom emoji: one row per `:shortcode:`.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE emoji (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
shortcode TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||
filename TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
uploaded_by INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
|
||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
mime_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'image/png' -- migration 026
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
`filename` holds the **storage UUID** the image bytes were written under (the
|
||
same convention as `attachments.stored_as`); the column name is inherited from
|
||
the initial schema. It is never derived from anything the uploader sent and is
|
||
never shown to a user.
|
||
|
||
`shortcode` is always lowercase — `[a-z0-9_]{2,32}` is the only spelling the
|
||
validator admits — which is what makes the plain `UNIQUE` index a
|
||
case-insensitive one without a `COLLATE NOCASE` change.
|
||
|
||
`mime_type` (migration 026) is the type **sniffed from the file's own bytes** at
|
||
upload, restricted to `image/png`, `image/jpeg`, `image/gif` and `image/webp`.
|
||
It exists so `GET /api/v1/emoji/{id}/image` can set a Content-Type without
|
||
opening and re-sniffing the file on every request. The `DEFAULT` is only there
|
||
to make the `ALTER` legal; nothing had ever written to this table before
|
||
migration 026, because the table shipped in 001 with no server code at all.
|
||
|
||
Writes are gated on `MANAGE_SERVER` (see api.md for why no new permission bit
|
||
was added), and every mutation broadcasts the whole set as `emoji_update`.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### rate_lockouts
|
||
|
||
Persists rate-limiter lockouts (e.g. repeated failed logins) so they survive
|
||
server restarts. Sliding-window counters themselves stay in memory.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE rate_lockouts (
|
||
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
|
||
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### user_blocks
|
||
|
||
User blocking (added by migration 012): a block prevents DM creation and
|
||
messaging between the two users.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE user_blocks (
|
||
blocker_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
blocked_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
|
||
PRIMARY KEY (blocker_id, blocked_id),
|
||
CHECK (blocker_id != blocked_id)
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### events
|
||
|
||
Persistent broadcast log (migration 014) — the cold tier of the reconnect
|
||
replay pipeline (see [protocol.md](protocol.md)). Written asynchronously by
|
||
the event persister, pruned by retention (configurable, default 24h). The
|
||
hub's in-memory sequence counter is seeded from `MAX(events.seq)` at startup
|
||
so sequence numbers stay monotonic across restarts.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE events (
|
||
seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
payload BLOB NOT NULL,
|
||
channel_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
### plugins / plugin_kv
|
||
|
||
Plugin registry and per-plugin key/value storage (migration 015). `plugin_kv`
|
||
is namespaced per plugin via the composite primary key.
|
||
|
||
```sql
|
||
CREATE TABLE plugins (
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||
name TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||
version TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
enabled INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||
manifest_json TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
installed_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
CREATE TABLE plugin_kv (
|
||
plugin_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES plugins(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||
key TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||
value BLOB NOT NULL,
|
||
PRIMARY KEY (plugin_id, key)
|
||
);
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Indexes
|
||
|
||
| Index Name | Table | Columns | Purpose |
|
||
|------------|-------|---------|---------|
|
||
| `idx_sessions_user` | sessions | `(user_id)` | Fast deletion of all sessions for a user |
|
||
| `idx_sessions_expires_at` | sessions | `(expires_at)` | Sargable 15-minute session-expiry sweep (031) |
|
||
| `idx_messages_channel` | messages | `(channel_id, id DESC)` | Latest messages in channel query |
|
||
| `idx_messages_user` | messages | `(user_id)` | Filter by author |
