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https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF.git
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Validate RFC 3161 document timestamps and expose timestamping (#7095)
# Description of Changes Fixes timestamp issue and adds timestamp to the signing/security policiy --- ## Checklist ### General - [ ] I have read the [Contribution Guidelines](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) - [ ] I have read the [Stirling-PDF Developer Guide](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/DeveloperGuide.md) (if applicable) - [ ] I have read the [How to add new languages to Stirling-PDF](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/devGuide/HowToAddNewLanguage.md) (if applicable) - [ ] I have performed a self-review of my own code - [ ] My changes generate no new warnings ### Documentation - [ ] I have updated relevant docs on [Stirling-PDF's doc repo](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-Tools.github.io/blob/main/docs/) (if functionality has heavily changed) - [ ] I have read the section [Add New Translation Tags](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/devGuide/HowToAddNewLanguage.md#add-new-translation-tags) (for new translation tags only) ### Translations (if applicable) - [ ] I ran [`scripts/counter_translation.py`](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/docs/counter_translation.md) ### UI Changes (if applicable) - [ ] Screenshots or videos demonstrating the UI changes are attached (e.g., as comments or direct attachments in the PR) ### Testing (if applicable) - [ ] I have run `task check` to verify linters, typechecks, and tests pass - [ ] I have tested my changes locally. Refer to the [Testing Guide](https://github.com/Stirling-Tools/Stirling-PDF/blob/main/DeveloperGuide.md#7-testing) for more details.
This commit is contained in:
Anthony Stirling
+66
-6
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ import org.bouncycastle.cms.CMSSignedData;
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import org.bouncycastle.cms.SignerInformation;
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import org.bouncycastle.cms.SignerInformationStore;
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import org.bouncycastle.cms.jcajce.JcaSimpleSignerInfoVerifierBuilder;
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import org.bouncycastle.operator.jcajce.JcaDigestCalculatorProviderBuilder;
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import org.bouncycastle.tsp.TimeStampToken;
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import org.bouncycastle.tsp.TimeStampTokenInfo;
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import org.bouncycastle.util.Store;
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import org.springframework.http.MediaType;
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import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
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@@ -54,6 +57,9 @@ public class ValidateSignatureController {
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private final CustomPDFDocumentFactory pdfDocumentFactory;
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private final CertificateValidationService certValidationService;
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/** PDF sub-filter identifying an RFC 3161 document timestamp (PAdES-LTV). */
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private static final String SUBFILTER_RFC3161 = "ETSI.RFC3161";
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@InitBinder
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public void initBinder(WebDataBinder binder) {
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binder.registerCustomEditor(
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@@ -128,8 +134,35 @@ public class ValidateSignatureController {
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byte[] signedContent = sig.getSignedContent(file.getInputStream());
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byte[] signatureBytes = sig.getContents(file.getInputStream());
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CMSProcessable content = new CMSProcessableByteArray(signedContent);
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CMSSignedData signedData = new CMSSignedData(content, signatureBytes);
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// An RFC 3161 document timestamp (PAdES-LTV) carries its signed content
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// *inside* the CMS - a TSTInfo - rather than being detached over the document.
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// Building it as detached digests the ByteRange against an attribute that
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// covers the TSTInfo, which can never match.
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boolean isDocTimeStamp = SUBFILTER_RFC3161.equals(sig.getSubFilter());
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CMSSignedData signedData;
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if (isDocTimeStamp) {
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signedData = new CMSSignedData(signatureBytes);
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} else {
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CMSProcessable content = new CMSProcessableByteArray(signedContent);
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signedData = new CMSSignedData(content, signatureBytes);
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}
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// What actually binds a timestamp to this document: the TSTInfo's message
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// imprint must equal the digest of the signed byte range. Without this check a
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// valid timestamp token for some *other* document would verify happily here.
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Date timeStampGenTime = null;
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if (isDocTimeStamp) {
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TimeStampToken token = new TimeStampToken(signedData);
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TimeStampTokenInfo info = token.getTimeStampInfo();
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timeStampGenTime = info.getGenTime();
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if (!timestampCoversContent(info, signedContent)) {
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result.setValid(false);
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result.setErrorMessage(
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"Timestamp message imprint does not match the document");
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results.add(result);
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continue;
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}
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}
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Store<X509CertificateHolder> certStore = signedData.getCertificates();
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SignerInformationStore signerStore = signedData.getSignerInfos();
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@@ -162,7 +195,15 @@ public class ValidateSignatureController {
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CertificateValidationService.ValidationTime validationTimeResult =
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certValidationService.extractValidationTime(signerInfo);
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Date validationTime;
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if (validationTimeResult == null) {
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if (timeStampGenTime != null) {
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// The TSA's own asserted time is the authoritative one here, and is
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// exactly what makes the signature verifiable after the cert expires.
