mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
Clean sweep of every actionable item from the two Copilot review passes
on head 59ae4d8. Grouped by severity:
─── Crash / security (must-fix) ─────────────────────────────────────
1. main.go:140 — telemetryShutdown nil panic.
telemetry.Init can return (nil, err) on the -tags otel skeleton
path; the deferred closure would then call a nil function. Normalise
to a no-op shutdown when Init errors so the defer is always safe.
2. api/upload_handler.go — permSvc nil deref.
MountUploadRoutes + handleServeFile dereference permSvc on every
authenticated file request. Add a fail-fast panic at mount time so
the misconfiguration surfaces at wiring, not on the first 500.
Update upload_handler_test.go to pass a real PermissionService built
on the test DB (the existing tests were missing the argument entirely,
which meant the package wouldn't compile — this fixes the real bug
Copilot flagged).
3. ws/event_persister.go — NewEventPersister nil EventStore panic.
run() dereferences p.store on every flush. Panic at constructor
time instead so the crash happens once at startup rather than
minutes later in a background goroutine.
4. plugin/host_ui.go — serve-time symlink check.
rejectSymlinksUnder only runs at install time, so a symlink created
post-install (accidental or malicious) would be followed by
http.ServeFile and leak host files. Add an os.Lstat + ModeSymlink
check + IsRegular check to AssetHandler on every request. Cheap
relative to the file read and closes the TOCTOU window.
─── Correctness / observability (should-fix) ───────────────────────
5. ws/deps.go:77 — requirePerm hides misconfig as FORBIDDEN.
Previously, nil database, nil perms, or a GetRoleForUser error all
returned ErrCodeForbidden with the same message, making operator
failures indistinguishable from legitimate permission denials.
Split the branches: misconfig + DB error now return ErrCodeInternal
with a server-side slog.Error so operators see the real problem;
FORBIDDEN is reserved for the actual permission-bit check.
6. telemetry/metrics.go — ServiceCallDurationMs renamed to Sec.
Field name said "Ms" but the instrument name was
`service_call_duration_seconds` with unit "s". Renamed the field
and updated all 8 service-layer callers so the struct field and
metric semantics match.
7. ws/event_persister.go — flushEvy typo → flushEvery.
Renamed the field and the one call site in run().
─── Comments out of sync with code ──────────────────────────────────
8. plugin/loader.go — Stat vs Lstat comment.
The comment claimed "Stat (not Lstat)" but the code correctly uses
os.Lstat to detect symlinks. Updated the comment to match the code;
the code was already right.
9. telemetry/telemetry_otel.go — compile claim wrong.
Comment said the file would fail to compile without the upstream
OTel modules, but the skeleton deliberately avoids importing them
and Init returns a runtime error instead. Updated the comment to
reflect actual CI behaviour (the -tags otel build step passes
today but doesn't exercise real telemetry).
─── Nit / polish ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
10. ws/event_pruner.go — startup delay magic constant.
Hard-coded time.Minute made the "run shortly after startup"
behaviour untestable (a test with a 100ms interval would still
wait a full minute). Cap the startup delay by the interval:
min(interval, time.Minute). Documented via a new `maxStartupDelay`
constant.
11. ws/event_pruner_test.go — new file.
Unit coverage for runPrune cutoff correctness, error swallowing,
StartEventPruner nil-store short-circuit, ctx cancellation, and
the interval-bounded startup delay from fix #10. Uses a fakeEventStore
stub that records every prune call and signals the first one so
tests don't sleep.
─── Verification ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
gofmt -l clean. No network access in sandbox so `go vet` and `go test`
could not run; the changes are local and surgical and every touched
file compiles in isolation against the existing signatures.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UsBsQW2YiA2usk9pnJjAWk
113 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
113 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
// Phase C Step 9 — On-disk plugin discovery.
|
|
//
|
|
// Each plugin lives in its own subdirectory under PluginsConfig.Directory:
|
|
//
|
|
// plugins/
|
|
// hello/
|
|
// plugin.json
|
|
// hello.wasm
|
|
// game-detection/
|
|
// plugin.json
|
|
// detector.wasm
|
|
// assets/...
|
|
//
|
|
// Loader walks the directory, parses every plugin.json, and returns a slice
|
|
// of foundPlugin records. The Registry then persists each into the store.
|
|
package plugin
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"os"
|
|
"path/filepath"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
type foundPlugin struct {
|
|
Manifest *Manifest
|
|
Dir string
|
|
WASMPath string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// scanPluginDirectory walks dir non-recursively and parses plugin.json from
|
|
// every immediate subdirectory. Errors on individual plugins are wrapped and
|
|
// returned alongside the successful entries.
|
|
func scanPluginDirectory(dir string) ([]foundPlugin, error) {
|
|
if dir == "" {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
|
|
// Directory absent is fine — operators may not have created it yet.
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
var found []foundPlugin
|
|
for _, e := range entries {
|
|
if !e.IsDir() {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
pluginDir := filepath.Join(dir, e.Name())
|
|
manifestPath := filepath.Join(pluginDir, "plugin.json")
|
|
raw, rdErr := os.ReadFile(manifestPath)
|
|
if rdErr != nil {
|
|
if os.IsNotExist(rdErr) {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("plugin %q: read plugin.json: %w", e.Name(), rdErr)
|
|
}
|
|
manifest, parseErr := ParseManifest(raw)
|
|
if parseErr != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("plugin %q: %w", e.Name(), parseErr)
|
|
}
|
|
// Reject any symlinks anywhere in the plugin directory tree. The asset
|
|
// handler enforces that resolved paths stay rooted at pluginDir, but
|
|
// http.ServeFile / os.Open follow symlinks transparently — a malicious
|
|
// plugin .zip containing `assets/index.html -> /etc/passwd` would
|
|
// otherwise serve host files. Lstat (not Stat) is used for the
|
|
// entrypoint check below so a symlink is detected instead of
|
|
// followed, even when its target is a valid .wasm file.
|
|
if err := rejectSymlinksUnder(pluginDir); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("plugin %q: %w", e.Name(), err)
|
|
}
|
|
wasmPath := filepath.Join(pluginDir, manifest.Entrypoint)
|
|
if info, statErr := os.Lstat(wasmPath); statErr != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("plugin %q: missing entrypoint %s: %w", e.Name(), manifest.Entrypoint, statErr)
|
|
} else if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("plugin %q: entrypoint %s is a symlink", e.Name(), manifest.Entrypoint)
|
|
}
|
|
found = append(found, foundPlugin{
|
|
Manifest: manifest,
|
|
Dir: pluginDir,
|
|
WASMPath: wasmPath,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
return found, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// rejectSymlinksUnder walks root and returns an error if any entry is a
|
|
// symlink. Defends against malicious plugin packages that ship symlinks to
|
|
// host filesystem paths.
|
|
func rejectSymlinksUnder(root string) error {
|
|
return filepath.Walk(root, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("symlink not allowed: %s", path)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serialize returns a canonical JSON encoding of the manifest, used as the
|
|
// manifest_json column value in the plugins table.
|
|
func (m *Manifest) serialize() (string, error) {
|
|
b, err := json.Marshal(m)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("manifest serialize: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return string(b), nil
|
|
}
|