|
||
| `idx_messages_pinned` | messages | `(channel_id, id DESC)` partial: `WHERE pinned = 1 AND deleted = 0` | Pinned-message listing without scanning channel history (019) |
|
||
| `idx_audit_timestamp` | audit_log | `(created_at DESC)` | Pagination of audit log |
|
||
| `idx_audit_log_actor` | audit_log | `(actor_id)` | Filter by actor |
|
||
| `idx_login_ip` | login_attempts | `(ip_address, timestamp)` | Rate limiting queries |
|
||
| `idx_voice_states_channel` | voice_states | `(channel_id)` | All users in a voice channel |
|
||
| `idx_channel_overrides_role` | channel_overrides | `(role_id, channel_id, allow, deny)` | Covering per-role override fetch (019; replaced `idx_channel_overrides_channel_role`, which duplicated the UNIQUE auto-index) |
|
||
| `idx_dm_participants_user` | dm_participants | `(user_id)` | DM channel lookup |
|
||
| `idx_attachments_uploader` | attachments | `(uploader_id)` | Upload-ownership checks |
|
||
| `idx_attachments_message` | attachments | `(message_id)` | Message → attachments fetch (019, recreated by 030's rebuild) |
|
||
| `idx_user_blocks_blocked` | user_blocks | `(blocked_id, blocker_id)` | Reverse block lookup |
|
||
| `idx_events_channel_seq` | events | `(channel_id, seq)` | Cold-tier replay per channel |
|
||
| `idx_events_created_at` | events | `(created_at)` | Retention pruning |
|
||
| `idx_api_tokens_user` | api_tokens | `(user_id)` | Per-user token listing/revocation (018) |
|
||
| `idx_message_mentions_user` | message_mentions | `(mentioned_user_id)` | Per-user mention lookup |
|
||
| `idx_channel_user_overrides_user` | channel_user_overrides | `(user_id)` | "every override this member carries" — the direction the permission cache populates from (the PK covers the per-channel direction) |
|
||
| `idx_roles_name_nocase` | roles | `(name COLLATE NOCASE)` UNIQUE | Case-insensitive role-name uniqueness |
|
||
| `idx_users_avatar` | users | `(avatar)` partial: `WHERE avatar IS NOT NULL` | File route's avatar-authorization probe (027) |
|
||
| `idx_channels_dm_group` | channels | `(is_group)` partial: `WHERE type = 'dm'` | Group-DM filtering (028) |
|
||
|
||
Sessions are looked up by token and invites by code through their `UNIQUE`
|
||
auto-indexes; the duplicating `idx_sessions_token` / `idx_invites_code` were
|
||
dropped by migration 020.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Permission Bitfield System
|
||
|
||
Permissions are stored as an integer bitfield (31 bits used) in
|
||
`roles.permissions`, `channel_overrides.allow`/`deny`, and
|
||
`channel_user_overrides.allow`/`deny`.
|
||
|
||
### Bit Map
|
||
|
||
| Bit | Hex | Name | Description |
|
||
|-----|-----|------|-------------|
|
||
| 0 | `0x1` | `SEND_MESSAGES` | Post messages in text channels |
|
||
| 1 | `0x2` | `READ_MESSAGES` | View messages in text channels |
|
||
| 5 | `0x20` | `ATTACH_FILES` | Upload file attachments |
|
||
| 6 | `0x40` | `ADD_REACTIONS` | Add emoji reactions |
|
||
| 9 | `0x200` | `CONNECT_VOICE` | Join voice channels |
|
||
| 10 | `0x400` | `SPEAK_VOICE` | Transmit audio in voice channels |
|
||
| 11 | `0x800` | `USE_VIDEO` | Enable camera in voice channels |
|
||
| 12 | `0x1000` | `SHARE_SCREEN` | Share screen in voice channels |
|
||
| 16 | `0x10000` | `MANAGE_MESSAGES` | Delete others' messages, pin/unpin |
|
||
| 17 | `0x20000` | `MANAGE_CHANNELS` | Create, edit, delete channels, edit channel permission overrides (`/admin/api/channels*`) |
|
||
| 18 | `0x40000` | `KICK_MEMBERS` | Force-logout a lower-ranked user (`DELETE /admin/api/users/{id}/sessions`) |
|
||
| 19 | `0x80000` | `BAN_MEMBERS` | Ban/unban a lower-ranked user (`PATCH /admin/api/users/{id}`) |
|
||
| 20 | `0x100000` | `MUTE_MEMBERS` | Server-side mute/deafen in voice — admits to the admin perimeter; no route enforces it yet |
|
||
| 21 | `0x200000` | `MENTION_EVERYONE` | Give `@everyone`/`@here` real mention semantics (highlight + mention badge). Without it the token stays plain text |
|
||
| 24 | `0x1000000` | `MANAGE_ROLES` | Assign a role below the actor's own rank to a lower-ranked user (`PATCH /admin/api/users/{id}`), and create/edit/delete/reorder roles below the actor's own (`/admin/api/roles…`) |
|
||
| 25 | `0x2000000` | `MANAGE_SERVER` | Read and modify server settings (`/admin/api/settings`) |
|
||
| 26 | `0x4000000` | `MANAGE_INVITES` | Create and revoke invite codes |
|
||
| 27 | `0x8000000` | `VIEW_AUDIT_LOG` | Read the audit log (`GET /admin/api/audit-log`) |
|
||
| 30 | `0x40000000` | `ADMINISTRATOR` | Bypasses ALL permission checks |
|
||
|
||
Bits 2-4, 7, 13-15, 22-23, 28-29, 31 are reserved.