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validationTime = timeStampGenTime;
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// Distinct from "timestamp", which CertificateValidationService already
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// uses for a signature countersigned by a TSA. Both are RFC 3161, but
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// one attests a signature and the other attests the whole document.
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result.setValidationTimeSource("document-timestamp");
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} else if (validationTimeResult == null) {
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validationTime = new Date();
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result.setValidationTimeSource("current");
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} else {
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@@ -235,10 +276,13 @@ public class ValidateSignatureController {
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// Set basic signature info
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result.setSignerName(sig.getName());
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// A DocTimeStamp has no /M entry; its date is the TSA's genTime.
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result.setSignatureDate(
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sig.getSignDate() != null
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? sig.getSignDate().getTime().toString()
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: null);
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timeStampGenTime != null
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? timeStampGenTime.toString()
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: sig.getSignDate() != null
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? sig.getSignDate().getTime().toString()
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: null);
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result.setReason(sig.getReason());
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result.setLocation(sig.getLocation());
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@@ -301,4 +345,20 @@ public class ValidateSignatureController {
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return ResponseEntity.ok(results);
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}
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/**
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* True when the timestamp token was issued over exactly these bytes.
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*
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* <p>The digest algorithm is taken from the token rather than assumed, because a TSA chooses it
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* - assuming SHA-256 would silently fail against any TSA that uses something else.
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*/
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private static boolean timestampCoversContent(TimeStampTokenInfo info, byte[] signedContent)
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throws Exception {
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org.bouncycastle.operator.DigestCalculator digest =
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new JcaDigestCalculatorProviderBuilder().build().get(info.getHashAlgorithm());
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try (java.io.OutputStream out = digest.getOutputStream()) {
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out.write(signedContent);
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}
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return java.util.Arrays.equals(digest.getDigest(), info.getMessageImprintDigest());
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}
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}
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+91
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
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package stirling.software.SPDF.controller.api.security;
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import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
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import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any;
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import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
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import java.io.IOException;
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import java.io.InputStream;
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import java.util.List;
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import org.apache.pdfbox.Loader;
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import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
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import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
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import org.springframework.core.io.ClassPathResource;
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import org.springframework.mock.web.MockMultipartFile;
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import stirling.software.SPDF.model.api.security.SignatureValidationRequest;
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import stirling.software.SPDF.model.api.security.SignatureValidationResult;
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import stirling.software.SPDF.service.CertificateValidationService;
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import stirling.software.common.model.ApplicationProperties;
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import stirling.software.common.service.CustomPDFDocumentFactory;
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/**
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* Validation of RFC 3161 document timestamps (PAdES-LTV).
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*
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* <p>These fixtures are a real PDF stamped by a real public TSA (freetsa.org). Before this was
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* handled explicitly, every such timestamp was reported invalid: a DocTimeStamp's CMS encapsulates
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* a TSTInfo rather than being detached over the document, so digesting the byte range compared
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* against the wrong thing and always mismatched. That made the timestamp feature look broken to
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* anyone who checked their own output with our validator.
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*/
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class DocumentTimestampValidationTest {
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private ValidateSignatureController controller;
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@BeforeEach
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void setUp() throws Exception {
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CertificateValidationService certValidationService =
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new CertificateValidationService(null, new ApplicationProperties());
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CustomPDFDocumentFactory factory = org.mockito.Mockito.mock(CustomPDFDocumentFactory.class);
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// Delegate to the real loader so the signature dictionary is parsed as in production.
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when(factory.load(any(InputStream.class)))
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.thenAnswer(
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invocation ->
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Loader.loadPDF(
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((InputStream) invocation.getArgument(0)).readAllBytes()));
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controller = new ValidateSignatureController(factory, certValidationService);
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}
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@Test
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void aGenuineDocumentTimestampValidates() throws Exception {
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SignatureValidationResult result = validate("timestamp/doc-timestamped.pdf");
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assertThat(result.isValid()).isTrue();
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assertThat(result.getErrorMessage()).isNull();
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// The TSA's asserted time is what keeps the signature verifiable once the signing
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// certificate expires, so it must be the time we validate against.
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// Deliberately not "timestamp" - that value already means "signature countersigned by a
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// TSA", which is a different assertion about a different thing.
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assertThat(result.getValidationTimeSource()).isEqualTo("document-timestamp");
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assertThat(result.getSignatureDate()).isNotNull();
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assertThat(result.getSubjectDN()).contains("freetsa.org");
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assertThat(result.isCoversEntireDocument()).isTrue();
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}
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@Test
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void aTamperedDocumentFailsTheMessageImprintCheck() throws Exception {
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// Same file with a single byte flipped inside the signed range. Without the imprint check
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// the CMS signature over the TSTInfo would still verify happily - the token is untouched -
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// and a modified document would be reported as validly timestamped.
