Files
OwnCord/Server/ws/livekit_webhook.go
T
J3vbandClaude Opus 4.8 7b178ff30b fix(security): harden server against verified code-review findings
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase
security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is
clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a
pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes).

High severity:
- auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt
  atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user
  brute-force cap.
- plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a
  WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the
  configured budget was previously parsed but never applied.
- api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests
  so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed.
- ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which
  fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects.

Medium severity:
- api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to
  remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle.
- ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound
  to the body hash (kills forgery/replay).
- authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command
  broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess.
- api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint.
- service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead
  of silently reporting success.
- api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the
  client-controllable leftmost one.
- plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked
  RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials
  (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU).
- api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin.

Low severity:
- auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth
  (was returning the ciphertext as plaintext).
- api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too.
- service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR).
- admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the
  update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU).
- service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban.

chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact.

Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and
make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 21:08:54 +02:00

246 lines
8.8 KiB
Go

package ws
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/livekit/protocol/auth"
"github.com/livekit/protocol/livekit"
"github.com/livekit/protocol/webhook"
)
// webhookMaxBodyBytes bounds the webhook request body to prevent unbounded
// reads from an unauthenticated caller.
const webhookMaxBodyBytes = 64 * 1024
// NewLiveKitWebhookHandler returns an HTTP handler that processes LiveKit
// webhook events. It synchronises LiveKit room state back into OwnCord's
// voice_states DB — primarily for crash recovery when a participant
// disconnects from LiveKit without sending a WS voice_leave.
//
// Speaker detection is handled client-side via LiveKit's
// RoomEvent.ActiveSpeakersChanged (lower latency than webhooks).
func (h *Hub) NewLiveKitWebhookHandler(apiKey, apiSecret string) http.HandlerFunc {
// The SDK receiver verifies the token signature AND that the token's sha256
// claim matches the request body hash, binding verification to the body so
// a captured token cannot be replayed against a forged payload.
provider := auth.NewSimpleKeyProvider(apiKey, apiSecret)
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Check Authorization header BEFORE reading the body to avoid
// allocating memory for unauthenticated requests.
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: missing Authorization header")
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Bound the body before the SDK reads it (ReceiveWebhookEvent uses an
// unbounded io.ReadAll internally).
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, webhookMaxBodyBytes)
// ReceiveWebhookEvent verifies the JWT signature, the token's body-hash
// claim, and the exp/nbf claims, then parses the payload. This replaces
// the previous manual ParseAPIToken/Verify sequence, which was not bound
// to the request body (forgery/replay).
event, err := webhook.ReceiveWebhookEvent(r, provider)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: verification failed", "error", err)
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
slog.Info("livekit webhook received",
"event", event.Event,
"room", event.GetRoom().GetName(),
"participant", event.GetParticipant().GetIdentity(),
)
switch event.Event {
case "participant_joined":
h.handleWebhookParticipantJoined(r.Context(), event)
case "participant_left":
h.handleWebhookParticipantLeft(r.Context(), event)
default:
slog.Debug("livekit webhook: unhandled event", "event", event.Event)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
}
// parseParticipantIdentity extracts a user ID and optional join token from a
// LiveKit participant identity formatted as "user-{id}" or
// "user-{id}:{joinToken}".
func parseParticipantIdentity(identity string) (int64, string, error) {
if !strings.HasPrefix(identity, "user-") {
return 0, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid identity format: %s", identity)
}
body := identity[5:]
idPart, joinToken, _ := strings.Cut(body, ":")
userID, err := strconv.ParseInt(idPart, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return 0, "", err
}
return userID, joinToken, nil
}
// parseIdentity extracts a user ID from a LiveKit participant identity.
