mirror of
https://github.com/J3vb/OwnCord.git
synced 2026-09-03 03:50:00 +03:00
Applies fixes for 20 adversarially-verified findings from a whole-codebase security review (server side). All Go build-tag variants build, `go vet` is clean, and the suite passes (the sole failing test, ws TestEmitEvents, is a pre-existing nil-harness failure unrelated to these changes). High severity: - auth: close TOCTOU in TOTP verify rate-limit by recording each attempt atomically up-front (was Check-then-Allow), restoring the per-user brute-force cap. - plugin: enforce the CPU/time budget on every WASM guest call via a WithTimeout context (WithCloseOnContextDone interrupts runaways); the configured budget was previously parsed but never applied. - api/waf: inspect request bodies for chunked (ContentLength==-1) requests so the SQLi/XSS/RCE body rules can no longer be bypassed. - ws: rate-limit voice_join/voice_leave and voice_e2ee announce/offer, which fan out to every participant and could force mass disconnects. Medium severity: - api: run bcrypt on the unknown-user login path (no || short-circuit) to remove the timing-based username-enumeration oracle. - ws: verify LiveKit webhooks via the SDK receiver so the signature is bound to the body hash (kills forgery/replay). - authz: require READ_MESSAGES for reactions and for plugin-command broadcasts; route the latter through RequireChannelAccess. - api: cache the client-update signature fetch and rate-limit the endpoint. - service: propagate DeleteOtherSessions failure from ChangePassword instead of silently reporting success. - api: trust the rightmost non-proxy X-Forwarded-For entry, not the client-controllable leftmost one. - plugin: route auto-registered commands through the conflict-checked RegisterCommand; pin the DNS-validated IP for host_http dials (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU). - api: mark access-controlled downloads private/no-cache + Vary: Origin. Low severity: - auth: fail closed when a fully-shaped TOTP ciphertext fails GCM auth (was returning the ciphertext as plaintext). - api: apply the livekit-proxy path allowlist to WebSocket upgrades too. - service: verify attachment ownership before linking (IDOR). - admin: bound the bootstrap setup invite (5 uses / 24h); re-verify the update binary hash immediately before rename+spawn (TOCTOU). - service: require BanMembers + role hierarchy for moderation ban/unban. chore: stop tracking the stray Server/owncord-server.exe build artifact. Test infra: add uploader_id to the hand-rolled ws test attachment schemas and make MemStore.GetAttachmentByID a no-op lookup, matching production/DB behavior. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
101 lines
3.0 KiB
Go
101 lines
3.0 KiB
Go
// Package api provides the HTTP router and handlers for the OwnCord server.
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//
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// client_update.go serves Tauri-compatible update metadata so the desktop
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// client can check for new versions and self-update.
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package api
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import (
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"github.com/owncord/server/updater"
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"golang.org/x/mod/semver"
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)
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// tauriPlatformResponse is the per-platform entry in the Tauri updater JSON.
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type tauriPlatformResponse struct {
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Signature string `json:"signature"`
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URL string `json:"url"`
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}
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// tauriUpdateResponse is the JSON shape the Tauri updater plugin expects.
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type tauriUpdateResponse struct {
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Version string `json:"version"`
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Notes string `json:"notes,omitempty"`
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PubDate string `json:"pub_date,omitempty"`
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Platforms map[string]tauriPlatformResponse `json:"platforms"`
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}
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// MountClientUpdateRoute adds the unauthenticated client-update endpoint.
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// The route is outside the auth middleware because the client needs to check
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// for updates before (or without) logging in.
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func MountClientUpdateRoute(r chi.Router, u *updater.Updater) {
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r.Get("/api/v1/client-update/{target}/{current_version}", handleClientUpdate(u))
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}
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func handleClientUpdate(u *updater.Updater) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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target := chi.URLParam(r, "target")
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currentVersion := chi.URLParam(r, "current_version")
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if target == "" || currentVersion == "" {
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http.Error(w, "missing target or current_version", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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info, err := u.CheckForUpdate(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "failed to check for updates", http.StatusBadGateway)
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return
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}
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// Compare versions — return 204 if no update available.
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cv := ensureV(currentVersion)
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lv := ensureV(info.Latest)
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if semver.Compare(cv, lv) >= 0 {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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// Find the .nsis.zip and .nsis.zip.sig assets from the release.
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clientAssets := u.FindClientAssets()
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nsisURL := clientAssets.InstallerURL
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sigURL := clientAssets.SignatureURL
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if nsisURL == "" || sigURL == "" {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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// Fetch the signature file content (small text file). Cached with the
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// same TTL as the release info so this unauthenticated endpoint does not
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// perform an outbound fetch on every request (DoS hardening).
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sigContent, err := u.FetchTextAssetCached(r.Context(), sigURL)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "failed to fetch signature", http.StatusBadGateway)
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return
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}
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resp := tauriUpdateResponse{
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Version: strings.TrimPrefix(info.Latest, "v"),
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Notes: info.ReleaseNotes,
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Platforms: map[string]tauriPlatformResponse{
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target: {
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Signature: strings.TrimSpace(sigContent),
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URL: nsisURL,
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},
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},
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
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}
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}
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// ensureV returns a version string with a "v" prefix for semver comparison.
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func ensureV(v string) string {
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if strings.HasPrefix(v, "v") {
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return v
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}
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return "v" + v
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}
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