|
||
|
||
### Permission groups
|
||
|
||
The bit map above is the authority on what each bit *does*; this grouping is
|
||
how the bits are *presented* — it is the layout of the admin panel's role
|
||
permission grid (`PERM_GROUPS` in `Server/admin/static/index.html`). It carries
|
||
no semantics, but the two must stay in step: every defined bit belongs to
|
||
exactly one group, and a bit missing from the grouping is a bit no operator can
|
||
grant through the panel.
|
||
|
||
| Group | Bits |
|
||
|-------|------|
|
||
| General | `MANAGE_CHANNELS`, `MANAGE_ROLES`, `MANAGE_INVITES`, `MANAGE_SERVER`, `VIEW_AUDIT_LOG`, `ADMINISTRATOR` |
|
||
| Text | `READ_MESSAGES`, `SEND_MESSAGES`, `ATTACH_FILES`, `ADD_REACTIONS`, `MENTION_EVERYONE`, `MANAGE_MESSAGES` |
|
||
| Voice | `CONNECT_VOICE`, `SPEAK_VOICE`, `USE_VIDEO`, `SHARE_SCREEN` |
|
||
| Moderation | `KICK_MEMBERS`, `BAN_MEMBERS`, `MUTE_MEMBERS` |
|
||
|
||
### Admin perimeter
|
||
|
||
`permissions.AdminPerimeter` is the ANY-of mask that admits a principal to
|
||
`/admin/api/*`: `ADMINISTRATOR | MANAGE_CHANNELS | MANAGE_ROLES |
|
||
MANAGE_SERVER | VIEW_AUDIT_LOG | KICK_MEMBERS | BAN_MEMBERS | MUTE_MEMBERS`.
|
||
Holding one bit only gets a principal through the door — each route group
|
||
re-checks the specific bit it needs, so the seeded Moderator role can manage
|
||
channels and ban members without reading settings or the audit log. Owner-only
|
||
routes (backups, updates, API tokens) still gate on role *position*, not on a
|
||
bit. See `docs/api.md` for the per-route mapping.
|
||
|
||
### Permission Checking Logic
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
1. Get the user's role -> role.Permissions (base)
|
||
2. If (base & ADMINISTRATOR) != 0 -> ALLOW everything
|
||
3. Get channel_overrides for (channel_id, role_id) -> allow, deny
|
||
4. Get channel_user_overrides for (channel_id, user_id) -> uAllow, uDeny
|
||
5. roleLayer = (base & ~deny) | allow
|
||
6. effective = (roleLayer & ~uDeny) | uAllow
|
||
7. Check: (effective & required_permission) == required_permission
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
The order is Discord's: **base role permissions -> role override -> user
|
||
override**. Within a layer deny is applied first (strips bits) then allow (adds
|
||
bits), so allow wins when both target the same bit. Across layers the later,
|
||
narrower layer wins:
|
||
|
||
| Situation | Outcome |
|
||
|-----------|---------|
|
||
| role override allows, user override denies | denied |
|
||
| role override denies, user override allows | allowed |
|
||
| user override allows and denies the same bit | allowed |
|
||
| holder has `ADMINISTRATOR` | allowed regardless of either layer |
|
||
|
||
`permissions.EffectiveChannelPerms` is the single implementation of steps 5-6,
|
||
and `permissions.EffectivePerms` the one-layer primitive it is built from. The
|
||
`ADMINISTRATOR` bypass lives at the call sites (`Checker.HasChannelPerm`,
|
||
`Checker.HasChannelPermBatch`, and through it `VisibleChannelIDs`), not inside
|
||
the formula — it is a bypass, not a bit that survives an override.
|
||
|
||
Both layers are fetched together and per member, never per channel:
|
||
`db.GetChannelOverridesFor(roleID, userID)` runs two batch queries and merges
|
||
them, which is what keeps `buildReady`, REST `ListVisibleChannels`, reconnect
|
||
replay filtering and the cached `service.PermissionService` free of N+1 lookups
|
||
and unable to drift from each other.
|
||
|
||
DM channels bypass role permissions entirely and use participant-based authorization instead.
|
||
|
||
### Default Role Permission Values
|
||
|
||
| Role | Hex | Permissions |
|
||
|------|-----|-------------|
|
||
| Owner | `0x7FFFFFFF` | Everything including ADMINISTRATOR |
|
||
| Admin | `0x3FFFFFFF` | Everything except ADMINISTRATOR |
|
||
| Moderator | `0x002FFFFF` | All message + voice + moderation, plus `MENTION_EVERYONE` (granted by migration 022) |
|
||
| Member | `0x1E63` | Send, read, attach, react, voice, video, screen share |
|