func parseIdentity(identity string) (int64, error) {
userID, _, err := parseParticipantIdentity(identity)
return userID, err
}
// parseRoomChannelID extracts a channel ID from a LiveKit room name
// formatted as "channel-{id}".
func parseRoomChannelID(roomName string) (int64, error) {
if !strings.HasPrefix(roomName, "channel-") {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid room name format: %s", roomName)
}
return strconv.ParseInt(roomName[8:], 10, 64)
}
func (h *Hub) handleWebhookParticipantJoined(_ context.Context, event *livekit.WebhookEvent) {
p := event.GetParticipant()
room := event.GetRoom()
if p == nil || room == nil {
return
}
userID, joinToken, err := parseParticipantIdentity(p.Identity)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_joined bad identity",
"identity", p.Identity, "error", err)
return
}
channelID, err := parseRoomChannelID(room.Name)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_joined bad room",
"room", room.Name, "error", err)
return
}
slog.Info("livekit webhook: participant joined",
"user_id", userID,
"channel_id", channelID,
"room", room.Name)
// Validate that the participant has a matching voice_states row (BUG-127).
// A replayed token from a previous session will not have a matching row,
// so we remove the rogue participant from LiveKit.
if h.db != nil {
state, stateErr := h.db.GetVoiceState(userID)
if stateErr != nil || state == nil || state.ChannelID != channelID {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: rogue participant_joined — no matching voice state, removing",
"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
if h.livekit != nil {
if rmErr := h.livekit.RemoveParticipant(channelID, userID, joinToken); rmErr != nil { //nolint:contextcheck // RemoveParticipant manages its own timeout context
slog.Error("livekit webhook: failed to remove rogue participant",
"error", rmErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
}
}
return
}
// Verify join token matches to prevent token replay from old sessions.
if joinToken != "" && state.JoinedAt != joinToken {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: stale join token on participant_joined, removing",
"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID,
"expected_token", state.JoinedAt, "got_token", joinToken)
if h.livekit != nil {
if rmErr := h.livekit.RemoveParticipant(channelID, userID, joinToken); rmErr != nil { //nolint:contextcheck // RemoveParticipant manages its own timeout context
slog.Error("livekit webhook: failed to remove stale participant",
"error", rmErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
}
}
return
}
}
}
func (h *Hub) handleWebhookParticipantLeft(ctx context.Context, event *livekit.WebhookEvent) {
p := event.GetParticipant()
room := event.GetRoom()
if p == nil || room == nil {
return
}
userID, joinToken, err := parseParticipantIdentity(p.Identity)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_left bad identity",
"identity", p.Identity, "error", err)
return
}
channelID, err := parseRoomChannelID(room.Name)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("livekit webhook: participant_left bad room",
"room", room.Name, "error", err)
return
}
slog.Info("livekit webhook: participant left",
"user_id", userID,
"channel_id", channelID)
// Clean up voice state if the user disconnected from LiveKit
// without sending a WS voice_leave (e.g. crash, network loss, F5 reload).
h.mu.RLock()
c, exists := h.clients[userID]
h.mu.RUnlock()
if exists {
currentChID, currentJoinToken := c.getVoiceState()
if currentChID == channelID && currentJoinToken != "" && currentJoinToken == joinToken {
// Double-check voice state to guard against a concurrent voice_join
// that updated the state between the read above and clearVoiceState (L8).
if reChID, reJT := c.getVoiceState(); reChID == channelID && reJT == joinToken {
c.clearVoiceState()
if h.db != nil {
if err := leaveVoiceChannelWithRetry(ctx, h, userID, channelID, joinToken); err != nil {
slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannel exhausted retries",
"error", err, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
}
}
h.BroadcastToAll(buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
slog.Info("livekit webhook: cleaned up stale voice state",
"user_id", userID,
"channel_id", channelID)
}
} else if h.db != nil {
// Client has voiceChID=0 or moved to a different channel (e.g.
// after F5 reload), or this webhook is for an older join instance.
deleted, dbErr := h.db.LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch(userID, channelID, joinToken)
if dbErr != nil {
slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch failed (stale DB row)",
"error", dbErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
} else if deleted {
h.BroadcastToAll(buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
slog.Info("livekit webhook: cleaned stale DB voice row after reconnect",
"user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
}
}
} else if h.db != nil {
// Client already disconnected from WS — use channel-conditional delete
// to avoid wiping a newer row if the user reconnected and rejoined.
deleted, dbErr := h.db.LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch(userID, channelID, joinToken)
if dbErr != nil {
slog.Error("livekit webhook: LeaveVoiceChannelIfMatch failed (client gone)",
"error", dbErr, "user_id", userID, "channel_id", channelID)
} else if deleted {
h.BroadcastToAll(buildVoiceLeave(channelID, userID))
}
}
}
// MountWebhookRoute is a helper for the router to mount the webhook endpoint.
func MountWebhookRoute(h *Hub, apiKey, apiSecret string) http.HandlerFunc {
return h.NewLiveKitWebhookHandler(apiKey, apiSecret)
}