ConnorYohandReece Browne df170fd4a6 feat(storage): encryption-at-rest ops — audit, admin kill switch, migration, key rotation (PR2) (#7173)
# Description of Changes

**PR2 of the encrypt-at-rest initiative — PR1 was #7155** Makes the P1
crypto operable and compliance-credible: admins can see the feature's
state, flip the kill switch over an API instead of raw SQL, encrypt the
pre-existing plaintext backlog, rotate the master key, and every
security-relevant event lands in the audit trail. No frontend — that's
PR3.

**What was changed**

- **Audit events** — new `STORAGE_ENCRYPTION` audit type, emitted
through a small listener interface so the crypto classes stay plain
objects: `encrypt`, `decrypt` (per-read events honour
`storage.encryption.auditReads`, default **on** — HIPAA reviewers expect
read audit; busy installs can disable), `decrypt.denied` (always),
`key.created/disabled/enabled`, `master.rotated`, `migration.completed`,
plus a `plaintextExport` marker whenever a plaintext copy of
encrypted-at-rest content is served (with `inline` flag to distinguish
in-app view from saved download).
- **Admin API** `/api/v1/admin/storage-encryption` (`hasRole('ADMIN')`):
- `GET /status` — write/decrypt state, **master-key fingerprint**
(SHA-256 prefix for backup verification, never key material), encrypted
vs plaintext file counts, full key list with status history.
- `POST /keys/{id}/disable` / `enable` — the kill switch, now with
active cache invalidation so revocation is immediate on the handling
node (cross-node converges within the 60s cache TTL). Enable is
restricted to DISABLED keys so two ACTIVE keys can't exist per scope.
  - `POST /migrate` + `GET /migrate/status` — encrypt-existing job.
- `POST /master/rotate` — key material is never accepted over HTTP; keys
come from config/env.
- **Deliberately no delete endpoint** — key material can be disabled but
never destroyed through the API.
- **Encrypt-existing migration job** — new writes are encrypted from the
moment the flag is on; this converts the backlog. Crash-safe per file:
store the encrypted copy under a NEW storage key → compare-and-swap the
DB row → only then delete the old blob. A CAS miss (user replaced the
file mid-run) discards the job's copy — the user's file always wins.
Worst crash outcome is an orphaned blob, never a lost file; re-runs are
idempotent (`encryption_key_id IS NULL` selection, cursor-paged so
failures can't wedge the loop). Handles all three blobs per row
(main/history/audit-log), runs on a throttled virtual thread,
single-flight guarded.
- **Master-key rotation** — cheap by design thanks to the P1 hierarchy:
rotate re-wraps the handful of KEK rows, zero file I/O. New config
`stirling.security.fileEncryptionKeyPrevious` (+env) gives `unwrap` a
fallback during rotation, and
`stirling.security.fileEncryptionKeyVersion` marks which master wrapped
each row. Runbook: set new key primary + old as previous + bump version
→ restart (startup self-check passes via fallback, warns about pending
rows) → `POST /master/rotate` → remove the previous key.
- **Shared state bean** — `StorageEncryptionState` is built once and
shared by the storage decorator and the admin API, so kill-switch cache
invalidation hits the same caches the decorator reads.

**Reviewer notes**

- The revoked→403 mapping promised for PR2 already landed in #7155 after
manual testing; this PR adds the matching `decrypt.denied` audit event.
- 19 new tests: audit emission (encrypt/decrypt/denied, legacy plaintext
emits nothing), kill-switch immediacy (no TTL wait), rotation
(previous-key fallback, re-wrap + cleanup, idempotent second call),
migration (backlog encrypted byte-identical, CAS-miss discards own copy,
per-file failure counting, concurrent-start rejection, write-disabled
rejection), admin controller status/conflict/not-found paths.
- Full proprietary suite: 2246/2247 green (the one failure is the
pre-existing Windows-symlink FolderIdentitiesTest, unrelated).

---


[ENCRYPTION_AT_REST_TEST_REPORT.html](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/30664158/ENCRYPTION_AT_REST_TEST_REPORT.html)

---------

Co-authored-by: Reece Browne <74901996+reecebrowne@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-11 12:01:58 +00:00
2026-07-24 09:37:10 +00:00
2026-07-11 12:48:53 +01:00
2026-03-25 11:00:40 +00:00
2026-07-17 10:16:06 +00:00
2026-03-25 11:00:40 +00:00

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