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SignatureValidationResult result = validate("timestamp/doc-timestamped-tampered.pdf");
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assertThat(result.isValid()).isFalse();
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assertThat(result.getErrorMessage())
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.isEqualTo("Timestamp message imprint does not match the document");
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}
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private SignatureValidationResult validate(String resource) throws IOException {
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byte[] bytes;
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try (InputStream in = new ClassPathResource(resource).getInputStream()) {
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bytes = in.readAllBytes();
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}
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SignatureValidationRequest request = new SignatureValidationRequest();
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request.setFileInput(
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new MockMultipartFile("fileInput", "doc.pdf", "application/pdf", bytes));
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List<SignatureValidationResult> results = controller.validateSignature(request).getBody();
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assertThat(results).hasSize(1);
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return results.get(0);
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}
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}
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Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
@@ -7475,6 +7475,10 @@ label = "Redact sensitive information"
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desc = "Removes hidden JavaScript so nothing can run automatically when the document is opened."
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label = "Strip active content"
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[portal.policies.wizard.capability.timestampPdf]
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desc = "Proves the document existed in this exact form at a point in time, using an independent timestamp authority. Only a hash is sent - the document never leaves your server."
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label = "Add a trusted timestamp"
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[portal.policies.wizard.capability.watermark]
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desc = "Stamps a visible mark (e.g. “Confidential”) across every page."
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label = "Apply a watermark"
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ export interface SignatureValidationBackendResult {
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coversEntireDocument?: boolean | null; // false = content appended after signing
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revocationChecked?: boolean | null;
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revocationStatus?: string | null; // "not-checked" | "good" | "revoked" | "soft-fail" | "unknown"
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validationTimeSource?: string | null; // "current" | "signing-time" | "timestamp"
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validationTimeSource?: string | null; // "current" | "signing-time" | "timestamp" | "document-timestamp"
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signerName?: string | null;
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signatureDate?: string | null;
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reason?: string | null;
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@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ export interface SignatureValidationSignature {
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coversEntireDocument?: boolean | null; // false = content appended after signing
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revocationChecked?: boolean | null;
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revocationStatus?: string | null; // "not-checked" | "good" | "revoked" | "soft-fail" | "unknown"
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validationTimeSource?: string | null; // "current" | "signing-time" | "timestamp"
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validationTimeSource?: string | null; // "current" | "signing-time" | "timestamp" | "document-timestamp"
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signerName: string;
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signatureDate: string;
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reason: string;
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@@ -114,6 +114,14 @@ const CAPABILITY_META: Record<
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descEn:
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"Removes hidden JavaScript so nothing can run automatically when the document is opened.",
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},
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timestampPdf: {
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labelKey: "portal.policies.wizard.capability.timestampPdf.label",
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labelEn: "Add a trusted timestamp",
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descKey: "portal.policies.wizard.capability.timestampPdf.desc",
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descEn:
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"Proves the document existed in this exact form at a point in time, using an independent timestamp authority. Only a hash is sent - the document never leaves your server.",
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},
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watermark: {
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labelKey: "portal.policies.wizard.capability.watermark.label",
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labelEn: "Apply a watermark",
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@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ describe("POLICY_OPERATIONS", () => {
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"ocr",
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"redact",
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"sanitize",
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"timestampPdf",
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"watermark",
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]);
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for (const id of ALL_TOOL_IDS) {
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
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import { describeToolOperation } from "@app/hooks/tools/shared/toolOperationDescriptor";
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import { redactOperationConfig } from "@app/hooks/tools/redact/useRedactOperation";
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import { sanitizeOperationConfig } from "@app/hooks/tools/sanitize/useSanitizeOperation";
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import { timestampPdfOperationConfig } from "@app/hooks/tools/timestampPdf/useTimestampPdfOperation";
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import { addWatermarkOperationConfig } from "@app/hooks/tools/addWatermark/useAddWatermarkOperation";
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import { ocrOperationConfig } from "@app/hooks/tools/ocr/useOCROperation";
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import { flattenOperationConfig } from "@app/hooks/tools/flatten/useFlattenOperation";
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@@ -53,6 +54,12 @@ export const POLICY_OPERATIONS = {
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"/api/v1/security/sanitize-pdf",
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sanitizeOperationConfig,
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),
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// RFC 3161 timestamp. Already a SISO tool; surfacing it here is what makes a signature durable
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// in a pipeline (PAdES-LTV), and only a SHA-256 hash reaches the TSA - never the document.
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timestampPdf: describeToolOperation(
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"/api/v1/security/timestamp-pdf",
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timestampPdfOperationConfig,
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),
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watermark: describeToolOperation(
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"/api/v1/security/add-watermark",
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addWatermarkOperationConfig,
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